

FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1878-1885

BY
ROBERT H. WIENEFELD


A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns
Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
1929

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PREFACE

The writer has attempted to give an account of the relations between France and Germany from 1878 to 1885. This period, in contrast with previous years, was one of good relations between the two countries.

Some of the results derived from this study seem to be:

Good relations between the two countries became possible with the fall of the ultramontane-royalist government and the accession of a conservative republican ministry in France.

Germany manifested her friendly feeling towards France during the time of the Congress of Berlin, and in the settlements made in pursuance of the Treaty of Berlin.

Prince Bismarck having adopted the policy of isolating France effectively by means of his system of alliances with Austria, Russia, and Italy, the German government cultivated more friendly relations with France by assisting her to begin a spirited colonial policy, at the Conference of Madrid in 1880 and in the affair of Tunis in 1881.

The tendency of the two governments to act together, especially in the affairs by means of which France sought to further her colonial ambitions, became strongest during the second ministry of Jules Ferry—from February, 1883, to March, 1885.

The respective grievances of France and Germany against Great Britain on account of affairs in Egypt and West Africa served to strengthen the good understanding between Paris and Berlin.

The bases of the Franco-German entente were rudely shaken by the resignation of the ministry of Jules Ferry in March, 1885, and the restoration of friendly Anglo-German relations through the efforts of the Conservative ministry of Lord Salisbury in June, 1885.

In the preparation of this study the author has made use of the great mass of printed diplomatic documents rendered available by the European powers, as well as the numerous memoirs, letters, and biographies of the chief participants in European affairs. Particular attention has also been paid to the proceedings in the legislative chambers in France, Germany, and Great Britain, and to contemporary periodicals and newspapers.

This study was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor

Edward Raymond Turner, who, by his valuable advice and helpful criticism, aided the writer in bringing the work to a conclusion. The author is under deep obligation to Professor John H. Latané for his constant encouragement and assistance in the field of historical research. Acknowledgment must also be made to Dr. Charles C. Tansill, formerly of the Legislative Reference Service, for his invaluable aid at the Library of Congress; and to Dr. H. Lee Bowen of Rice Institute, for frequent criticisms and suggestions.

R. H. W.

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FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1878-1885

CHAPTER I

THE YEARS AFTER THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT

The Franco-German war had not been in progress very long before it became patent that a great change in Europe would result from the conflict. Suddenly there arose a united Germany, and just as quickly there disappeared the second French Empire. Napoleon III was a captive; Paris capitulated January 28, 1871;¹ nothing remained but to make peace. An armistice was concluded with the victorious Germans,² and February 8 a national assembly was elected to decide whether the war should be continued or upon what conditions peace should be made.³ This constituent body met at Bordeaux, electing an eminent statesman, Adolphe Thiers, as the "head of the executive power of the French Republic."⁴ Realizing that peace was a necessity for the new republic, Thiers and his minister of foreign affairs, Jules Favre, signed a preliminary treaty of peace, February 26, with the German plenipotentiaries.⁵ During the next few months the French government was busy suppressing the Commune,⁶ and negotiating

¹ Jules Simon, *Le Gouvernement de M. Thiers*, I, 1; Jules Valfrey, *Histoire de la Diplomatie du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale*, III, 87-89; Gabriel Hanotaux, *Histoire de la France Contemporaine*, I, 21.

² Jules Favre, *Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale*, II, chap. vi; Albert Sorel, *Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, II, chap. vi; Simon, I, 1; Valfrey, III, 89-99; Hanotaux, I, 21.

³ Favre, III, 46-47; Simon, I, 45; Hanotaux, I, 29.

⁴ *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, 1871, p. 110. This will be cited hereafter as *Journal Officiel*. Simon, I, 67-69; Favre, III, 76-79; Hanotaux, I, 61-67.

⁵ Sorel, II, 231-250; Simon, I, 125-130; Favre, III, 89-120; Hanotaux, I, 105-124; *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, 1871-1914, I, 1-6. This source will be cited as *Grosse Politik*.

⁶ Favre, III, chap. v; Simon, I, chap. vi; Hanotaux, I, chap. iii. An exhaustive study of these turbulent days has been made by Edmond Lepelletier, *Histoire de la Commune de 1871*.

a definitive treaty of peace with the Germans. Such a treaty was signed May 10, 1871.⁷

Negotiations were now undertaken in order to execute the treaty of peace. At Frankfort numerous details arising out of the treaty were being regulated,⁸ a joint commission was proceeding with the delimitation of the frontier,⁹ and preparations were being made to pay the indemnity. The latter, of course, was a very important question, for the evacuation of French territory depended upon it.¹⁰ It therefore became imperative for the two governments to resume diplomatic relations, but at the same time was recognized the impossibility of accrediting ambassadors. Accordingly, Thiers and Bismarck agreed to exchange chargés d'affaires, the former entrusting the French embassy in Berlin to Marquis Joseph Jules de Gabriac,¹¹ and the latter nominating General Alfred von Waldersee to represent Germany at Versailles.¹² The presence of German troops in France also gave rise to many difficulties which required immediate solution, causing the French government to choose Comte Charles Raymond de Saint-Vallier, the former French minister at Stuttgart, as minister plenipotentiary to the German headquarters at Compiègne.¹³

Soon after the arrival of Waldersee in Paris negotiations began for the payment of the first five hundred million

⁷ Grosse Politik, I, chap. i; Valfrey, I, chaps. i-iii; Sorel, II, chap. ix; Favre, III, chap. vi; Simon, II, 105-109; Hanotaux, I, 265-285.

⁸ Hanotaux, I, 288-289.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 289-291. A member of the delimitation commission has written an interesting account of his experiences while carrying out this work. Aimé Laussedat, *La Délimitation de la Frontière Franco-Allemande*.

¹⁰ Jean Baptiste Chaudordy, *La France à la suite de la Guerre de 1870-1871*, p. 123.

¹¹ Joseph Jules de Gabriac, *Souvenirs Diplomatiques de Russie et d'Allemagne*, 110.

¹² *Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee*, I, 137; Grosse Politik, I, 49.

¹³ *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 10; Adolphe Thiers, *Notes et Souvenirs*, 228; Hanotaux, I, 312; Jules Valfrey, *Histoire du Traité de Francfort et de la Libération du Territoire Française*, I, 143. This phase of Franco-German relations is treated by Henri Doniol, M. Thiers, le Comte de Saint-Vallier et le Général Manteuffel.

francs.¹⁴ A dispute arose immediately as to when the installments were due,¹⁵ but the question was soon settled when Bismarck indulged in his customary threats of violence.¹⁶ The Germans were inclined to believe that France would have some difficulty in meeting this pecuniary obligation, but the wonderful recuperative powers of the French enabled them to pay the indemnity with surprising rapidity.¹⁷ A public subscription yielded nearly five billion francs,¹⁸ enabling Augustin Pouyer-Quertier, the French minister of finance, to meet the installment due July 1.¹⁹ Thiers and his advisers now hoped to anticipate the payments provided for in the treaty of peace, and in that manner to secure a more rapid liberation of French territory. Saint-Vallier and Pouyer-Quertier accordingly concluded a convention with General Edwin Manteuffel, the commander of the German troops in occupation, to effect this,²⁰ but Bismarck promptly disavowed the latter's action.²¹ Manteuffel, who advocated a policy of appeasement, then advised the French minister of finance to negotiate directly with the chancellor,²² and Bismarck was soon compelled by circumstances to reach an agreement with France.

The concession providing for the free passage of produce from Alsace-Lorraine to France expired September 1, 1871,²³ and the South Germans, fearing competition, desired this

¹⁴ Waldersee, I, 143.

¹⁵ Article VII of the Treaty of Frankfort provided for the payment of five hundred million francs thirty days after re-establishment of the authority of the French government in Paris. Bismarck calculated July 1 as the time of payment, while Thiers requested July 10. Grosse Politik, I, 50.

¹⁶ Waldersee, I, 143-144; Grosse Politik, I, 50-52.

¹⁷ June 6 the French government requested the authorization of the national assembly to contract a loan of two billion five hundred million francs by popular subscription. This law was voted June 20. Journal Officiel, 1871, I, 1251, 1511; Thiers, 184, 191-192.

¹⁸ Thiers, 194-195; Waldersee, I, 144; Hanotaux, I, 314.

¹⁹ Waldersee, I, 145, 146; Grosse Politik, I, 57.

²⁰ Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 36-38; II, 427-430; Hanotaux, I, 337; Waldersee, I, 149-152.

²¹ Grosse Politik, I, 61-65; Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 44; Hanotaux, I, 319.

²² Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 46-47; Waldersee, I, 153.

²³ Article IX of the Treaty of Frankfort.

agreement to be continued.²⁴ Bismarck also desired to propitiate the annexed provinces by obtaining a tariff favorable to their interests.²⁵ Thiers took advantage of this opportunity by sending his minister of finance to Berlin²⁶ in order to open negotiations with Bismarck.²⁷ Within a few days an agreement was concluded, and on October 12, 1871 conventions were signed providing for the more rapid payment of the indemnity, progressive evacuation, and the regulation of customs duties.²⁸ The journey of Pouyer-Quertier to Berlin and the signature of the conventions of October 12 brought about a happy *détente* in the relations between France and Germany.²⁹ Emperor William assured the French minister of finance that he had made a favorable impression in Germany and expressed complete confidence in the French government.³⁰ Bismarck, too, was well satisfied with the convention,³¹ while in Paris public opinion was so highly gratified that the agreement was regarded as a significant diplomatic success.³²

An unhappy incident, however, indicated that mutual distrust and suspicion still prevailed in both countries. Several German soldiers had been murdered by Frenchmen, and in two instances juries acquitted them.³³ This caused bitter feeling in Germany, and Bismarck retaliated by proclaiming a state of siege in the occupied departments so that crimes com-

²⁴ Thiers, 221; Valfrey, I, 155; Hanotaux, I, 319.

²⁵ Gabriac, 160.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 162; Hanotaux, I, 319-320. Waldersee and his successor, Count Harry von Arnim, had already entered into negotiations with Thiers in Paris. Grosse Politik, I, 67-69.

²⁷ Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 72-81; Thiers, 223-225.

²⁸ The conventions provided for the payment of six hundred and fifty million francs by May 1, 1872, in return for the evacuation of six departments, and the continuation of the customs agreement, with some modifications, until December 31, 1872. Grosse Politik, I, 91-96.

²⁹ Gabriac, 163-164.

³⁰ Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 85.

³¹ Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, I Legislative Period, 2nd Session, 1871, I, 57.

³² Grosse Politik, I, 97-98.

³³ Gabriac, 169; Hanotaux, I, 352-353.

mitted against soldiers might be tried in military tribunals.³⁴ In a despatch to Count Harry von Arnim, the new German representative at Versailles, the chancellor deplored the fact that France had lost completely her sense of justice, remarking that the confidence which had been inspired by the negotiations with Pouyer-Quertier was now lost.³⁵ Gabriac used conciliatory language in Berlin, endeavoring to show that his government was doing everything to allay French susceptibilities.³⁶ Manteuffel was greatly vexed by Bismarck's despatch to Arnim,³⁷ and even went so far as to suggest arguments whereby the chancellor's statements could be refuted.³⁸ But within a few weeks relations again became more cordial, the two governments deciding to exchange ambassadors. Gabriac left the court of Berlin with sincere regret,³⁹ being replaced by Vicomte Élie de Gontaut-Biron;⁴⁰ and Arnim, on the other hand, was promoted from his extraordinary mission to that of German ambassador.⁴¹

The installments indicated in the convention of October 12 were met promptly by the French government,⁴² and it became apparent in the early part of 1872 that arrangements would be sought for the final payment of the remaining three billion francs. Germany was willing to evacuate the occupied territory, but she temporized because of the fear that France would not execute the treaty.⁴³ Also, the reorganization of the French army that was being effected served to increase ap-

³⁴ Grosse Politik, I, 101-103.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 103-105; Occupation et Libération du Territoire, II, 440-443.

³⁶ Gabriac, 178; Grosse Politik, I, 106.

³⁷ Occupation et Libération du Territoire, I, 104-107.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gabriac, 187-188.

⁴⁰ Élie de Gontaut-Biron, *Mon Ambassade en Allemagne*, 1872-1873, p. 4; Gabriac, 185; Journal Officiel, 1871, IV, 4781; Grosse Politik, I, 105-106. The new ambassador arrived in Berlin early in January, 1872, being well received by the German court. Gontaut-Biron, 8-20; Albert de Broglie, *L'Ambassade de M. de Gontaut-Biron à Berlin*, 7-8.

⁴¹ Grosse Politik, I, 106.

⁴² Thiers, 284-285.

⁴³ Gontaut-Biron, 62.

prehension in Berlin.⁴⁴ Thiers, being familiar with this situation, delayed opening negotiations until informed by Manteuffel that it would be advantageous for France to do so.⁴⁵ Gontaut-Biron was then instructed to begin conversations with Bismarck,⁴⁶ but he could make no progress.⁴⁷ The arrival of the German ambassador in Paris early in May 1872 then⁴⁸ caused Thiers himself to undertake negotiations.⁴⁹ Arnim suggested certain proposals to Thiers,⁵⁰ which the latter accepted,⁵¹ but Bismarck was not disposed to treat for the payment of the three billions.⁵²

While Thiers was endeavoring to make arrangements for the payment of the indemnity the national assembly continued its discussion of army reorganization.⁵³ Gontaut-Biron informed him that negotiations were retarded by the military party in Germany,⁵⁴ and Manteuffel warned Saint-Vallier that mistrust

⁴⁴ Thiers endeavored to convince Bismarck that the army reorganization was only meant to assure France her position in the council of nations (*Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 140-141; Gontaut-Biron, 68), but Bismarck refused to credit such an explanation. *Grosse Politik*, I, 109-110. The emperor, too, was unwilling to evacuate French territory until the new fortifications in Alsace-Lorraine were completed. Thiers, 288.

⁴⁵ *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 246.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 251; Gontaut-Biron, 92.

⁴⁷ *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 283-284, 289-300, 314.

⁴⁸ Arnim had received leave of absence in order to present his letters of recall at Rome, since he represented Prussia at that court when he was named to the Paris mission.

⁴⁹ *Grosse Politik*, I, 112-113.

⁵⁰ The German ambassador suggested methods whereby the three billion francs could be raised in France (Thiers, 294), but it appears that he made them upon his own authority.

⁵¹ *Grosse Politik*, I, 120-124; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 335; Thiers, 295-296, 429-431.

⁵² At first Bismarck desired to negotiate only for the payment of one billion francs (*Grosse Politik*, I, 124), but Thiers renewed his offer to pay three billions. Six departments were occupied by German troops at the time. Thiers proposed that two of them should be evacuated after the payment of the first five hundred million francs; the evacuation of two more after the payment of the third five hundred millions; and total evacuation after the payment of the sixth installment of five hundred million francs. *Ibid.*, pp. 125-128; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 347-348; Thiers, 434.

⁵³ *Journal Officiel*, 1872, III, 3548; Hanotaux, I, 431-436.

⁵⁴ Gontaut-Biron wrote to Thiers June 3 that delay was probably due to the discord between the political and military parties in

in Berlin was increasing because of the supposed warlike tendencies of France.⁵⁵ The French government insisted that it was peacefully inclined, instructing Gontaut-Biron to express these sentiments to the emperor and his chancellor.⁵⁶ The latter were now prepared to accept Thiers' proposals,⁵⁷ and June 14 Arnim submitted a draft treaty to the French government.⁵⁸ Negotiations then progressed rapidly. Some minor changes were made in the German proposals,⁵⁹ the final convention being signed June 29, 1872 at Versailles.⁶⁰ This agreement was received with satisfaction in Germany, as it was considered a pledge for a peaceful policy in France.⁶¹ In the latter country hasty preparations were made to raise three billion francs by a public loan. After the necessary authorization was given by the national assembly ⁶²a public subscription took place July 28.⁶³ Its success was phenomenal, for the loan was oversubscribed more than thirteen times.⁶⁴ The end of the foreign occupation was now in sight.

Berlin. Bismarck, he said, desired to negotiate for the payment of the indemnity and the evacuation of France, but that he was opposed by Moltke. *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 371-372; Gontaut-Biron, 123-124. General Le Flô, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, also informed Thiers that the German military party was committed to an hostile agitation against France. Thiers, 439.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 300, 435; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 349, 351.

⁵⁶ *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 353, 369; Gontaut-Biron, 120, 122.

⁵⁷ *Grosse Politik*, I, 128-131; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 404-405; Gontaut-Biron, 129.

⁵⁸ *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, I, 420; II, 443-444; Thiers, 305, 440-442. The German proposal differed somewhat from that of the French government. It provided for the payment of the three billions by March 2, 1875, and the evacuation of two departments after the payment of each billion francs.

⁵⁹ France agreed to the German proposal, but reserved the right to obtain total evacuation in 1873 if the required payments could be made. *Grosse Politik*, I, 137; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, II, 444-447; Thiers, 306-310, 449-451.

⁶⁰ *Grosse Politik*, I, 143-146; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, II, 447-450; Thiers, 313; Gontaut-Biron, 136.

⁶¹ *Provinzial Correspondenz*, 29 June 1872. This official newspaper article is reprinted in Ludwig Hahn, *Fürst Bismarck, Sein Politisches Leben und Wirken*, II, 535.

⁶² *Journal Officiel*, 1872, IV, 4839-4843.

⁶³ Thiers, 324-325.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

In the meantime Bismarck was engaged in laying the foundation of a policy which was intended to keep France isolated. Germany and Austria were now upon friendly terms,⁶⁵ but the former also desired good relations with Russia.⁶⁶ In order to bind the three empires more closely together a meeting of the three emperors took place in Berlin in September 1872 for the purpose of discussing the European situation.⁶⁷ This meeting was regarded with uneasiness in France, for it was generally thought that the eastern powers might enter into an agreement guaranteeing their possessions.⁶⁸ Accordingly, Gontaut-Biron was instructed to ascertain whether the conference would result in anything more than an interchange of friendly assurances.⁶⁹ The French ambassador was assured by Austrian and Russian statesmen that they would not be parties to any agreement directed against France,⁷⁰ and this proved to be substantially true.⁷¹ The chief result of the interview was that it paved the way for common action on the part of the three empires in the frequent European complications that arose.

⁶⁵ A period of intimate relations between Austria and Germany began in 1871 when Count Julius Andr ssy was made minister of foreign affairs in the former country. In the same year the two emperors met at Ischl in order to renew their friendship.

⁶⁶ Adolph Dechamps, a Belgian statesman of this period, was of the opinion that Bismarck had several motives in promoting good relations between the three empires. They were: to destroy the dreams of French revenge by preventing an alliance with Austria or Russia; to discourage the particularism of Bavaria and South Germany, which had always looked towards Austria for support; to lessen the resistance of German Catholics by showing them they had been abandoned by Austria; and to bring Germany out of the isolation into which she had fallen by reason of her last two wars. Adolph Dechamps, *Le Prince de Bismarck et l'Entrevue des Trois Empereurs*, 13-14, 19.

⁶⁷ *Grosse Politik*, I, 197-200.

⁶⁸ Broglie, 40-44; Eduard von Wertheimer, *Graf Julius Andr ssy, Sein Leben und Seine Zeit*, II, 66.

⁶⁹ Gontaut-Biron, 154; Broglie, 44.

⁷⁰ Broglie, 47-48.

⁷¹ No written agreement was concluded by the chancellors of the three empires (*Grosse Politik*, I, 201, 202; Wertheimer, II, 72), but current European problems were discussed by them. For additional information see: *The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus*, second series, II, 34-36; Wertheimer, II, 74-75; Gontaut-Biron, 157.

The success of the French loan enabled Thiers to anticipate the installments regulated by the convention of June 29, 1872, and made him eager to cancel the fourth and fifth billions.⁷² In Germany, however, the feeling prevailed that the question should be dealt with cautiously on account of Thiers' constitutional struggle with the monarchists in France.⁷³ Notwithstanding this the French government opened conversations with Arnim, proposing to pay the fourth billion in May 1873 and the fifth in September of the same year, in return for German evacuation beginning in June.⁷⁴ The German ambassador recommended this proposal to his government,⁷⁵ and the chancellor, after some hesitation,⁷⁶ indicated his willingness to negotiate with France.⁷⁷ Accordingly he proposed that the fourth billion should be paid by May 10, 1873, and the fifth by September 1 of the same year, in return for which Germany guaranteed to evacuate the four remaining departments in July, retaining Belfort until the final payments

⁷² Thiers, 381. Gontaut-Biron was accordingly instructed to open negotiations in Berlin. *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, II, 159-160; Gontaut-Biron, 236.

⁷³ Gontaut-Biron, 236-237; *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, II, 184-185. When the national assembly met in February 1871 it was generally agreed that the existing government was provisional, but Thiers soon became convinced that a conservative republic alone was feasible. For this reason he recommended that the national assembly should vote the necessary measures. *Journal Officiel*, 1872, VI, 6981; Thiers, 348; Broglie, 52. Long debates ensued, culminating in the adoption of a motion which provided that a commission should formulate a bill to regulate "the attributes of public powers and the conditions of ministerial responsibility." *Journal Officiel*, 1872, VI, 7387, 7416-7417. The majority of this commission favored a monarchical restoration, and Thiers entered into a long struggle with it in order to gain a republican victory. These events were regarded with much uneasiness in Germany (Gontaut-Biron, 225), causing the French ambassador to request the commission to come to some agreement with the president. Broglie, 75. The German emperor also advised the French to compose their differences if they desired to gain a hearing in Germany. *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁷⁴ *Grosse Politik*, I, 166-168; Thiers, 382-383.

⁷⁵ *Grosse Politik*, I, 169, 171-172.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 174. Thiers and the commission of thirty came to an agreement by the end of February 1873, causing the former to negotiate more energetically with Germany. *Occupation et Libération du Territoire*, II, 234-235; Gontaut-Biron, 254-255.

had been received.⁷⁸ The latter proviso was received unfavorably by Thiers, but the chancellor simply informed him that he might "take it or leave it."⁷⁹

Bismarck soon became more conciliatory, and suggested that Belfort might be evacuated along with the other departments if some equivalent pledge, such as Toul or Verdun, was given.⁸⁰ Thiers gladly accepted the substitution of Verdun for Belfort,⁸¹ authorizing the French ambassador in Berlin to sign the final convention.⁸² The agreement of March 15, 1873 provided that France was to pay two billion francs by September 5, 1873; and Germany, on the other hand, was to evacuate the four remaining departments, except a zone about Verdun, beginning July 5. The latter district was to be evacuated within a fortnight after the payment of the final installment.⁸³ These obligations were performed faithfully, and on September 15 the last German troops crossed the border.⁸⁴ France again was free.

No sooner had the evacuation of the territory been accomplished when France was plunged into party strife. A recent Paris election had made the conservatives fearful of more radical tendencies,⁸⁵ and caused them to submit a parliamentary motion requesting the government to pursue a deter-

⁷⁸ Grosse Politik, I, 176-178; Thiers, 384; Gontaut-Biron, 259; Occupation et Libération du Territoire, II, 250.

⁷⁹ Grosse Politik, I, 179; Thiers, 385. Gontaut-Biron and Saint-Vallier informed the German government that the retention of Belfort was an indication of mistrust which would estrange and alarm public opinion in France, and Thiers complained that such a provision would injure his position at home. Thiers, 385; Grosse Politik, I, 180. Also consult: Occupation et Libération du Territoire, II, 264, 269; Thiers, 386-387; Gontaut-Biron, 268-269; Grosse Politik, I, 178-179.

⁸⁰ Grosse Politik, I, 184; Occupation et Libération du Territoire, II, 294, 297-298; Gontaut-Biron, 275-276; Thiers, 389-390.

⁸¹ Grosse Politik, I, 184; Thiers, 390; Gontaut-Biron, 281.

⁸² Occupation et Libération du Territoire, II, 321; Gontaut-Biron, 285.

⁸³ Grosse Politik, I, 186-188.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 192.

⁸⁵ Thiers had put forward his minister of foreign affairs as a candidate for the national assembly in a Paris constituency, but a schism in the republican party resulted in an overwhelming defeat. Broglie, 97; Thiers, 398-401.

mined conservative policy.⁸⁶ Debate began May 19 upon an interpellation of the Duc de Broglie,⁸⁷ terminating in an order of the day which was considered hostile to the government.⁸⁸ Thiers replied to this with his resignation,⁸⁹ and on the same day, May 24, the national assembly elected an old soldier, Marshal Edmé Patrice MacMahon, as president of the French Republic.⁹⁰ The news of Thiers' resignation was received with keen regret by the German government,⁹¹ for he was held in high esteem by the court of Berlin.⁹² Bismarck, who desired the maintenance of the republic in France,⁹³ regarded the change with misgiving.⁹⁴ The Duc de Broglie, the new French minister of foreign affairs, endeavored to assure the German government that the change of presidents had no bearing upon foreign relations,⁹⁵ and in a confidential letter to Gontaut-Biron sought to ascertain the true impression created in Germany by the conservative reaction in Paris.⁹⁶

⁸⁶ Broglie, 98-99.

⁸⁷ Journal Officiel, 1873, III, 3204.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 3316.

⁸⁹ Thiers, 410; Hanotaux, I, 616. The resignation of Thiers and its effect abroad is discussed by Henri Welschinger, "La Démission de M. Thiers," in the *Revue Bleue*, fifth series, LIV, 579-583, 620-623.

⁹⁰ Journal Officiel, 1873, III, 3320. Also see Camille Alfred de Meaux, *Souvenirs Politiques*, chap. iii.

⁹¹ Gontaut-Biron, 335.

⁹² Wertheimer, II, 93.

⁹³ The chancellor developed this theme in numerous despatches to Count von Arnim. *Grosse Politik*, I, 155-156, 157-162, 162-164, 189-191.

⁹⁴ Bismarck wrote to the German ambassador in Vienna: "Ich sehe in dem Tausch MacMahons gegen Thiers die Eintauschung eines stärkeren, militärischen, ultramontane, bündnisfähigeren Frankreich gegen ein schwächeres, civilistisches, antiklerikales, isoliertes. Thiers, durch die Opposition der Parteien, deren vereintem Angriffe er unterlegen ist, genötigt, sich auf andere Elemente zu stützen, konnte die Politik nicht befolgen, die zweifellos von einer kühlen Berechnung der französischen Interessen vorgeschrieben ist, Hand in Hand mit Rom und durch Rom mit unseren tätigsten und gefährlichsten inneren Gegnern zu gehen. MacMahon wird diesen Weg gehen können. Thiers, in inneren Kämpfen sich mit Schwierigkeit behauptend, würde keinen Bundesgenossen gefunden haben. Unter MacMahon ist Frankreich bündnisfähiger geworden; unter einer Monarchie, zu der MacMahon den Übergang bilden soll, wird es das in noch höherem Grade sein." *Grosse Politik*, I, 189 note 2.

⁹⁵ Broglie, 101; Gontaut-Biron, 347.

⁹⁶ Gontaut-Biron, 375-377; Broglie, 104-106.

Bismarck's attitude towards MacMahon was soon made clear when he refused to consider as sufficient a simple notification of the advent of the new president,⁹⁷ insisting that new credentials were necessary since those from Thiers were void.⁹⁸ After frequent diplomatic exchanges the question was settled by conforming to the wishes of the German chancellor.⁹⁹

After the election of MacMahon to the presidency the German government expected a royalist-ultramontane policy in France, and events during the summer and autumn of 1873 gave some basis for this. It seemed that the Bourbon claimant, the Comte de Chambord, would regain his throne,¹⁰⁰ but at the crucial moment he lacked the determination or the skill to effect this.¹⁰¹ At the same time the *Kulturkampf* that was being carried on by Germany caused frequent complications with France. Bismarck was attacked at home by a strong Catholic party, Pius IX frequently protested against his measures,¹⁰² and Catholic bishops in Great Britain, France, and Belgium assailed the chancellor's clerical policy.¹⁰³ The action of French bishops vexed him exceedingly, for he had already been put into an ill-humor by their mandates to the inhabitants of Lorraine.¹⁰⁴ He intended to proceed against

⁹⁷ Gontaut-Biron, 349; Broglie, 108.

⁹⁸ Grosse Politik, I, 189; Broglie, 109; Gontaut-Biron, 356.

⁹⁹ Gontaut-Biron, 358-359, 366-367; Broglie, 112. Austria and Russia supported Bismarck in order to protect the three monarchies against the possibility of recognizing a radical government in France. Grosse Politik, I, 189; Wertheimer, II, 99-100.

¹⁰⁰ Hanotaux, II, chaps. iii-v.

¹⁰¹ Broglie, 150; Meaux, chaps. iv-vi. The news of Chambord's refusal to accept the tricolor as the national emblem made Bismarck exceedingly happy. A member of the German foreign office wrote: "Ich habe ihn selten so aufgeräumt und guter Laune gesehen als nach Empfang dieser Nachricht. 'Den dummer Kerl sind wir los,' bemerkte er dazu." Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen von Joseph Maria von Radowitz, I, 282.

¹⁰² Hanotaux, II, 393.

¹⁰³ André Dreux, *Dernières Années de l'Ambassade en Allemagne de M. de Gontaut-Biron*, 5-6. The difficulties encountered by Bismarck in his struggle with the Catholic church are well described by Georges Goyau, *Bismarck et l'Église*, II, chap. vii.

¹⁰⁴ The bishop of Nancy published a pastoral letter July 26, 1873, which said in part: "Après une guerre formidable qui a desolé notre chère Lorraine et une paix désastreuse qui l'a mutilée; au lendemain du départ des soldats étrangers qui FOULAIENT depuis

the former, but in order to justify his measures he linked the efforts of the French royalists to the *Kulturkampf*, representing that the restoration of a Catholic monarchy would cause German Catholics to resist their government more strongly.¹⁰⁵ In order to avoid difficulties with Germany the French bishops were admonished by their government,¹⁰⁶ but the Germans were not altogether satisfied with a simple warning.¹⁰⁷ The Duc Louis-Charles Decazes, the new French minister of foreign affairs,¹⁰⁸ was unwilling to take legal action against the bishops as desired by Germany,¹⁰⁹ although he indicated that France was anxious to prevent such annoying incidents. When, therefore, the bishop of Périgueux issued a pastoral letter attacking the *Kulturkampf*, the French government suspended the journal that had printed it.¹¹⁰ Bismarck was apparently satisfied by such prompt action, for he dropped the question entirely.¹¹¹

The affair of the pastoral letters only served to exacerbate the ill-feeling existing between France and Germany, causing rumors of war to emanate from Paris and Berlin. Prince Henry VII Reuss, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, reported that he had learned from Russian sources that France would be ready to begin war within five or six years, and that

trois ans notre sol, qu'il sera à-propos de mêler aux chants de la délivrance les prières du repentir, et de se prosterner dans la douleur afin de se relever dans l'espérance! . . . A côté des bannières de Nancy, marcheront, douloureux souvenir, celles de nos DEUX INFORTUNÉES SOEURS, Metz et Strasburg." Valfrey, II, 200; Hanotaux, II, 285-286 note. Since the delimitation of the diocese had not yet taken place, as provided for by the Treaty of Frankfort, this letter directly affected German subjects. Diplomatic exchanges took place, and the French government informed the bishop that his action had called forth the "just susceptibilities of the German government." Grosse Politik, I, 211-224.

¹⁰⁵ Broglie, 128-129.

¹⁰⁶ Dreux, 13; Grosse Politik, I, 225-226.

¹⁰⁷ Broglie, 163-164; Dreux, 15-26; Grosse Politik, I, 227-232.

¹⁰⁸ After the failure of the proposed restoration the national assembly prolonged the powers of President MacMahon for seven years. The ministry was subsequently reorganized with Decazes as minister of foreign affairs and Broglie as minister of interior.

¹⁰⁹ Grosse Politik, I, 232-233; Broglie, 172; Dreux, 26-28.

¹¹⁰ Dreux, 29; Broglie, 176; Hanotaux, II, 399.

¹¹¹ Grosse Politik, I, 238; Broglie, 180; Dreux, 34.

she was at the time in as good condition as in 1870.¹¹² Bismarck deprecated the idea of another war with France, but indicated that Germany would consider herself threatened if French policy became subservient to the Roman curia.¹¹³ French diplomatic representatives, on the other hand, were equally disturbed by the attitude of Germany. Since 1871 the German chancellor had menaced France frequently, usually accusing her of planning a war of revenge, and endeavoring to league Catholic countries against Germany. General Adolphe-Charles Le Flô, the French ambassador to Russia, informed the tsar of this precarious state of affairs, but the latter assured him that there would be no war.¹¹⁴ British statesmen also feared the imminence of a Franco-German war,¹¹⁵ and Queen Victoria, upon the advice of George Lord Granville,¹¹⁶ made a personal appeal to the kaiser to preserve peace.¹¹⁷ The old emperor replied that he deplored

¹¹² Grosse Politik, I, 234.

¹¹³ The chancellor wrote to Reuss: "Für uns ist die Rachestimmung in Frankreich nicht erwünscht; wir haben den Ernst und die Leiden jedes Krieges, auch eines siegreichen, würdigen gelernt und sind entschlossen, denselben zu vermeiden, solange sich uns nicht die Überzeugung aufdrängt, dass er unvermeidlich ist. Diese Überzeugung würde uns dann werden, wenn die weltliche Regierung Frankreichs der politischen Leitung jenes herrschsüchtigen Priestertums anheimfiele, welches wir als den geborenen Feind des Friedens und der staatlichen Ordnung kennen. Wenn die französische Politik sich den uns feindlichen Bestrebungen der römischen Kurie dienstbar macht, so werden wir uns für bedroht erachten und auf die Abwehr Bedacht nehmen müssen. Auf andern Gebieten liegt für uns kein Grund vor, eine Störung des Friedens zu besorgen, und wir haben weder Absicht noch Bedürfnis, in die ruhige Entwicklung unsrer künftigen Beziehungen zu dem mächtigen Nachbarstaate gewaltsam einzugreifen. Es ist unser lebhaftester Wunsch, mit demselben in Frieden zu leben und wir werden kein Mittel unversucht lassen, um die französische Regierung für die gleiche Anschauung zu gewinnen." Grosse Politik, I, 235. Also see *Ibid.*, pp. 239-241.

¹¹⁴ Dreux, 41-42; Loftus, II, 92. Gorchakov, the Russian chancellor, did not attach much attention to Bismarck's threatening language, informing the British ambassador that it was probably used as a parliamentary strategem. Loftus, II, 91. For additional information see the French diplomatic correspondence revealed by Le Flô in the literary supplement of *Le Figaro*, 21 May 1887.

¹¹⁵ Lord Newton, *The Life of Lord Lyons*, II, 50-53; Edmund Fitzmaurice, *The Life of Lord Granville*, II, 114-115.

¹¹⁶ Lord Granville was secretary of state for foreign affairs in the Gladstone ministry.

¹¹⁷ *The Letters of Queen Victoria* (edited by George Earle Buckle),

having imputed to him the desire for another war, assuring the queen that he was peacefully inclined.¹¹⁸

Finally this tension was relieved,¹¹⁹ and Bismarck made more friendly relations possible by sending Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst to Paris in order to replace Arnim.¹²⁰ At the same time the pressure of home affairs turned the chancellor's attention from France. His struggle with the Catholic clergy grew more bitter; strenuous opposition was made to the army bill that he had submitted to the reichstag; and the trial of Arnim exposed him to attack from many quarters.¹²¹ Complications with other states on account of the *Kulturkampf* also arose. He requested Italy to amend the law of guarantees in order to prevent papal fulminations against Germany; he endeavored to have Belgium alter her law in order to secure the punishment of persons who encouraged German Catholics in their resistance; and he desired to bring about the recognition of General Serrano, who was leading a revolt in Spain, for the purpose of weakening a Catholic power.¹²²

second series, II, 313-314. Granville made the original draft of this letter. Fitzmaurice, II, 115-116.

¹¹⁸ The emperor replied to the queen as follows: "I expect, dear Sister, that with your sense of justice you will see that this desire for war does not arise with us in Germany, but is instigated by that cry of 'revenge' which is being continually shouted at us by France! . . . The possessors of power in France . . . are now at the head of the nation which *will* have *revanche*, and therefore these rulers are driven by public opinion, by the Press, and by other motives, to allow this cry to have its course, *more perhaps than they themselves would wish*." Buckle, II, 325-326.

¹¹⁹ Earl Russell questioned the government May 6, 1874, in the house of lords upon the peace of Europe. The Earl of Derby reviewed the relations between France and Germany, saying that "so far as immediate appearances go, there is no serious cause for apprehension of any present disturbance of the peace of Europe." Parliamentary Debates, third series, CCXVIII, 1567-1568.

¹²⁰ Denkwürdigkeiten des Fürsten zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, II, 106-107. The new ambassador left Berlin with the emperor's explicit instruction that "he desired to maintain the best possible relations with France." Ibid., p. 121.

¹²¹ The former German ambassador in Paris became involved in a dispute with Bismarck concerning the disappearance of diplomatic papers from the embassy, and December 9, 1874, his trial began in the criminal court in Berlin.

¹²² A full discussion of these incidents is to be found in Goyau, II, chap. ix. Also L'Année Politique, 1875, pp. 127-139.

The ill-success of the chancellor's clerical policy left him very vexed, and frequent illness made him more irritable and nervous.¹²³ Besides, he feared that the Catholic powers, France and Austria, would unite with Russia to form a coalition against Germany.¹²⁴ This consideration made him quite anxious to strengthen the *Dreikaiserbündnis*, endeavoring especially to cultivate more friendly relations with his eastern neighbor. A personal animus existed between Bismarck and Gorchakov,¹²⁵ but the former sent an experienced diplomat, Joseph von Radowitz, to St. Petersburg in February 1875 for the purpose of settling all outstanding differences.¹²⁶ The German representative had audience with Gorchakov¹²⁷ and Alexander II, discussing with the latter the entire field of European politics.¹²⁸ His report of these conversations was well received in Berlin, for Bülow, the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote that the differences between the two countries were now at an end.¹²⁹ Radowitz then remained in charge of the embassy until the regular German representative returned to his post.¹³⁰

¹²³ The Austrian ambassador in Berlin wrote to Count Andrassy: "Mann muss hier leben um in vollem Masse das undurchdringliche Absperrungssystem zu erfassen, welches der Reichskanzler nunmehr bereits seit sechs Jahren den fremden Diplomaten gegenüber ohne Rücksicht auf Rang und Persönlichkeit eingeführt hat." Wertheimer, II, 222.

¹²⁴ Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck, II, 194-195; Loftus, II, 125.

¹²⁵ Bismarck was disappointed moreover because Russia would not follow his lead in recognizing the Serrano government in Spain. A dispute had also arisen between the consuls of the two countries at Belgrade. For a full discussion of this see Hajo Holborn, Bismarcks Europäische Politik zu Beginn der Siebziger Jahre und die Mission Radowitz.

¹²⁶ Radowitz was also to take over the work of the German embassy, due to an injury sustained by Prince Henry VII Reuss. Radowitz, II, 297-298; Bismarck, II, 199-200; Johannes Penzler, Fürst Bismarck nach Seiner Entlassung, IV, 280. Concerning his instructions Radowitz wrote: "Ich empfang nur die Weisung, in diesem Sinne unsere laufenden Geschäfte dort zu behandeln und zu erledigen, aber keinerlei besonderen politischen Auftrag." Radowitz, I, 298.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 299; Loftus, II, 126.

¹²⁸ Radowitz, I, 299-300.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 301.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 307. Gontaut-Biron, under the date of April 25, 1875, wrote that he had been informed by a Russian woman that Rado-

Meanwhile reports from France were considered alarming by some German officials. January 11, 1875 the national assembly began discussing an army reorganization bill which was intended to create an effective force of 472,000 men in time of peace and double this number in time of war.¹²¹ This measure, along with other changes in the military system,¹²² was adopted by the assembly.¹²³ Germany watched closely this reorganization, and February 26 Bismarck wrote to Hohenlohe he had learned that German horse dealers had received an order to purchase ten thousand army mounts for France.¹²⁴ In reply to the chancellor's request for informa-

witz had gone to Russia for the purpose of offering her a free hand in the east if she would allow Germany to follow a similar policy in the west. This, it was said, had been refused by the tsar. Dreux, 359-360. General Le Flô, the French ambassador to Russia, expressed a similar view with regard to this mission, although at the time he was in France. *Le Figaro*, 21 May 1887. Numerous French writers have accepted this version, although they have given no further evidence as to the sources of their information.

When Le Flô made his revelations in the *Figaro* of May 21, 1887, Radowitz the German ambassador in Constantinople. The former asserted that Russia was offered compensations in Turkey, but that she had declined. The German government assured the Porte that such was not the case and the latter thereupon issued a *démenti* in *La Turquie*, May 26, 1887. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of June 1 and June 3, 1887, also denied Le Flô's assertions, to which the latter replied in the *Mémorial Diplomatique* of June 11, 1887. Bismarck denied the truth of the French version of the Radowitz mission at a later time (Penzler, IV, 200), and Radowitz also emphatically denied the truth of the French assertions. A recent German writer regards the Radowitz mission as entirely separate from the subsequent war scare, and this seems to be established from the new materials drawn from the German archives. Hans Plehn, *Bismarcks Auswärtige Politik nach der Reichsgründung*, 25-27.

¹²¹ *Journal Officiel*, 1875, I, 260-269, 291.

¹²² Under the law of 1872 there were 144 regular infantry regiments, each one being composed of three battalions of six companies and three additional *dépôt* companies. A regiment thus consisted of twenty-one companies of forty-eight men each. During the second reading of the army bill a reorganization was made, and adopted, that henceforth there should be four, instead of six, companies to a battalion in order to meet the requirements of modern warfare. *Ibid.*, pp. 327, 363. The same number of regiments was retained, but each was organized into fifteen companies of ninety men.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333.

¹²⁴ *Grosse Politik*, I, 245; Hohenlohe, II, 151. The chancellor informed the German ambassador in Paris: "Ich glaube nicht an

tion Hohenlohe wrote that he could find no evidence from which it could be concluded that the French government would begin a war in the near future.¹³⁵ The German military attaché in Paris likewise reported that from a military viewpoint he could not regard the measures in question as threatening, or feel compelled to recognize in them immediate warlike intentions.¹³⁶ Nevertheless the chancellor issued an order forbidding the further exportation of horses to France.¹³⁷ The German government's suspicion of French armaments was increased when the national assembly began the third reading of the army reorganization bill March 9. The reduction of the number of companies in a battalion¹³⁸ necessarily would place many officers upon the reserve list, and in order to remedy this the army commission recommended that a regiment should consist of four battalions of four companies each instead of the number provided for in the second reading of the bill.¹³⁹ This change was accepted by the minister of war, and agreed to by the national assembly without debate.¹⁴⁰ In reporting upon this change the German military attaché in Paris calculated that the new law would greatly increase the French army,¹⁴¹ but his estimates were by far too large.¹⁴² At most the changes were only prospective.

Materials were now at hand for a crisis, and it soon de-

Kriegsabsichten im nächsten Jahre, aber 10,000 Reitpferde wäre ein Aderlass, den wir noch empfinden würden, wenn wir in etwa 3 Jahren mobil zu machen hätten. . . ." *Grosse Politik*, I, 245.

¹³⁵ Hohenlohe replied: "Ich bin vollkommen der Ansicht Eurer Durchlaucht, dass ein Krieg mit Frankreich im nächsten Jahre nicht zu erwarten ist. Ebenso bestimmt glaube ich aber, dass die französische Nation den Gedanken noch keineswegs aufgegeben hat, die verlorenen Provinzen wieder zu erobern und den geminderten Kriegsrühm glänzend wieder herzustellen." *Grosse Politik*, I, 245-246.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 247. He added that it would be justifiable to prohibit the export of horses from Germany, but that it would not have a prohibitive effect upon French preparations.

¹³⁷ Dreux, 79. Also see Newton, II, 69-70.

¹³⁸ Above, note 132.

¹³⁹ *Journal Officiel*, 1875, II, 1900.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1901.

¹⁴¹ *Grosse Politik*, I, 248-249, 250-253.

¹⁴² Dreux, 80-81.

veloped. Germany was alarmed by the French military measures,¹⁴³ and France, on the other hand, feared a German attack. Decazes called to the attention of Richard Lord Lyons, the British ambassador in Paris, the recent attitude of Germany,¹⁴⁴ while several weeks later the French representative in London indicated to Edward Lord Derby disquieting symptoms of war.¹⁴⁵ The French ambassador to Russia, who at the time was in Paris upon leave of absence, was also informed of the warlike intentions of Germany, and instructed to acquaint the tsar with the situation.¹⁴⁶ Anxiety in France was redoubled when a prominent German newspaper published its famous *Krieg in Sicht* article.¹⁴⁷ Hohenlohe reported at once that the Post had caused great uneasiness in Paris,¹⁴⁸ where it was considered to set forth the opinions of

¹⁴³ Hohenlohe, II, 152, 153. Gustav Freytag, the German dramatist, wrote to General Albrecht von Stosch: "Die Franzosen haben sich durch ihre Heeresorganisation so hoch gespannt, dass sie daran zugrunde gehen oder in den nächsten Jahren losschlagen müssen. Ich glaube gar nicht, dass sie mannhaft den Krieg haben wollen, sondern dass sie leichtsinnig mit dem Gedanken spielen." Gustav Freytags Briefe an Albrecht von Stosch (herausgegeben von Hans F. Helmolt), 105.

¹⁴⁴ Newton, II, 68. Lord Lyons informed Lord Derby that Decazes was "in a greater state of alarm about the intentions of Germany than anything specific he told me seemed to warrant." Ibid., p. 70. The British minister of foreign affairs replied: "I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Decazes's anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to justify alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace." Ibid., p. 71. About the same time a prominent German, Dr. Friedrich Wilhelm Geffken, wrote to Sir Robert Morier, the British chargé d'affaires in Munich, that Bismarck was planning a bold stroke that might result in war with France. Rosslyn V. Wemyss, *Memoirs and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Robert Morier*, II, 334.

¹⁴⁵ Charles Gavard, *Un Diplôme à Londres, Lettres et Notes*, 231. Again Lord Derby expressed the opinion that he could see nothing which would disturb the peace of Europe. Ibid., p. 232.

¹⁴⁶ *Le Figaro*, 21 May 1887.

¹⁴⁷ *Berlin Post*, 8 April 1875. The writer of this article, Constantine Rössler, asserted that the passing of the constitutional laws, the army reforms, and the purchase of cavalry horses indicated that France was preparing for a war of revenge. Great consternation was caused by the following passage: "Wenn wir demnach unsere an die Spitze gestellte Frage: ist der Krieg in Sicht? beantworten sollen, so müssen wir sagen: der Krieg ist allerdings in Sicht, was aber nicht ausschliesst, dass die Wolke sich zerstreut."

¹⁴⁸ *Grosse Politik*, I, 254, 257-258.

Prince Bismarck.¹⁴⁹ Both MacMahon and Decazes expressed their surprise at the article; the former assuring the German ambassador that the army reform was not a warlike measure, while the latter reiterated the pacific intentions of France.¹⁵⁰ Great Britain and Russia also took steps to preserve peace in Europe. Gorchakov promised Le Flô that the tsar would take advantage of his prospective visit to Berlin to work in the direction of peace,¹⁵¹ and Lord Derby indicated to Count Münster, the German ambassador in London, that there was no danger of a Franco-German war unless the empire was engaged in a struggle with some other power.¹⁵² In the same manner Sir Robert Morier, the British chargé d'affaires at Munich, impressed the German crown prince with the gravity of the situation, but the latter protested that the intentions of the German government were pacific.¹⁵³

The scare caused by the Post article, however, was of short duration. The German government had been informed by its military attaché in Paris that the recent reforms would effect no great changes in the manpower of the French army,¹⁵⁴ causing the former to become somewhat re-

¹⁴⁹ At the time it was generally thought that the Post article was inspired by the German chancellor (Newton, II, 72), but documents published recently give a contrary indication. *Grosse Politik*, I, 254, 255-256. The Post, soon after the publication of the article in question, also denied that it was inspired officially or unofficially. The Times (London), 13 April, 1875. The American minister in Berlin, H. C. Bancroft Davis, wrote to secretary of state Hamilton Fish: "I have excellent authority for saying that Prince Bismarck had no knowledge, direct or indirect, of the intention to print such articles as have appeared in the 'Post.' I am assured further, that, so far from projecting or desiring war, he is most anxious to preserve peace." MSS. Department of State (Washington, D. C.), German Despatches, VII, number 98.

¹⁵⁰ *Grosse Politik*, I, 258-259.

¹⁵¹ *Le Figaro*, 21 May 1887.

¹⁵² *Grosse Politik*, I, 259.

¹⁵³ Wemyss, II, 335-336. After his conversation with the crown prince Morier asked whether these observations might be confided to Léfebvre de Béhaine, the French chargé d'affaires in Munich, for communication to his government. The crown prince assented to this (*Ibid.*, p. 338), and Béhaine then reported the incident to his government. Dreux, 84.

¹⁵⁴ Lieutenant von Bülow wrote: "Das Gesetz bringt nach allem keine Verstärkung der Armee in ihrem Mannschaftseffektiv und dem Friedensfuss mit sich. . . . Dem Gedanken, dass die Art und Weise,

assured.¹⁵⁵ France had also become less disturbed,¹⁵⁶ and April 14 Gontaut-Biron interviewed Bülow, repeating that France was making no warlike preparations and that Germany's uneasiness was without foundation.¹⁵⁷ The latter expressed his satisfaction with these explanations,¹⁵⁸ while on the same day the kaiser remarked to Prince Polignac, the French military attaché in Berlin: "They wished to embroil us, but it is over now."¹⁵⁹ At St. Petersburg General Le Flô was received by the tsar, who assured him that Germany did not desire another war, but concluded by saying that "the interests of . . . France and Russia are common, and if, as I refuse to believe, you were some day seriously threatened, you would soon know it. . . . You would know it through me."¹⁶⁰

Shortly after this an important incident caused Decazes to rely more heavily upon Russia's good offices. This was the conversation between Gontaut-Biron and Radowitz at the

wie dieses Gesetz zustandegekommen ist, und seine Konsequenzen selber die Kriegsbedrohung in grössere Nahe gerückt hätten, als sie es war, vermag ich nicht beizustimmen." Quoted by Hans Herzfeld, *Die Deutsch-Französische Kriegsgefahr von 1875*, p. 26.

¹⁵⁵ The official *Provinzial Correspondenz* of 14 April 1875 asserted: "Besorgliche Erörterungen in einem angesehenen Blatte über die augenblicklichen politischen Verhältnisse haben in den letzten Tagen vielfach Befürchtungen erweckt, welche in der wirklichen Lage zur Zeit keine Begründung finden und welche inzwischen durch Aeusserungen von sicher unterrichteter Stelle beschwichtigt werden sind." Quoted by Hahn, II, 776.

¹⁵⁶ From Paris the correspondent of the *Times* wrote: "The departure of the Duc Decazes from Paris had a reassuring effect, as well as the return of M. Gontaut-Biron to Berlin. The latter, moreover, has instructions to lay the real feelings of the French Government before the Prussian officials, and to give a true exposition of the state of affairs in France." The *Times*, 15 April 1875.

¹⁵⁷ Dreux, 85; Broglie, 201-202; Grosse Politik, I, 261.

¹⁵⁸ Dreux, 85.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87; Broglie, 202-203; The *Times*, 24 April 1875. The American minister wrote to his government: "The press of Europe also gives prominence to a reassuring conversation between the Emperor of Germany and Prince Polignac. . . . I had an opportunity to ask the Prince in my own house whether the conversation is correctly reported. He says that it is." MSS. Department of State, German Despatches, VII, number 109.

¹⁶⁰ Le Figaro, 21 May 1887. The tsar repeated the tenor of his remarks to Le Flô the German military plenipotentiary, General von Werder. Grosse Politik, I, 266.

British embassy April 21. In his report of this incident the former attributed remarks to the latter which indicated that Germany might wage a preventive war in order to anticipate a French attack.¹⁶¹ Such remarks coming from a high official were considered to be the views of his government, and similar ideas expressed by a military leader made France all the

¹⁶¹ Gontaut-Biron quoted Radowitz as saying: "Pouvez-vous assurer que la France, regagnant son ancienne prospérité, ayant reorganisé ses forces militaires, ne trouvera pas alors des alliances qui lui manquent aujourd'hui, et que ces ressentiments qu'elle ne peut manquer nourrir, qu'elle conserve très naturellement pour la prise de ses deux provinces, ne la poussent inévitablement à déclarer la guerre à l'Allemagne? Et si nous avons laissé la France ressusciter, grandir, n'en avons-nous pas tout à craindre? Mais si la revanche est la pensée intime de la France,—et elle ne peut être autre—pourquoi attendre pour l'attaquer qu'elle ait repris des forces et qu'elle ait contracté des alliances? Convenez, en effet, que politiquement, philosophiquement, *chrétiennement même*, ces déductions sont fondées et de semblables préoccupations bien faites pour guider l'Allemagne." Dreux, 92-93; Broglie, 209-210. May 12, 1875, Radowitz submitted to his government a report of the conversation with Gontaut-Biron. It in no manner coincides with the version given by the French ambassador, and is reassuring rather than provocative in tone. Radowitz, I, 318-320; Grosse Politik, I, 275-277. Concerning this divergence Radowitz says: "Meine oben wiedergegebene amtliche Aufzeichnung über die Unterredung zeigt, dass es mir dabei wesentlich darauf angekommen war, den jammernden Botschafter zu beruhigen. Er muss aber ohne Zweifel die ganze Unterredung zu dem Zwecke gesucht haben, dahin Stoff zu Alarmierung zu finden, die sich gerade aus meiner Person nach dem vermeintlichen Verlaufe der Petersburger Mission am wahrscheinlichsten herleiten liess. So hat er mir, mit starken Übertreibungen und freien Zutaten, Äusserungen mit der Pointe gegen Frankreich als von mir ausgehend und meine (respektive meiner Regierung) Ansicht wiedergebend, die ich ihm, nach dem ganzen Zusammenhang des Gespräches, erst auf seine eigenen Fragen, als Erklärung für den Ideegang in einem Teile unserer Presse—mit dem ausdrücklichen Zusatze, dass das nicht die Ansicht der Regierung sei—vielleicht gemacht habe. Das andere, was ich ihm sagte, um jede Absicht eines Angriffs von unserer Seite als eine irrigte Voraussetzung zu bezeichnen, erwähnt er nicht in seinem Referate, ebensowenig seine Anspielung darauf, wir möchten Lothringen wieder herausgeben, um den Frieden dauernd zu retten." Radowitz, I, 330.

When Gorchakov came to Berlin in May the German chancellor brought to him Radowitz's report of his conversation with Gontaut-Biron, but the Russian chancellor considered this written *ad hoc*. Wemyss, II, 363-364. The explanation that Bismarck prompted Radowitz to reveal the nefarious plans of the German military party in order to frustrate them seems to be without warrant. This thesis has been maintained by Henri Stephan Blowitz, My Memoirs, 126.

more apprehensive.¹⁶² This was very evident during the interview between Decazes and Hohenlohe April 25.¹⁶³

The French minister of foreign affairs now desired all the more to acquaint the European powers with Germany's intentions, and for this reason he sent copies of Radowitz's conversation with Gontaut-Biron to French representatives abroad.¹⁶⁴ He was especially eager to receive the active support of Russia, instructing Le Flô to procure the intervention of the tsar.¹⁶⁵ On the same day, April 29, Decazes received Hohenlohe, again renewing his protestations concerning the impossibility of making war, saying that if Germany invaded France the armies of the latter would retreat to the Loire or the Garonne.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile the French representatives in London and St. Petersburg delivered Decazes' note of April 29 to the governments to which they were accredited.¹⁶⁷ Lord Derby took no action at the time,¹⁶⁸ but Gorchakov and Alexander II renewed their promises to warn France if she were seriously threatened.¹⁶⁹ At the same time Sir Robert Morier was urged to convince the Russians that

¹⁶² Reference is here to the remarks made by General von Moltke to Baron Nothomb, the Belgian minister to Germany, concerning a preventive war. Dreux, 105; Broglie, 205-206. The latter informed the British ambassador in Berlin of these remarks. Newton, II, 74.

¹⁶³ Grosse Politik, I, 261-262.

¹⁶⁴ Dreux, 100; Gavard, 241.

¹⁶⁵ Broglie, 220. The French foreign minister wrote to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg: "*Sa Majesté à daigne vous dire qu'au jour du danger nous serons prévenus et prévenus par Elle. Nous acceptons cette certitude avec une confiance d'autant plus grande que c'est à sa sollicitude que nous aurons recours ce jour-là. Mais si elle n'était pas prévenue à temps, elle daignera comprendre et reconnaître qu'elle aussi aura été trompée et surprise; qu'elle se trouvera pour ainsi dire devenue la complice involontaire du piège qui nous aura été tendu. Et je dois avoir aussi cette confiance qu'Elle vengera ce qui devenu son injure propre, et qu'Elle couvrira de son épée ceux qui se sont reposés sur son appui.*" Le Figaro, 21 May 1887.

¹⁶⁶ Dreux, 102; Grosse Politik, I, 265. In his despatch giving an account of this interview Hohenlohe wrote: "*Nur darüber bin ich nicht im Zweifel, dass die Friedensliebe bei dem Herzog Decazes und beim Marschall MacMahon eine ungeheuchelte ist, und dass beide überzeugt sind, dass Frankreich so bald keinen Krieg führen kann.*"

¹⁶⁷ Gavard, 241; Le Figaro, 21 May 1887.

¹⁶⁸ Lord Derby was of the opinion that Germany was preparing to attack Austria, not France. Gavard, 238, 239.

¹⁶⁹ Le Figaro, 21 May 1887.

France did not desire war, and to advise Great Britain and Russia to take common measures in this crisis.¹⁷⁰

Assurance of Russian support reached Decazes on the evening of May 4,¹⁷¹ causing him to regard Hohenlohe's visit on the morrow with more equanimity. The German ambassador had already been informed by Bülow that his government was not yet completely satisfied with regard to the peaceful intentions of France, and that Gontaut-Biron's reports had been too sanguine.¹⁷² Accordingly Hohenlohe called upon Decazes May 5, indicating to him the content of Bülow's despatch.¹⁷³ The French foreign minister, on the other hand, could only repeat that his government had no intention of waging war against Germany.¹⁷⁴ He now determined to enlist the aid of the Paris correspondent of the Times in order to bring the situation of France to the attention of Europe,¹⁷⁵ and May 6, that journal appeared with its famous article: *A French Scare*.¹⁷⁶ On the same day the French representative in London endeavored to draw Lord Derby out of his reserve, finally gaining his promise that Great Britain would put forward every effort to maintain peace.¹⁷⁷

British statesmen were now prepared to concert measures with Russia,¹⁷⁸ for as early as May 5 Lord Derby wrote to

¹⁷⁰ Wemyss, II, 339.

¹⁷¹ Broglie, 223.

¹⁷² Grosse Politik, I, 267-268.

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 269-271; Dreux, 108-111; Broglie, 228. In his despatch of May 5 Hohenlohe wrote: "Ich kann das Ergebnis der Unterredung dahin zusammen fassen, dass es mir gelungen ist, dem Duc Decazes klarzumachen, dass wir in der französischen Militärorganisation und in den militärisch finanziellen Massregeln nach wie vor eine Bedrohung Deutschlands sehen, wenn wir auch an eine nahe bevorstehende kriegerische Verwicklung nicht glauben." Grosse Politik, I, 271.

¹⁷⁴ Grosse Politik, I, 270.

¹⁷⁵ Blowitz, 109-111.

¹⁷⁶ The Times, 6 May, 1875. An interesting account of the negotiations prior to the publication of this article is given by Blowitz, 110-111. Also see: Edward Cook, Delane of "The Times," 249-250; Hohenlohe, II, 157-158; Gavard, 244.

¹⁷⁷ Gavard, 242, 243.

¹⁷⁸ Lord Derby wrote to the British ambassador in Berlin, May 3: "Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace? It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France destroyed and Germany omnipotent. If the czar were to say that a new war must not

Queen Victoria that the prevalence of the preventive war theory in Germany constituted a serious danger to Europe.¹⁷⁹ On the same day the queen saw Disraeli,¹⁸⁰ reaching the decision to appeal to the European concert to prevent war.¹⁸¹ The prime minister thereupon consulted Lord Derby, and then informed the queen that it was "agreed to telegraph Odo,¹⁸² calling his attention to the critical situation and the choice opportunity; that he should feel his way with the Emperor of Russia, as to the desirability of some common understanding to secure the peace of Europe"; and that when Shuvalov¹⁸³ had been interviewed more precise instructions would be given.¹⁸⁴ At the same time the tsar reassured Le Flô, May 5 and 6, saying that Russia would not allow France to be surprised by Germany.¹⁸⁵ Shuvalov had told Odo Russell of this,¹⁸⁶ and May 8 the latter informed his government that Russia would make strong representations to Germany.¹⁸⁷

take place, and that he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly undertake to fight Russia and France combined." Newton, II, 75.

¹⁷⁹ Buckle, II, 390-391.

¹⁸⁰ The queen made the following entry in her journal: "Saw Mr. Disraeli and talked about the very alarming rumours from Germany, as to war. . . . I said this was *intolerable*, that France could not for years make war, and that I thought we ought, in concert with the other Powers, to hold the strongest language to both Powers, declaring that they *must not fight*, for that *Europe* would *not* stand another war!" Ibid., p. 391.

¹⁸¹ After his interview with the queen, May 5, Disraeli wrote to Lord Derby: "My own impression is that we should construct some concerted movement to preserve the peace of Europe. . . . There might be an alliance between Russia and ourself for this special purpose; and other powers, as Austria, and perhaps Italy, might be invited to accede." W. F. Monypenny and C. E. Buckle, *The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield*, V, 422.

¹⁸² Lord Odo Russell was the British ambassador in Berlin.

¹⁸³ Count Peter Shuvalov was the Russian ambassador to Great Britain.

¹⁸⁴ Buckle, II, 392. Count Shuvalov was returning to his post in London arriving in Berlin May 6. Newton, II, 76.

¹⁸⁵ Le Flô informed Decazes: "Je considère ainsi que nous avons obtenu aujourd'hui un résultat important, inespéré, puis-je dire. Nous nous sommes assuré le concours moral, l'intervention énergique de la Russie en cas de conflit avec l'Allemagne. . . ." Le Figaro, 21 May, 1887.

¹⁸⁶ Newton, II, 76.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 77. May 8 Sir Robert Morier again had a long interview with Crown Prince Frederick William, pointing out the disastrous consequences that would result from a Franco-German war.

The Russian ambassador to Great Britain arrived in London May 7, immediately requesting Lord Derby to support the efforts of the tsar at Berlin to maintain peace.¹⁸⁸ The British foreign minister agreed, sending the following instructions to Lord Odo Russell early on the morning of May 9:¹⁸⁹

Her Majesty's Government have observed with regret the general apprehension which prevails of a disturbance of European peace. The French Chargé d'Affaires has expressed much uneasiness on the subject of a possible attack, either now or at no distant future, from Germany, the alleged provocation being the rapidity with which the reorganization of the French Army is proceeding. The German Government is believed to regard these military preparations on the part of France as indicating a design of making war for the recovery of the lost provinces.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that no such design is entertained by the Government of France, and that such apprehensions, if really felt, are unfounded.

Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire the maintenance of peace and instruct you hereby to use all means in your power to put an end to the misunderstanding which has arisen.

It is believed that the Emperor of Russia will speak in the same sense during his visit to Berlin. Should his Imperial Majesty do so, you will strongly support his efforts for the preservation of peace.

Wemyss, II, 339-344. The following day he addressed a long letter to the crown prince. Ibid., pp. 346-348.

¹⁸⁸ Dreux, 137. With regard to this episode Decazes wrote to Le Flô May 17: "Comme l'on pouvait craindre que le cabinet anglais, croyant avoir besoin d'Allemagne en Asie, hésitât, le comte Schouvaloff lui apportait aussi l'engagement de donner à l'Angleterre satisfaction sur ces questions et communiquait des ordres formels qui interdisent à l'armée de la mer Caspienne de continuer sa marche sur Merv." Le Figaro, 21 May 1887. Shuvalov interviewed Derby again May 9 (Buckle, II, 394), and the next day reported to Gorchakov: "My first conversation with Disraeli and Derby on Asia has produced the best impression. In general, great desire for *rapprochement* with us in order to avert the crisis." "Russo-British Relations during the Eastern Crisis," in the Slavonic Review, III, 424.

¹⁸⁹ Buckle, II, 393-394. With regard to this despatch the queen's secretary, General Ponsonby, wrote to Lord Derby: "The Queen is pleased with the tenor of this despatch to Lord Odo Russell, but commands me to observe that it is scarcely correct to assume that no such design as making war for the recovery of the lost provinces is entertained by France, for though no such intention is dreamt of at present, the Queen is sure that the wish exists in almost every Frenchman's heart, and that the Germans know this better than we do. Her Majesty therefore thinks that, while remonstrating with Germany, it becomes our duty also to warn France against aggressive movements. Buckle, II, 393-394.

The British ambassador interviewed Bülow the same day, May 9, informing him of the instructions he had received.¹⁹⁰ Both Bismarck and his secretary of state for foreign affairs hastened to assure Russell that no danger of war existed, and that the relations between France and Germany were satisfactory.¹⁹¹ The following day, May 10, Alexander II and Gorchakov arrived in Berlin.¹⁹² Their conversations with William I and his chancellor were satisfactory, the latter protesting vigorously against having warlike intentions attributed to him.¹⁹³ It was with pleasure, then, that Russell could inform Derby that he had "a most satisfactory interview with Prince Gortchakoff at Prince Bismarck's house. They are both agreed that the peace of Europe shall not be disturbed, and cooperate for the maintenance of peace."¹⁹⁴ Bismarck thanked the British statesmen for their interest in maintain-

¹⁹⁰ Grosse Politik, I, 272. Lord Loftus, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, communicated to the Russian government the nature of the instructions addressed to Lord Odo Russell. Loftus, II, 132-133. Gavard was also informed of their nature. Gavard, 245.

¹⁹¹ Dreux, 138.

¹⁹² Queen Victoria wrote to the tsar, May 10, that she hoped he would use his influence to maintain peace in Europe. Buckle, II, 396.

¹⁹³ Dreux, 145-150; Broglie, 239-241; Loftus, II, 134. William wrote of his meeting with Alexander as follows: "Die Unterredung mit dem Kaiser hat eine Übereinstimmung unserer Ansichten, wie ich sie Ihnen heute früh schrieb, festgestellt, wie ich solche nur je hatte wünschen können. Er wird von Neuem, wie er es schon in den letzten 4 Wochen, ohne mich von Neuem gehört oder gesehen zu haben, unsere Friedens Liebe nach allen Seiten hin proclamiren und so hoffentlich dem ewigen Zeitungs Geschwatz ein Ende machen, da unsere Zeitungen unverbesserlich sind!" Grosse Politik, I, 273.

¹⁹⁴ Monypenny and Buckle, V, 423. Derby communicated this telegram to Gavard, the French chargé d'affaires in London. Gavard, 246. Queen Victoria received this despatch with pleasure. She entered in her journal: "Windsor Castle, 13th May 1875. Saw Mr. Disraeli. We both rejoiced at the very satisfactory accounts received yesterday from Berlin, from Lord Odo Russell. The meeting of Prince Bismarck with Count Gortchakoff and the Emperor of Russia had been all that could be desired, so much so, that no further assurances were to be asked for, they having been given spontaneously. I then said France must now be told that, having done our best to prevent any attack on her, she must be equally ready to cause no complaints by threats of revenge." Buckle, II, 396-397.

ing the peace of Europe, but again he declared that Germany never contemplated war.¹⁹⁵

After the representations of Great Britain and Russia there was no longer any danger of war—if there ever had been any.¹⁹⁶ Decazes expressed his thanks to Lord Derby and John Delane, editor of the London Times, for their efforts in maintaining peace;¹⁹⁷ and on the other hand, the tsar informed Queen Victoria that he had found the emperor and his chancellor peacefully inclined, receiving from them the most positive assurances for the maintenance of peace.¹⁹⁸ The German government, however, felt that it had been accused unjustly of desiring war. Frederick William wrote to Queen Victoria

¹⁹⁵ Grosse Politik, I, 273-274; Monypenny and Buckle, V, 424. Odo Russell wrote to Lord Derby, May 15, that "Bismarck must be frantic at our combined action with Russia in favour of peace, which took him by surprise." Newton, II, 79. At this time Radowitz addressed the following to his mother: "Das Kriegsgeschrei kommt wahrhaftig nicht von hier: wir haben kein Bedürfnis und kein Objekt für den Krieg—es kommt von den Leuten, die beim Krieg zu gewinnen hoffen. Die wohnen aber nicht in der Wilhelmstrasse, sondern in Rom und in Paris, in Polen, Österreich, Belgien, usw. . . ." Radowitz, I, 333. At the same time Count Münster wrote to Rudolf von Bennigsen: "Das ganze Vorgehen des englischen Kabinetts hatte Gründe, die ich nicht näher reproduzieren kann; es war ein Parteimanöver, welches aber nicht geschickt und auch nicht glücklich ausgeführt wurde. Es wird hier von Ultramontanen, von der Cambridgepartei im Verein mit Beust, heftig gegen uns, d.h. das Deutsche Reich, folglich auch gegen mich intrigiert. . ." Hermann Oncken, Rudolf von Bennigsen, Ein Deutscher Liberaler Politiker, I, 286.

¹⁹⁶ Lord Derby had requested the support of Italy and Austria in maintaining the peace, but both of these countries did not consider that there was any danger of war. The Italian minister of foreign affairs, Visconti-Venosta, replied that the reports from Berlin indicated that Germany also desired peace, hence there was no sufficient reason for the efforts of Russia and Great Britain to maintain peace. Grosse Politik, I, 277. Andrassy was suspicious of the motives of France, informing Karolyi, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin: "Es handelt sich für Frankreich darum Kaiser Alexander in erster Linie die Rolle des Schützers und Erhalters des europäischen Friedens zuzuwenden. Durch eine möglichst demonstrative Inszenierung der russischen Friedensvermittlung soll das Verhältnis zwischen Russland und Deutschland zu trüben versucht werden." Wertheimer, II, 231.

¹⁹⁷ Gavard, 251.

¹⁹⁸ Buckle, II, 398-399. Von Schweinitz, the German ambassador to Russia, asserts that Alexander disclaimed any intention of acting as peace-maker in May 1875. Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters General v. Schweinitz, I, 309, 316, 403.

that his father was indignant concerning the rumors of war,¹⁹⁹ and June 3 the old emperor expressed the hope to the British queen that with Lord Derby's address to parliament²⁰⁰ there would be an end to such rumors.²⁰¹ Victoria replied to William I, rejoicing "to read the expression in which you condemn the notion of attacking the French, or any other people, merely on the suspicion of their meditating hostilities in their turn should an opportunity occur."²⁰² The kaiser answered this letter June 20, once more assuring the queen that he had been ignorant of any intention to wage war, and that her communication would make him more watchful and prudent.²⁰³ Thus ended the episode of 1875.^{203a}

¹⁹⁹ Buckle, II, 401-402.

²⁰⁰ May 31 Earl Russell moved that the correspondence between Great Britain and other European powers relating to the peace of Europe should be communicated to parliament if it could be done "without injury to the public service." Parliamentary Debates, third series, CCXXIV, 1091-1095. Lord Derby felt obliged to refuse this, but he gave an account of Great Britain's action during the events of April and May. *Ibid.*, pp. 1095-1099.

²⁰¹ Buckle, II, 402-403. June 5 the crown princess of Germany assured her mother: "I feel sure that all this irritation will blow over, but to us, and to many quiet and reflecting Germans, it is very sad, and appears very hard, to be made an object of universal distrust and suspicion, which we naturally are, as long as Prince Bismarck remains the sole and omnipotent ruler of our destinies." Monypenny and Buckle, V, 424-425. To which Queen Victoria replied: "No one wishes more, as you know, than I do for England and Germany to go well together; but Bismarck is so overbearing, violent, grasping and unprincipled that *no one* can stand it, and *all* agree that he was becoming just like the first Napoleon whom Europe had to join in putting down. This was the feeling, and we were determined to prevent another war. At the same time I said France must be told that she must give *no* cause of anger or suspicion to Germany, and must *not* let them have any pretext to attack her. France will for many years be incapable of going to war and is terrified at the idea of it." Buckle, II, 405. A more complete version of these two letters is to be found in the Letters of the Empress Frederick (edited by Sir Frederick Ponsonby), 138-140.

²⁰² Buckle, II, 408-409.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 410.

^{203a} Notwithstanding the publication of new materials the affair of 1875 still remains an enigma. Recently published German diplomatic documents and memoirs reveal this episode more clearly, but much information is still desired. In view of the projected publication of the French diplomatic correspondence final judgment concerning the war scare must be suspended. The author intends to publish in the future a more detailed account of this phase of Franco-German relations.

Soon after the affair of 1875 the attention of Europe was turned to the east, and remained directed there for several years. In July of that year a revolt of the Christians in Herzegovina broke out, soon spreading over the entire region of the Balkans. France and Germany were not directly concerned in the questions which arose in the east, but they could not remain outside of the activities carried on by the remaining members of the concert.²⁰⁴ As a member of the *Dreikaiserbündnis* Germany was desirous of maintaining peace between Russia and Austria,²⁰⁵ and at the same time due consideration had to be given to the policy of Great Britain. France, too, steered a middle course, endeavoring to maintain harmony within the European concert in order that some reforms might be forced upon a reluctant sultan.²⁰⁶ Disruptive tendencies, however, were too great to be overcome. The Andrassy note of December 30, 1875;²⁰⁷ the Berlin memorandum of May 13, 1876;²⁰⁸ and the Constantinople confer-

²⁰⁴ A mass of information concerning the eastern question from 1875 to 1877 is contained in the following works: *Livre Jaune*, 1875-1877, *Affaires d'Orient*; Grosse Politik, I, chaps. x-xi; Hanotaux, IV, chaps. ii, v; Dreux, chap. v; Broglie, 272-298; Loftus, II, chaps. vi-ix; Newton, II, chap. xii; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, chaps. i-v; John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone*, II, book vii, chap. iv; Fitzmaurice, II, chap. v; Buckle, II, chaps. xiv-xvi; Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, II, chaps. iv-v; Wertheimer, II, chaps. x-xv; Andrew Lang, *Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote*, II, chap. xiv; H. Sutherland Edwards, *Sir William White, His Life and Correspondence*, chaps. v-vii; *Slavonic Review*, III, 423-434, 657-683; IV, 176-197, 433-462, 733-759; V, 413-434; VI, 423-433.

²⁰⁵ The policy of Austria, Russia, and Germany in the eastern question has been reviewed recently in two articles by William A. Gauld, "The 'Dreikaiserbündnis' and the Eastern Question, 1871-1876," in the *English Historical Review*, XL, 207-221; and "The 'Dreikaiserbündnis' and the Eastern Question, 1877-1878," *Ibid.*, XLII, 560-568.

²⁰⁶ French policy in the eastern question, especially with regard to Russia, is well indicated in the correspondence between Decazes and Gontaut-Biron. Dreux, chap. v.

²⁰⁷ Count Andrassy proposed that certain reforms should be made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that a special mission should control the execution of them. The text of the Andrassy note is to be found in *Livre Jaune*, 1875-1877, *Affaires d'Orient*, 59-71.

²⁰⁸ Russia, Austria, and Germany issued a memorandum May 13, 1876, proposing that Turkey should conclude an armistice with the insurgents for two months, and proposed during this period, to

ence at the end of the year, marked stages in the failure of pacific means.²⁰⁹ Russia then appealed to the arbitrament of arms, declaring war upon Turkey April 24, 1877. France and Germany then endeavored to localize the conflict in order to prevent a general European war. In this they were successful, although at times it seemed as if Great Britain would come to the assistance of Turkey.

Although the eastern question did not bring France and Germany into direct conflict, the years from 1875 until 1878 witnessed a dull antagonism between the two countries. After the episode of 1875 Bismarck conceived a great dislike for Gontaut-Biron, accusing him of having intrigued with Russia in order to gain a diplomatic victory over Germany.²¹⁰ Then too, the favor enjoyed by the French ambassador at the German court made the chancellor suppose that the former was the center of opposition to his policies.²¹¹ Gontaut-Biron was a Catholic who desired a monarchical restoration in France—an act which was regarded by Bismarck as prejudicial to the continuation of peace between France and Germany.²¹² The chancellor therefore determined to rid himself of a foreign representative who was *persona non grata*, and the history of Franco-German relations from 1875 to 1878 is largely concerned with the efforts of Bismarck to accomplish this.

Prince Hohenlohe was instructed in May 1875 to urge Decazes to recall Gontaut-Biron,²¹³ but the French foreign

effect a reconciliation by applying the principles recommended in the Andrassy note. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-131. France adhered to this proposal, but nothing was accomplished when Great Britain refused to adopt it.

²⁰⁹ A conference of ambassadors in Constantinople began deliberations December 12, 1876, in order to formulate measures whereby internal reforms in Turkey could be secured, but at the same time to prevent the dissolution of the empire. The letters of the British representative at the conference, Lord Salisbury, are especially interesting for this period. Cecil, II, chap. iv.

²¹⁰ Bismarck, II, 198; *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XLIV, 218-219; *The Times*, 7 September 1878.

²¹¹ Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years*, 26; Broglie, 252.

²¹² Hohenlohe, II, 155-156.

²¹³ *Ibid.*; Broglie, 258-259.

minister was loath to make the change.²¹⁴ During the latter months of 1875 the German government renewed this request without any definite action being taken in France.²¹⁵ Bismarck then hoped that the elections of 1876 would bring a more complaisant government to power; but in this he was disappointed. Although the Republicans made some gains²¹⁶ Duc Decazes was retained as minister of foreign affairs in the new cabinet of Jules Dufaure.²¹⁷ It now seemed that the clerical tendencies of MacMahon were checked somewhat,²¹⁸ but at the same time it was feared that a *coup d'état* might result in the restoration of the earlier condition of things.²¹⁹ Hohenlohe reopened the question of Gontaut-Biron's recall,²²⁰ but Decazes was still unconvinced as to the expediency of removing the ambassador.²²¹

The only result of Decazes' action was further irritation of the German chancellor. An invitation to participate in the Paris exposition in 1878 was refused by Bismarck,²²² giving a fair indication of his policy towards France. Then too, the internal situation in France was alarming. Dufaure resigned December 2, 1876²²³ after finding it impossible to serve both a conservative senate and a republican chamber of deputies,²²⁴ and Jules Simon was summoned to form a ministry.²²⁵ The latter's term of office was also brief,²²⁶ making it appear as if a

²¹⁴ Hohenlohe, II, 158-159.

²¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 169-170, 175-176.

²¹⁶ Hanotaux, III, chap. vii.

²¹⁷ Journal Officiel, 1876, I, 1369; Broglie, 258-259.

²¹⁸ Dreux, 259-260.

²¹⁹ Bülow wrote to Hohenlohe April 22, 1876: "Fürst Bismarck ist nicht ausser Sorge, dass die klerikalen Sympathien des Marschall MacMahon und seiner Umgebung den Marschall dazu führen könnten, durch einen Staatsstreich gegen die jetztige, dem Ultramontanismus weniger günstige Stimmung einzuschreiten, und Ew. pp. haben in Ihrer Berichterstattung selbst hervorgehoben, dass es nicht an Leuten fehle, die von verschiedenem Standpunkte aus darauf hindrängen." Grosse Politik, I, 305.

²²⁰ Hohenlohe, II, 184-185.

²²¹ Ibid., p. 207.

²²² Grosse Politik, I, 306-310.

²²³ Journal Officiel, 1876, VI, 8985.

²²⁴ Hanotaux, III, chap. viii.

²²⁵ Journal Officiel, 1876, VI, 9273.

²²⁶ The ministry of Jules Simon resigned May 16, 1877.

conservative, royalist-ultramontane ministry would finally prevail.²²⁷ MacMahon dissolved the chamber of deputies June 25, 1877,²²⁸ and now the German government decided to await the result of the elections before making new attempts to have Gontaut-Biron removed.²²⁹ It was evident that the return of a republican majority would bring about the recall of the French ambassador, hence Germany worked for this end.²³⁰ The desired result was accomplished, for the elections of October 1877 were a sweeping republican victory.²³¹ Gontaut-Biron was soon recalled,²³² and the advent of the second ministry of Jules Dufaure marked the beginning of a period of friendly relations with Germany.²³³

²²⁷ Bülow wrote to Hohenlohe: "Ob der Marschall im konstitutionellen Wege bleibt, sei für uns keine Friedensbürgschaft: eine legal-klerikale Wendung der Dinge sei für den Frieden nicht minder bedrohlich, als ein Staatsstreich in der Richtung; es hätten beide Fälle allerdings den Trost hinter sich, dass sie Frankreich militärisch und in seinem innern Frieden schwächen, aber bevor sie diese Wirkung üben, würden sie doch immer erst zum Kriege führen. Sei, wie man gern glauben könne, die Mehrheit der Nation einer Fortdauer des Friedens zugeneigt, so könne es für uns sicherlich erwünschten Zieles nur erspriesslich sein, wenn wir aus der Auffassung kein Geheimnis machen, dass der Ultramontanismus der Krieg ist, die jetzige Regierung aber unserer Ansicht nach zum Ultramontanismus führt." *Grosse Politik*, I, 324.

²²⁸ *Journal Officiel*, 1877, III, 4773.

²²⁹ Hohenlohe, II, 216-217.

²³⁰ *Grosse Politik*, I, 326.

²³¹ Hanotaux, IV, chap. iii; Meaux, chap. xi.

²³² Dreux, chap. viii. Bismarck's position with regard to the form of government in France is discussed fully by Georg Rosen, *Die Stellungnahme der Politik Bismarcks zur Frage der Staatsform in Frankreich von 1871 bis 1890*.

²³³ During 1876 and 1877 the German press frequently pointed out that it would be to the common interest of France and Germany to carry out an identical policy against the papacy. This, of course, was only possible if a Republican government came to power in France. Dreux, 259. Thiers was friendly to this idea (Hohenlohe, II, 186), and Gambetta also paid attention to it. Juliette Adam, *Nos Amitiés Politiques avant l'Abandon de la Revanche*, 439.

CHAPTER II

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

The constitutional struggle in France which began with the events of May 16, 1877¹ came to a close towards the end of the year when President MacMahon summoned Jules Dufaure to form his second ministry.² At first there was some difficulty in selecting a minister of foreign affairs, but it was finally determined to entrust this important post to William Waddington, senator for the department of Aisne.³ Following this choice some important changes were made in the diplomatic service, the most outstanding of which was the appointment of Count de Saint-Vallier as ambassador to the German Empire.⁴ The previous relations of the new ambassador with the German government prepared him well for the difficult

¹ The ministry of Jules Simon had been forced to retire, and an attempt was made to govern the country with a conservative ministry that could not command a parliamentary majority.

² *Journal Officiel*, 1877, VII, 8349-8350; Georges Picot, M. Dufaure, Sa Vie et Ses Discours, 377-379.

³ William Henry Waddington was born December 11, 1826, in the department of Eure-et-Loire. He was the grandson of an Englishman who had established cotton factories in France, and had become a naturalized French citizen. He received his early education at the Lycée Saint-Louis in Paris, and then completed his studies at Cambridge. The next years of his life were devoted largely to the study of Greek numismatics and epigraphy, but he also took deep interest in French politics. The department of Aisne elected him to the national assembly in 1871, and two years later he was made minister of public instruction. He was elected senator from Aisne in 1876, entering the first ministry of Dufaure as minister of public instruction. Jules Simon retained him in the same position in his ministry, but the events of May 16 caused the cabinet to resign. When Waddington was chosen minister of foreign affairs a friendly journal remarked: "il a paru opportun de placer aux affaires étrangères un homme dont le nom seul rassurât l'Europe sur les dangers d'une politique extérieure ultramontaine, et, sous ce rapport, nul n'offrait à la fois plus garanties d'indépendance et plus de garanties de modération." *Journal des Débats* (Paris), 15 December 1877. An unfriendly contemporary considered him as "an Englishman and a Bismarckian." Juliette Adam, *Après l'Abandon de la Revanche*, 101.

⁴ *Journal Officiel*, 1877, VII, 8637; Edgar Zevort, *Histoire de la Troisième République*, II, 392.

task that he was undertaking⁵ and made him a true representative of a policy of peace.⁶ He arrived in Berlin January 28, 1878,⁷ and two days later he was visited by Count von Bülow, the German secretary of state for foreign affairs. The latter greeted the new ambassador warmly, saying that "we are happy to see you here, for you represent a policy in absolute conformity with the pacific and friendly views of our government with regard to France."⁸ The ambassador formally presented his credentials to the emperor February 3, and this occasion was again utilized to give mutual assurances as to the peaceful intentions of the two governments.⁹

Relations between France and Germany had been strained since the election of MacMahon to the presidency, but now, with the downfall of the Conservatives, a period of friendly relations began; and Saint-Vallier was assured that only the monarchical and ultramontane tendencies of the previous governments had prevented this heretofore.¹⁰ The death of Pius IX, February 9, 1878, and the elevation of Leo XIII to the Holy See was also of importance in the establishment of better relations between France and Germany. The new pope was anxious to end the struggle with Germany, and the Ger-

⁵ Ernest Daudet, *La Mission du Comte de Saint-Vallier*, 33-34. In his address to the emperor the French ambassador alluded to his former relations with Germany as follows: "en ce que concerne mes vieilles sympathies pour l'Allemagne, les relations intimes que j'ai conservées ici, la mission d'apaisement que M. Thiers m'a confiée en 1871, en un mot, mon passé tout entier me designaient comme l'interprète d'une politique amicale." *Journal Officiel*, 1878, I, 1146; *Le Siècle* (Paris), 4 February 1878.

⁶ Saint-Vallier's instructions emphasized the peaceful character of his mission. Waddington wrote: "Je considère comme un devoir de vous inviter à témoigner au gouvernement auprès vous êtes accrédité, le haut prix que j'attache à entretenir avec lui des relations fondées sur une confiance mutuelle . . ." Émile Bourgeois and Georges Pagès, *Les Origines et les Responsabilités de la Grande Guerre*, 186.

⁷ *Deutscher Reichs-Anzeiger* and *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, 1 February 1878.

⁸ Bourgeois and Pagès, 186; Daudet, 37-38.

⁹ *Journal Officiel*, 1878, I, 1146; *Le Siècle*, 4 February 1878.

¹⁰ Daudet, 38. Bismarck wrote to Hohenlohe January 26, 1878: "Ich werde, sobald ich wieder in Berlin bin, dem Grafen St. Vallier in jeder Weise entgegenkommen, um an den Tag zu legen, dass nur die polnisch-ultramontanen Beziehungen seines Vorgängers dies früher dem französischen Botschafter gegenüber verhindert haben." *Grosse Politik*, III, 381.

man emperor met Leo's advances by intimating that the *Kulturkampf* was coming to an end.¹¹ Dufaure and his colleagues, on the other hand, were disposed to live upon friendly terms with both Germany and the Papacy.¹²

The closing months of 1877 witnessed another event indicating that the relations between France and Germany were becoming more friendly. Count Henckel von Donnersmarck, a German banker who resided in Paris, lavishly entertained many prominent Frenchmen among whom was Léon Gambetta.¹³ The latter was a frequent visitor at Pontchartrain, the country house of the Henckels, and in a short time he was quite intimate with the wealthy German.¹⁴ Politics were often discussed, and Henckel in his conversations with Gambetta generally emphasized the clerical danger, suggesting that France and Germany should follow a common policy against the Papacy.¹⁵ Soon afterwards, October 17, 1877, Henckel informed Bismarck of Gambetta's frequent visits and

¹¹ Lucius von Ballhausen, *Bismarck Erinnerungen*, 132; Goyau, III, 4-6.

¹² Léon Gambetta, who was the sponsor of the Dufaure ministry, desired to conclude an agreement with Rome in order to replace the Concordat of 1801. Paul Deschanel, *Gambetta*, 242-243. The French statesman wrote to his confidante, Léonie Léon: "Aujourd'hui sera un grand jour, la paix venue de Berlin, et peut-être la conciliation faite au Vatican. On a nommé le nouveau pape . . . et le nom de Leon XIII qu'il a pris me semble du meilleur augure. Je salue cet avènement plein de promesses. Il ne rompre pas ouvertement avec les traditions et les déclarations de son prédécesseur; mais sa conduite, ses actes, ses relations vaudront mieux que les discours, et s'il ne meurt pas trop tôt, nous pouvons espérer un mariage de raison avec l'Eglise." *Revue de Paris*, thirteenth year, VI, 694-695.

¹³ Hanotaux, IV, 254. Hanotaux expresses the opinion that Gambetta was introduced to Henckel by Thiers. He writes: "Il n'est pas impossible que le projet d'un rapprochement franco-allemande, qui paraît avoir occupé l'esprit de M. Thiers quelque temps avant sa mort, ait motivé ces relations." *Ibid.* A similar statement was made by Gambetta's friend, Joseph Reinach, in a letter to *Le Temps* (Paris), 11 December 1901. Other writers, however, have not accepted this. Henri Galli, *Gambetta et l'Alsace-Lorraine*, 135; Frédéric Loliée, *La Païva, la Légende et l'Histoire de la Marquise de Païva*, 264.

¹⁴ A detailed account of this is given by Loliée, chap. x.

¹⁵ Henckel is quoted as saying to Gambetta: "Ce n'est que dans une conversation que vous pourrez établir solidement les conditions du rétablissement d'un régime de confiance entre nos deux pays sur la base d'une politique commune de la France et d'Allemagne contre la Papauté." Adam, 112-113.

offered to utilize this intimacy in the interest of friendly Franco-German relations.¹⁶ Count Herbert Bismarck replied October 30 that his father was very much interested in the relations between Henckel and Gambetta, but that it would be disadvantageous for the latter to receive direct communications from the chancellor.¹⁷

With the accession of a French Protestant as minister of foreign affairs and the withdrawal of Gontaut-Biron it became plainly evident that France desired to live in peace with her eastern neighbor, and an interview between Bismarck and Gambetta assumed more importance. Henckel wrote again, December 23, 1877:¹⁸

If you will grant me permission I will take it upon myself to bring Gambetta to Varzin, either openly or not, as you prefer. The father Joseph of the present government and the leader of the national assembly . . . will propose to you a rapprochement and collaboration with France. He feels this necessary for the establishment of well-ordered and firm relations in Europe and for preparation against the commercial and industrial crisis. The agreement will have in view a mutual attitude by France and Germany against Rome, restoration of confidence between both nations, and reciprocal enlightenment as to military budgets.

Bismarck, however, did not take advantage of this splendid opportunity, for he wrote to Henckel December 28 that it would not be advisable for Gambetta to risk his influence by paying a visit to Varzin. He excused himself by saying that "he would be very glad to enter into personal relations with him; for the moment, however, that would greatly alarm the emperor, as His Majesty has been well worked upon by

¹⁶ The correspondence between Bismarck, Henckel, and Gambetta is published in the second volume of the *Anhang zu den Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck* (edited by Horst Kohl). This will be cited hereafter as *Aus Bismarcks Briefwechsel*.

¹⁷ *Aus Bismarcks Briefwechsel*, 494-495.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 499. Gambetta would have undoubtedly welcomed an understanding with Germany concerning armaments. He requested the Italian statesman, Francesco Crispi, to broach the question of disarmament to the chancellor. Crispi in his diary, under the date of September 17, 1877, quotes Bismarck as saying: "Un' alleanza con la Francia repubblicana sarebbe senza scopo per noi. Il disarmo dei duo paesi non sarebbe possibile." Palamenghi-Crispi, Francesco Crispi, *Politica Estera*, 28.

Gontaut and other influences in respect of Republican propaganda. . . ."¹⁹

Meanwhile in the east the Russo-Turkish war was coming to a close. After the fall of Plevna the victorious Russian armies marched almost to Constantinople, while the defeated Turks asked for an armistice. Great excitement prevailed throughout Europe;²⁰ it seemed as if the nations were on the verge of a general war. Peace was not assured until Bismarck announced to the reichstag that a European congress would be held to consider the consequences of the war.²¹ The chancellor's speech at first created a very favorable impression in France,²² but after a few days there was some modification of opinion. One French journal said that Bismarck "spoke in order not to be understood," and that he had succeeded.²³ Gambetta, however, received it with great satisfaction. He wrote to his confidante, Léonie Léon, that "we occupy beneath the veil of allusion an important and distinguished place. . . . There now arises in this man the radiant dawn of right; it is for us to profit now from the circumstances and the arrangement of rival ambitions to clearly place before him our legitimate claims and to establish, in accord with him, the new order."²⁴

It is evident that Gambetta now realized more than ever that great benefits might arise from an interview with Bis-

¹⁹ Aus Bismarcks Briefwechsel, 500.

²⁰ Great Britain had sent warships to the straits to protect Constantinople.

²¹ It was during this speech that Bismarck made the famous statement: "Die Vermittelung des Friedens denke ich mir nicht so, dass wir nun bei divergirenden Ansichten den Schiedrichter spielen und sagen: so soll es sein, und dahinter steht die Macht des deutschen Reichs, sondern ich denke sie mir bescheidner, ja ohne Vergleich im übrigen stehe ich nicht an, Ihnen etwas aus dem gemeinen Leben zu zitiren—mehr die eines ehrlichen Maklers, der das Geschäft wirklich zu stande bringen will." Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, III Legislative Period, 2nd Session, 1878, I, 98; Die Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarcks, VII, 92.

²² Journal des Débats, 21 February 1878.

²³ Ibid., 25 February 1878. Bismarck's address to the reichstag was largely improvised, explaining, to some extent, its lack of unity, frequent repetitions, and general vagueness. Lucius, 128.

²⁴ Revue de Paris, thirteenth year, VI, 694.

marck prior to the meeting of a European congress.²⁵ For this reason he requested Henckel to propose an interview to the chancellor.²⁶ This was soon arranged, and April 14 Bismarck gave directions as to the route and meeting place.²⁷ Several days later, April 22, final arrangements between Henckel and Gambetta were completed.²⁸ The former, confident that he had done his work well, informed the chancellor that "on the 30th, the day on which the reichstag reopens, Gambetta will be at your disposal, and I trust to receive at the Kaiserhof ²⁹ intimation as to the time that will suit you best. The whole matter has, of course, been kept a close secret here."³⁰ Suddenly, April 24, Henckel received the following letter from Gambetta:³¹

Man proposes . . . parliament disposes. When I accepted with eagerness yesterday I had not reckoned with the unforeseen which holds us all in check.

Questions relating to the ministry of war have assumed a serious aspect and I have been informed that an important debate will be opened upon the ministry of war as soon as the chambers meet. . . .

I am, therefore, under the dire necessity of postponing at least until after the session, . . . the execution of a project to the realization of which you have so efficaciously and so sympathetically contributed. I am extremely grateful for this, and when the chambers adjourn you will perhaps, if there is still time, again permit me to solicit your kind intervention.

At the last moment the French statesman had withdrawn.³²

²⁵ The hopes which Gambetta entertained at the time have been set forth by an intimate friend. He says: "Il s'était évidemment persuadé, à l'époque, sur quelque propos de Henckel, qu'il arracherait à Bismarck d'importantes concessions. . . . Mais l'erreur, à mon sens, est précisément là. Avoir cru que des concessions lui seraient faites sur l'Alsace-Lorraine par celui qu'il appelait le *Monstre*, et cela parce que Gambetta en aurait fait la condition de l'appui de la France 'à l'ordre nouveau' qu'à la vieille du Congrès de Berlin. . . . ce fut une illusion. . . ." Joseph Reinach, *La Vie Politique de Léon Gambetta*, Suivie d'Autres Essais sur Gambetta, 252.

²⁶ Hanotaux, IV, 262. According to Jacques Spuller, an intimate friend of Gambetta, it was Bismarck who changed his mind and desired to see the French statesman. Adam, 161.

²⁷ Aus Bismarcks Briefwechsel, 502.

²⁸ After having interviewed the German banker Gambetta wrote to Léonie Léon: "J'ai vu, j'ai promis. Le Monstre rentre pour me recevoir, et j'ai besoin de te voir. . . ." *Revue de Paris*, fourteenth year, I, 58.

²⁹ A prominent hotel in Berlin.

³⁰ Aus Bismarcks Briefwechsel, 504.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 504-505.

³² Twenty years ago Francis Laur, an intimate friend of Gam-

Bismarck's announcement that a European conference would consider the questions arising out of the Russo-Turkish war was made only after prolonged negotiations between the powers. The suggestion to have a conference came from Austria,³³ for Andrassy was of the opinion that with the signing of the preliminary peace between the belligerents the time had come to establish European accord upon the modifications which it would make in existing treaties.³⁴ He accordingly invited the powers signatory to the treaty of Paris of 1856 and to the London protocol of 1871 to attend the conference.³⁵ In reply to this invitation Waddington instructed Marquis de Vogüé, the French ambassador in Vienna, that he adhered to the proposition for a conference, provided all the powers signatory to the treaty of Paris were represented there, and that the program of its deliberations was limited and definite.³⁶ Not, however, until the signing of the

betta, asserted that an actual meeting took place between the two statesmen. In a series of articles in the Times, August 17, 19, and 26, 1907, the author stated that Gambetta travelled incognito to Friedrichsruh in May 1878. He declared that three questions were discussed during the interview: it was agreed not to enter upon the question of Alsace-Lorraine; with respect to the limitation of armaments it was agreed to maintain the status quo, provided the navy budget was excluded; and lastly, the question of alliances. In discussing the latter the chancellor is said to have expressed himself in favor of a Franco-Russo-German alliance. Gambetta opposed including Russia, and desired to substitute Great Britain.

Laur's assertions were refuted in two able articles appearing in the Times, August 22 and 27, 1907. At present it is generally believed that no meeting took place between Bismarck and Gambetta at this time. Otto Hamman, *Der Misverständene Bismarck*, 151; Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, 409; Paul Matter, *Bismarck et Son Temps*, III, 445; Paul Matter, *Gambetta*, 120; Hanotaux, IV, 263; Reinach, 252; Adam, 165; Galli, 172. The following statement was made by Bismarck to Hohenlohe: "Schon früher war eine solche vorbereitet, und nur durch meine Krankheit während der Osterzeit wurde die Ausführung des damals gehegten Planes verhindert." *Grosse Politik*, I, 387.

³³ *Grosse Politik*, II, 169-170; Wertheimer, III, 84.

³⁴ *Grosse Politik*, II, 169-170.

³⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Affaires d'Orient*, Congrès de Berlin, 7-8; Cd. 1977. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey, 1-2; *Grosse Politik*, II, 183.

³⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Affaires d'Orient*, Congrès de Berlin, 8-9. Waddington informed Wimpffen, Austrian ambassador in Paris, to the same effect. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Anglo-Russian convention of May 30 was the danger of war averted and the success of the congress assured.³⁷

France regarded the Russo-Turkish war with some indifference, being too much preoccupied by domestic difficulties.³⁸ Her statesmen followed a policy of peace, always keeping in view the attitude of Germany in the eastern affair.³⁹ The question, then, whether France should participate in a European congress was the source of some disagreement at home. It appears that the ministry hesitated at first,⁴⁰ but finally determined to take its place among the European powers.⁴¹

³⁷ In the discussions concerning the questions to be submitted to the congress wide disagreement prevailed between Russia and Great Britain. A satisfactory settlement, however, was made in the Salisbury-Shuvalov agreement of May 30, 1878. Cecil, II, 258-260; Loftus, II, 249-251; Grosse Politik, II, 233-239; Radowitz, II, 7; Hanotaux, IV, 339.

³⁸ Especially the events of May 16 and the subsequent constitutional struggle.

³⁹ Hanotaux, IV, 309. See Decazes' declaration to the senate May 1, 1877. *Journal Officiel*, 1877, III, 3187. The American minister to France, Edward F. Noyes, reported to his government: "The French Government prefers a policy of peace and internal development, and will not I think be induced to engage in any war for an idea. Nevertheless the future action of France will undoubtedly depend somewhat upon the attitude assumed by the German Emperor. Unless Prussia takes an active part in the war which is possibly impending, I am confident the French Republic will pursue a policy of strict neutrality." MSS. Department of State, French Despatches, LXXXIII, number 70. The attitude of Germany towards the eastern question was, on the other hand, influenced by the policy of France. A British diplomat, Sir Horace Rumbold, recorded the following in his diary under the date of June 1, 1877: "It is reported from Berlin on the best authority that Bismarck still dreads an attack from France, and that all his policy is subordinate to that fear." Sir Horace Rumbold, *Further Recollections of a Diplomatist*, 103-104.

⁴⁰ This hesitation is apparent in Waddington's despatch of February 16 to Le Flô, French ambassador to Russia, when he wrote: "Bien que la Conférence n'ait pas un attrait pour nous. . . ." *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Affaires d'Orient*, *Congrès de Berlin*, II. Gathorne Hardy, the British secretary of state for war, wrote March 7, 1878: "France wants quiet—no Conference, or no active part in it." Gathorne Hardy, *First Earl Cranbrook* (edited by A. E. Gathorne Hardy), II, 55.

⁴¹ Gambetta was at first opposed to France participating in the congress, but he changed his mind March 6 after a long interview with Waddington and Freycinet. Charles de Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 32; Reinach, 257. On the same evening he wrote to Léonie Léon: "tes dernières paroles ont triomphé de mes dernières hésitations, et si on se réunit à Berlin sous la présidence du Monstre,

However, it was considered expedient to enter the congress with reservations. Waddington, therefore, desired that the congress should be restricted to the consideration of questions arising out of the war,⁴² and March 7 he informed the French representatives abroad that the congress ought to exclude the question of Egypt, Syria, and the Holy Places.⁴³ Only after having been assured officially that its reservations were accepted by the powers did France agree to enter the congress.⁴⁴ The French minister of foreign affairs justified this policy by indicating that France had an important interest in maintaining the peace which was threatened by events in the Balkans since she was preparing to undertake works which required peace.⁴⁵

il faut y aller, surtout si c'est de lui que vient l'invitation. J'ai passé la soirée avec notre ministre et en rentrant j'ai trouvé cette merveilleuse et décisive missive. . . ." *Revue de Paris*, fourteenth year, I, 57. The same influence is also indicated in a letter of March 11: "Tu as triomphé de mes dernières résistances. C'est fait, nous irons là-bas avec toutes sortes de précautions, de lisières." *Ibid.*, thirteenth year, VI, 453. Also see *Le Siècle*, 12 March 1878.

⁴² *Grosse Politik*, II, 212-213. A full account of French policy was given by Waddington to the chamber of deputies June 7, 1878. *Journal Officiel*, 1878, *Chambre, Ord.*, III, 6411.

⁴³ *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Affaires d'Orient*, Congrès de Berlin, 14.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17. France insisted upon the same reservations during the negotiations concerning a preliminary conference. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20; *Grosse Politik*, II, 219-220.

⁴⁵ The minister of foreign affairs explained that the construction of railways and schools, and the opening of the universal exposition made peace necessary. *Journal Officiel*, 1878, *Chambre, Ord.*, III, 6411. See also Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, II, 150.

The exposition was to open in Paris May 1, 1878. Officially Germany did not participate in the exposition, but the emperor authorized German sculptors and painters to exhibit their work. *Grosse Politik*, III, 382-384; *Journal Officiel*, 1878, II, 2484. This caused great satisfaction to the French ministry, for Hohenlohe reported to Bismarck: "Die Nachricht, dass Deutschland sich an der Weltausstellung nun ebenfalls beteiligen werde, hat hier in allen massgebenden Kreisen den günstigsten Eindruck hervorgebracht. Ich hatte bereits die Ehre zu berichten, dass Herr Waddington, als ich ihm die bezügliche Mitteilung machte grosse Befriedigung darüber an den Tag legte, nachdem ich nun während der letzten Tage mit mehreren andern politischen Persönlichkeiten über dieselbe Frage gesprochen habe, kann ich konstatieren, dass die Befriedigung des Ministers nicht nur von seinen Kollegen, sondern überhaupt von der ganzen regierungsfreundlichen Partei in vollem Masse geteilt wird. . . . Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass dem Hasse gegen das

During the negotiations leading up to the congress of Berlin the relations between France and Germany were of a very friendly character.⁴⁶ The former, in coming forth from her isolation, resumed her importance in the European concert, and the latter made use of this to bring the congress to a successful conclusion.⁴⁷ Bismarck gave his full support to the French contention that certain restrictions should be placed upon the competence of the congress,⁴⁸ and at the same time he endeavored to gain French support in order to prevent the formation of coalitions.⁴⁹ The French plenipotentiaries were received very graciously in Berlin by the Prince Imperial,⁵⁰ and Bismarck showed them every attention.⁵¹ The latter, having been elected to preside over the conference, was in a position to bestow his favor upon the French representatives; and it was through him that a member of the

siegreiche Deutschland, der ganz besonders durch die klerikale Presse geschürt und wachgehalten wird, durch die Beteiligung Deutschlands an der Ausstellung ein Ende gemacht werde. Eine solche Umwandlung in dem französischen Geiste kann durch die Zeit allein hervorgebracht werden; aber zur Befestigung offizieller, freundlicher Beziehungen, die mit der Zeit hoffentlich um sich greifen und tiefer und tiefer auch in die Volksschichten dringen werden, dürfte kaum andere Massregel mehr geeignet gewesen sein, als diejenige, die Seine Majestät der Kaiser in bezug auf Beteiligung an der Ausstellung zu genehmigen geruht haben." *Grosse Politik*, III, 385-386. The opening of the German exhibit was marked by mutual expressions of peace and friendship. *Journal Officiel*, 1878, III, 5114.

⁴⁶ One journal wrote: "Nous avouerons que nous avons considéré, dès l'origine, la question d'Orient comme un terrain sur lequel la France et l'Allemagne pouvaient arriver à une entente qui mettrait fin à ce 'fâcheux système de suspicion' que le journal allemande se réjouit de voir disparaître. Pendant deux ans nous avons combattu sans cesse la politique de M. Decazes, parce qu'elle rendait ce rapprochement diplomatique impossible, en laissant croire à l'Allemagne que nous voulions profiter de la question d'Orient pour nouer des alliances." *Journal des Débats*, 18 April 1878.

⁴⁷ *The Times*, 15 June 1878.

⁴⁸ *Grosse Politik*, II, 224.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

⁵⁰ *Journal Officiel*, 1878, III, 6620; Mary King Waddington, *My First Years as a Frenchwoman*, 142. The Prince Imperial represented the German government following Nobiling's attempt upon the life of the aged emperor. Erich Marcks, *Kaiser Wilhelm I*, p. 270.

⁵¹ Waddington, 144; Newton, II, 168; *Revue de Deux Mondes*, fifth period, XXIII, 739; *The Times*, 15 June 1878.

French delegation was named as one of the editors of the protocols of the congress.⁵²

The French plenipotentiaries went to Berlin without having promised their support to any power, and consequently they were not deeply engaged in many questions which were brought before the congress. They did, however, follow traditional French policy with regard to Greece and the Christian population of the Balkans,⁵³ and in this they were firmly supported by Bismarck.⁵⁴ At one of the early sessions of the congress⁵⁵ Waddington proposed that Greece should be admitted to discussions relative to the Turkish provinces contiguous to her territory, and also in other deliberations when the congress deemed it necessary.⁵⁶ Bismarck supported the French proposal, successfully securing its passage.⁵⁷ The Greek representatives then put forth their claims at the congress, and July 5 Waddington suggested that it would be equitable and politic to join to Greece populations that would

⁵² The French representative referred to, Comte de Moüy, has written a very interesting account of his experiences at the Congress of Berlin. His testimony as to Bismarck's friendliness is as follows: "Au cours des pourparlers préparatoires, dans ces fréquents entretiens avec notre ambassadeur, il nous témoignait la plus courtoise déférence; il avait adopté avec impressement les vues et les réserves de M. Waddington; il avait examiné avec l'un et l'autre, dans le sens plus conciliant, plusieurs points du programme générale, et donne ainsi à nos relations sur le terrain oriental les meilleurs apparences. Le choix du rédacteur des protocoles s'accordait avec cette conduite prévenante, dont assurément nous ne nous exagérons pas la portée, mais qui, après tout, devait faciliter notre rôle au Congrès et atténuer nos soucis permanens." *Revue de Deux Mondes*, fifth period, XXIII, 737. Also see Radowitz, II, 19. It is said that the entente between France and Germany was so complete on the eastern question that Bismarck offered the presidency of the congress to Waddington. The French archives have not yielded the letter containing this offer, but it is said that the French foreign minister declined the honor March 19. Bourgeois and Pagès, 183.

⁵³ See Waddington's statement to the chamber of deputies. *Journal Officiel*, 1879, *Chambre, Ord.*, VII, 7891.

⁵⁴ *The Times*, 11 February 1880; *Ibid.*, 2 August 1880.

⁵⁵ The protocols of the congress are to be found in several publications: *Journal Officiel*, 1878, VI, 10516-10557; *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Congrès de Berlin*; Cd. 2083. Correspondence Relating to the Congress of Berlin with the Protocols of the Congress; De Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Générale de Traités*, second series, III, 276-448. In this study the *Livre Jaune* has been used.

⁵⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Congrès de Berlin*, 76.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

be a source of strength to her and that were only a source of weakness to Turkey.⁵⁸ He therefore proposed that the congress should indicate in a general manner, without injury to the Porte, the limits that it would wish to see assigned to Greece.⁵⁹ This proposal was considered along with the fifteenth article of the treaty of San Stefano, being adopted by the congress without much dissent.⁶⁰

The second group of questions in which the French plenipotentiaries took an interest concerned the Christian population of the Balkans. While the problem of Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia was being discussed Waddington proposed that measures should be taken to guarantee equality of rights to all inhabitants regardless of religion, the free exercise of religious worship, and the protection of Catholic friars and priests.⁶¹ These propositions were accepted unanimously by the congress for it recognized the necessity of protecting minorities.⁶² When the question of Serbian independence was discussed Waddington submitted the same measure to secure religious freedom,⁶³ and in this he was supported by Bismarck, who declared that Germany's assent was acquired in every motion favorable to religious liberty.⁶⁴ France also secured the admittance of Rumanian representatives to the congress, and caused that body to place upon Rumanian independence the same limitations with regard to the preservation of religious liberty as had been done in the case of Serbia.⁶⁵ In the other questions before the congress the French representatives preserved a neutral attitude, endeavoring by their good offices to compose many minor differences

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 200-202.

⁵⁹ Ibid. The congress recommended a rectification of frontier in Thessaly and Epirus. This was embodied in Article XXIV of the Treaty of Berlin.

⁶⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1878, Congrès de Berlin, 207. Article XV of the treaty of San Stefano dealt with the application of the organic statute of 1868 in Crete, and a similar regulation in Thessaly and Epirus. This was later made Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 98-99.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 142.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 156.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 166.

affecting the powers.⁶⁶ In all, France contributed materially in bringing the conference to a successful conclusion.⁶⁷

Waddington well summarized the policy of France at the congress in an address at Aisne. He said:⁶⁸

We have brought back peace, which more than once might have been compromised by pretensions on one side or the other; and France has returned from Berlin as free from engagements as she went. On all questions where there was no risk of making France deviate from her neutrality, we exercised the influence appertaining to a great nation when its voice is impartial and disinterested.

France, indeed, returned from the Congress of Berlin with her position greatly strengthened abroad. She had entered into closer relations with all the powers, and had laid the basis for her future colonial expansion.⁶⁹

The congress left France and Germany in better relations with each other than at any time since the war of 1870-71. After the congress Hohenlohe and Bülow received the grand cross of the Legion of Honor; Radowitz was appointed grand officer; and Holstein and Busch were named commanders.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ On one occasion the French representatives maintained harmony within the congress by withdrawing their proposals concerning the evacuation of eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, and Rumania in order that Russia might be appeased.

⁶⁷ The congress was brought to a close July 13, 1878. With respect to the French delegates one correspondent wrote: "Nor must the French Plenipotentiaries be forgotten as having done good work in forwarding the common object. The professed policy of France was one, indeed, of inaction and of neutrality somewhat beyond the needs of the case. Not the less has the Congress been aided in its task by the presence of the French Plenipotentiaries." *The Times*, 15 July 1878. For further information as to the position of France at the congress see: Hanotaux, IV, 379-380; Radowitz, II, 28-29. Other interesting material concerning the congress is to be found in an article by A. N. Cumming, "The Secret History of the Treaty of Berlin," in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, LVIII, 83-90.

⁶⁸ *Journal des Débats*, 23 August 1878, reprinted this address from the *Courier de l'Aisne*.

⁶⁹ Gambetta was of the opinion that the Congress of Berlin had not left intact the understanding arrived at by the three emperors in 1873. In an interview with Blowitz he said: "In my opinion, therefore, it may be affirmed that the Congress of Berlin has modified in a very essential way the basis of the understanding of 1873; and I think France has every reason to approve a change which modifies a combination formed apart from her, if not against her." *The Times*, 24 July 1878.

⁷⁰ *The Times*, 30 July 1878. Concerning this incident the Paris correspondent wrote: "The appointment of Prince Hohenlohe has

The French representatives felt that one of the important results of the congress was the increased good friendship between France and Germany. Saint-Vallier's opinion was indicative of this feeling when he said in an address at Aisne:⁷¹

In 1871 M. Thiers summoned me to take part in the great work of the liberation of our soil, and the share he allowed me to take in it will ever be the pride and honour of my life. My present mission is the sequel, the complement of the first. After labouring to free our country, I am now engaged to insure its security by setting myself to dispel distrusts and to restore the good accord between ourselves and Germany. I feel deep satisfaction at being able to say that a great stride has been made during the last two months, and that hitherto my aim has been attained.

There was little activity in French politics during the summer and autumn of 1878 due to the diversions afforded by the universal exposition, but with its close preparations were made for the impending senatorial elections.⁷² The Republicans put forth every effort to secure a majority, and they were finally rewarded by the election of January 5, 1879.⁷³ Thus fortified with a majority in both houses of parliament the Republicans began a program of reform. At first President MacMahon yielded, but when the cabinet presented to him a decree relieving army corps commanders of their duties he refused to sign it.⁷⁴ He then submitted his resignation to the

long been desired and expected. . . . It is merely a mark of homage to his constant efforts to smooth away the many differences which have arisen during nearly five years between France and Germany. All that man could do without neglecting his duty Prince Hohenlohe has done to bring about that *trêve de Dieu* which will enable time to do its work and let the present generation enjoy peace. In giving him the highest grade of the national order the Government has shown that France appreciates the efforts of the German Ambassador and is publicly grateful to him for them."

⁷¹ Ibid., 23 August 1878.

⁷² Deschanel, 230-231.

⁷³ The Republicans won sixty-five seats while the Conservatives secured but sixteen. *Journal des Débats*, 6 January 1879; *Le Siècle*, 6 January 1879.

⁷⁴ Hanotaux, IV, 427-428; Freycinet, II, 52-56; Picot, 392; Ernest Daudet, *Souvenirs de la Présidence du Maréchal MacMahon*, 224; *Journal des Débats*, 31 January 1879; *Le Siècle*, 30 January 1879.

national assembly.⁷⁵ That body immediately chose a new executive, namely, Jules Grévy,⁷⁶ the president of the chamber of deputies.⁷⁷

President Grévy, desirous of making his foreign policy understood abroad, charged Waddington with the formation of a new ministry,⁷⁸ and this act was received by the continental powers as an assurance that the president desired to keep France at peace.⁷⁹ In order to accentuate his peaceful tendencies Grévy informed the senate and the chamber of deputies that "the government will continue to maintain and extend the good relations which exist between France and foreign powers, and to contribute in this manner to the establishment of general peace."⁸⁰

That the relations between France and Germany were not at all affected by the change was evident.⁸¹ At a *soirée* given

⁷⁵ Journal Officiel, 1879, I, 667. MacMahon considered this measure contrary to the interests of the army and the country.

⁷⁶ Jules Grévy was born in the department of Jura August 15, 1807. He was admitted to the bar in 1837, and in 1848 he was elected to the national assembly that met in that year. He served in this legislative body for several years, returning to his professional work in 1852. Later, 1868, he was again elected to this legislative body, and in 1871 he was made a member of the national assembly under the third republic. When the organic laws of 1875 went into effect Grévy was chosen president of the chamber of deputies. He held that office when elected president of the French Republic.

⁷⁷ Journal Officiel, 1879, I, 678. The German press spoke favorably of the change. Commenting upon this an influential French journal said: "on ne trouve dans les journaux de Berlin . . . que des éloges pour M. le Président Grévy, dont la personnalité grave et austère est saluée avec une unanime sympathie, et dont on se croit le droit d'espérer la continuation de relations internationales les plus pacifiques et les plus cordiales." Journal des Débats, 3 February 1879. Also see Le Siècle, 5 February 1879.

⁷⁸ Journal Officiel, 1879, I, 769.

⁷⁹ The Times, 3 February 1879. A republican journal made the following remark concerning the election of Grévy: "C'est là un événement important entre tous; c'est la plus grand témoignage que la France républicaine pouvait donner à l'Europe de son désir de marcher dans la voie du progrès et de la liberté et de sa ferme volonté de maintenir la paix extérieure. Car, à quoi bon un président militaire, si ce n'est pour faire la guerre au dehors ou au dedans?" Le Siècle, 2 February 1879.

⁸⁰ Journal Officiel, 1879, I, 819, 826.

⁸¹ With regard to the presidential change Bülow wrote to the Prussian representatives at Munich, Dresden, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe as follows: "Die Frage, ob die neue Regierung mit ihrer

by the emperor the French ambassador learned that the presidential election was regarded with favor by the German court,⁸² for in a conversation with Saint-Vallier the emperor said that "with M. Grévy nothing will be changed."⁸³ In Paris similar assurances were given Grévy by Prince Hohenlohe.⁸⁴ Mutual confidence seemed to be completely restored, and existing conditions were well described by the Berlin correspondent of the *Times*:⁸⁵

It is certain that ever since last July the diplomatic relations of the two countries have been of the most cordial kind, a state of things evidenced no less by the distinguished consideration paid here to M. St. Vallier than by the conspicuous courtesy to General Chanzy when passing through Berlin not long ago to replace General Le Flô as representative of the Republic in St. Petersburg. It is plain, indeed, that Prince Bismarck has altogether changed his attitude to France, hoping to gain by an appearance of confidence what it would be difficult to achieve by looks and acts of suspicion; and though events across the Rhine are watched here with the keenest attention, there is a feeling that there need be no serious cause for apprehension as long as the destinies of the Republic are in the hands of men animated by the spirit of such as M. Waddington.

schärfer akzentuierten demokratisch-republikanischen Tendenz für Frankreich ein günstiges Ereignis ist, hat für uns insofern keine praktische Bedeutung, als wir weder das Recht noch die Absicht haben, in die inneren Schicksale fremder Staaten einzugreifen." *Grosse Politik*, III, 390. In the same despatch the following tribute was paid to Waddington: "Endlich wurde in Erwägung gezogen, dass der Minister der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten und nunmehrige Conseilpräsident, Herr Waddington, uns durch seine ganze Amtsführung und die von ihm während des Berliner Kongresses, wie bei den Verhandlungen zur Ausführung der Berliner Verabredungen bewahrten loyalen und masshaltenden Friedensliebe, wie durch seine sehr achtbaren Charaktereigenschaften grosses Vertrauen und die Überzeugung eingeflösst hat, dass unter seiner Leitung—solange dieselbe wahr—die Republik sich in den verständigen und konservativen Politik bewegen wird." *Ibid.*, pp. 390-391. Waldersee gives similar testimony: "Minister Waddington hat jedenfalls den besten Willen, mit uns auf gutem Fuss zu bleiben." Waldersee, I, 196.

⁸² *The Times*, 21 February 1879; Ernest Daudet, *La Mission du Comte de Saint-Vallier*, 100-103.

⁸³ Daudet, 100-103.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁸⁵ *The Times*, 24 May 1879.

CHAPTER III

GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY

The relations between France and Germany remained very cordial during the period immediately after the Congress of Berlin. The treaty of July 13, 1878 did not bring peace at once to Europe, for the powers found it necessary to solve many problems arising out of this agreement. France considered the Christian populations of the eastern Mediterranean as her natural clientèle and was therefore anxious to procure for Greece the benefits which were to be realized under Article XXIV of the treaty.¹ In this particular question Prince Bismarck never ceased supporting Waddington in his efforts to secure new boundaries for Greece.² This was plainly evident during the negotiations which continued from July 1878 to April 1881.

Greece considered the boundary recommended by the congress as her own, while Turkey protested against such an interpretation of the treaty. The latter adopted her usual policy of delay, and the former prematurely appealed to the powers in order to secure mediation.³ Waddington in a circular despatch of October 21, 1878 asked whether the time had not come for the powers to mediate under Article XXIV,⁴ but before further steps could be taken the Turkish government named commissioners to meet the Greeks at Prevesa.⁵ This body, however, reached no agreement and March 19,

¹ Journal Officiel, 1879, Chambre, Ord., VII, 7891. Article XXIV of the Treaty of Berlin provided for the mediation of the powers if Greece and Turkey could not agree upon the boundary indicated in the thirteenth protocol of the congress.

² Bourgeois and Pagès, 193.

³ Livre Jaune, 1879, *Négotiations Relatives à la Rectification des Frontières de la Grèce*, 32. This will be cited hereafter as *Affaires de Grèce*. Cd. 2330. Correspondence Respecting the Negotiations for the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 30.

⁴ Cd. 2330, pp. 40-43; Livre Jaune, 1879, *Affaires de Grèce*, 33-36.

⁵ Cd. 2330, pp. 57-58. Prevesa is situated in Epirus near the Gulf of Arta.

1879 the conference came to a close.⁶ Waddington again called upon the European concert April 21, proposing a conference under the supervision of the ambassadors in Constantinople in order to facilitate the negotiations between Greece and Turkey.⁷ The powers accepted this proposal,⁸ and after the delivery of an identic note June 21⁹ the Porte named its commissioners to the conference.¹⁰ Again the Greeks were disappointed, for the meeting ended in failure November 23, 1879.¹¹

⁶ Livre Jaune, 1879, Affaires de Grèce, 77. For the protocols of these conferences: Ibid., pp. 179-261.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 112-113; Cd. 2330, pp. 178-180.

⁸ Livre Jaune, 1879, Affaires de Grèce, 113; Cd. 2330, pp. 187, 198, 204.

⁹ Cd. 2474. Further Correspondence Respecting the Negotiations for the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 4; Livre Jaune, 1879, Affaires de Grèce, 125-126.

¹⁰ Cd. 2474, p. 31; Livre Jaune, 1879, Affaires de Grèce, 133-134.

¹¹ Livre Jaune, 1879, Affaires de Grèce, 170. The attitude of Germany towards France during this period was well indicated by Bismarck in supporting the frequent proposals made by Waddington. The following despatch from von Radowitz of the German foreign office to Count Berchem, German chargé d'affaires in Vienna, illustrates this.

Berlin, den 21. November 1879.

Nr. 819

Vertraulich.

Ew. pp. wissen, dass wir uns schon früher bei dem k. und k. österreichisch-ungarischen Kabinett dahin geäussert haben, wir hielten eine Erledigung der griechischen Grenzfrage im Sinne der von Minister Waddington befürworteten Vorschläge für wünschenswert und wären unsrerseits geneigt, die französische Politik in dieser Angelegenheit zu unterstützen. Nach den Meldungen aus Constantinopel ist vorauszusetzen, dass der Moment bald eintreten werde, an dem die Mächte in Gemässheit des Artikels XXIV des Berliner Vertrages die endgültige Erledigung der Streitfrage in die Hand nehmen müssen. Für diesen Fall hat die französische Regierung neuerdings, in ganz vertraulicher Form, das Ersuchen an uns gestellt, dass wir, wie bisher, auch fernerhin in Übereinstimmung mit ihr uns erhalten und dazu beitragen möchten, die Frage einer für Frankreich annehmbar Lösung entgegenzuführen. Der Herr Reichskanzler hat diese allgemeine Zusicherung bereitwillig für unseren Teil gegeben und würde es mit Befriedigung sehen, wenn auch auf seiten des österreichisch-ungarischen Kabinetts die gleiche Anschauung massgebend bliebe. Es erscheint ihm unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen sehr erwünscht, dem französischen Ministerium, welches sich für die in Rede stehende Frage besonders engagiert hat, zu einer Genugthuung zu verhelfen, die nicht ohne Einfluss sein kann für die von uns in voller Übereinstimmung mit dem Wiener Kabinett gesuchte Befestigung der Stellung des Herrn Waddington.

Great Britain now assumed a more positive attitude and proposed to the European powers the establishment of a boundary commission to investigate the dispute.¹² Later, Lord Granville suggested the meeting of a conference in order to decide upon a proper line of rectification of the frontier.¹³ This was received favorably by the powers and June 7, 1880 the German Emperor issued invitations to the European cabinets to be represented in conference in Berlin.¹⁴ France was anxious for the meeting to succeed, and accordingly made known to Germany how important her future support would be.¹⁵ This was promised by Hohenlohe, who subsequently presided over the conference of ambassadors.¹⁶ This body met from June 16 to July 1, concluding its discus-

Ew. pp. bitte ich ergebent, im Auftrage des Herrn Reichskanzlers, sich gelegentlich und vertraulich in diesem Sinne dem Freiherrn von Haymerle gegenüber äussern zu wollen.

I. A.
von Radowitz

Grosse Politik, III, 393. Earlier in the year, May 29, the Rumanian agent in Berlin reported Saint-Vallier as saying: "Le prince de Bismarck marche très carrément avec nous dans la question des frontières grecques . . ." Nicolai Iorga, *Correspondance Diplomatique Roumaine sous le Roi Charles Ier, 1866-1880*, p. 286.

¹² Cd. 2555. Further Correspondence Respecting the Negotiations for the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 14-15.

¹³ Livre Jaune, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, 13-14; Cd. 2760. Correspondence Respecting the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 2; Grosse Politik, IV, 15; Von Schweinitz, II, 115.

¹⁴ Cd. 2760, p. 21; Cd. 2633. Correspondence Respecting the Conference at Berlin on the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 1; Livre Jaune, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, 41-42.

¹⁵ Grosse Politik, III, 399 note.

¹⁶ Hohenlohe wrote to von Radowitz under the date of June 10, 1880: "Wir werden die durch die Konferenz gebotene Gelegenheit gern benutzen, um Frankreich gefällig zu sein, und uns allen seinen Anträgen, falls sie nicht zu weit über die Kongressvorschläge hinausgehen, bereitwillig anschliessen, deshalb auch für die Überlassung von Janina an Griechenland, wenn sie Frankreich befürwortet, stimmen." Grosse Politik, III, 399. A week later he again wrote to von Radowitz: "Die auf eine Spannung zwischen uns und Frankreich spekulieren, verrechnen sich gründlich. In der griechischen Frage gehen wir ganz mit dem Franzosen und akzeptieren Janina-Metzowo. Die Konferenz wird also voraussichtlich zur einstimmigen Annahme des französischen Trasse führen . . ." Radowitz, II, 144. Hohenlohe noted in his journal June 18: "Die Konferenz ist also seit dem 16. eröffnet. Wir sind alle mit dem französischen Vorschlag einverstanden. Es wird also nicht lange dauern." Hohenlohe, II, 299.

sions by recommending a boundary closely following that of the Treaty of Berlin.¹⁷ The Porte was advised of this new demarcation in the collective note of July 15, 1880,¹⁸ but due to the general indecision of the powers nothing was accomplished.¹⁹ France then proposed that the question be arbitrated,²⁰ but this was also unsuccessful.²¹ Finally, a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople brought about a settlement, and May 24, 1881 a convention was signed between Turkey and Greece whereby the latter gained nearly all of Thessaly, while the former retained Epirus with the exception of Arta.²²

Probably the most important result of the Congress of Berlin was the estrangement of Germany and Russia, for the latter considered that she had been deprived of the fruits of victory chiefly through German action.²³ During the summer of 1879 a violent press war began in the two countries, and August 15 the tsar complained to his uncle, William I, concerning the action of the Germans serving

¹⁷ The protocols of the conference in Berlin and the proceedings of the technical commission are to be found in the *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, troisième annexe, xi-lxxxiii. Also Cd. 2633. These proceedings indicate that Germany gave full support to the proposals advocated by France.

¹⁸ Cd. 2760, p. 42; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, 85.

¹⁹ German policy in the Greek question was indicated as follows: "Was die Haltung Deutschlands gegenüber Griechenland anlangt, so stehen die allerhöchsten Intentionen dahin fest, dass die Aussichten dieses christlichen Königreichs auf Vergrößerung zu fördern seien, soweit wir dies ohne kriegerische Handlungen tun können." *Grosse Politik*, IV, 19.

²⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, 158-159; Cd. 2799. Further Correspondence Respecting the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 23; *Grosse Politik*, IV, 21 note; Arthur D. Elliot, *The Life of George Joachim Goschen*, I, 205-206.

²¹ Cd. 2799, pp. 51-52, 55; *Grosse Politik*, IV, 21-22.

²² *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires de Grèce*, 131-137; Cd. 2879. Further Correspondence Respecting the Rectification of the Greek Frontier, 1-8; Cd. 2912. Despatch from Mr. Goschen Forwarding the Convention between Greece and Turkey. The work of the conference of ambassadors is well depicted in Goschen's letters. Elliot, I, 217-240.

²³ Tsar Alexander II characterized the congress as a "European coalition against Russia under the leadership of Prince Bismarck." *Grosse Politik*, III, 3.

upon the commissions which were carrying out the treaty.²⁴ The German Emperor denied that the instructions or the reports of the German commissioners were in any way hostile to Russia.²⁵ Bismarck, long harassed by the "nightmare of coalitions," regarded these Russian menaces with anxiety, and finally he decided to seek an alliance with Austria.²⁶ He had already sounded Andrassy as to a meeting August 13, and ten days later he again urged the Austrian foreign minister to confer with him.²⁷ The latter responded to the chancellor's overtures, the two statesmen meeting at Gastein August 27 and 28.²⁸ They agreed upon a purely defensive alliance²⁹ since they thought their sovereigns would accept such a treaty, and Francis Joseph gladly consented,³⁰ but not William I.³¹ Notwithstanding this the German chancellor went to Vienna September 21 in order to renew his discussions with Andrassy,³² and the subsequent negotiations

²⁴ Grosse Politik, p. 15. The tsar claimed that France and Italy supported Russia while Germany always supported Austria. Previous to the letter of August 15 the tsar had complained to the German ambassador in St. Petersburg. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-12; Von Schweinitz, II, 65-66.

²⁵ Grosse Politik, III, 22. Bismarck gave an account of the tsar's letter and the German reply to Frederick Lord Dufferin, British ambassador in St. Petersburg. Alfred Lyall, *The Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, I, 304.

²⁶ Bismarck, II, 272-274.

²⁷ Wertheimer, III, 231.

²⁸ Bismarck, II, 274; Wertheimer, III, 237-245.

²⁹ Grosse Politik, III, 23; Bismarck, II, 274.

³⁰ Wertheimer, III, 253; Grosse Politik, III, 44.

³¹ The chancellor endeavored to convince the kaiser of the necessity of an agreement with Austria, but the latter remained unconvinced. Grosse Politik, III, 26-36, 39-43, 52-59. Before Bismarck departed for the Austrian capital the emperor wrote to him: "Sie mögen also in Wien . . . die Eventualitäten einer sich bis zum möglichen Bruche mit Russland steigenden Disharmonie und dann gefahrdrohend, vorstellen, und in Pourparlers über die dann gemeinschaftlich mit Österreich zu treffenden Massnahmen eintreten. Aber zu irgendeinem Abschluss einer Konvention oder gar Alliance autorisiere ich Sie, meinem Gewissen nach, nicht." *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³² Bismarck informed Andrassy that Germany would only negotiate a general defensive alliance, but the latter offered two objections to this: in the first place, if the present French ministry collapsed on account of symptoms of a monarchical alliance against the French Republic it would be driven into an alliance with Russia; secondly, a general defensive alliance between Austria and Germany would always be considered as being directed against France. Wertheimer, III, 279-280; Grosse Politik, III, 93-94.

resulted in a defensive alliance directed against Russia.³³ Bismarck put forth every effort to persuade his master to accept the treaty,³⁴ but with ill-success. Not until the chancellor threatened to resign³⁵ did William accept the agreement.³⁶

The Austro-German alliance must be regarded as having been made primarily with respect to Russia, for France received only secondary consideration.³⁷ Before leaving for

³³ Alfred F. Pribram, *Die Politischen Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns, 1879-1914*, I, 3-9; *Grosse Politik*, III, 103-104.

³⁴ From the German viewpoint the ends to be attained by the alliance were fivefold: to prevent the formation of an Austro-Russo-French alliance against Germany; to prevent Austria from entering into an agreement either with Russia or with France to the detriment of Germany; to assure Austria's benevolent neutrality in case of a French attack upon Germany; to assure Austrian aid in case of a Franco-Russian attack upon Germany; and to prevent the eventuality of a Russian attack. *Grosse Politik*, III, 96. The marginal notes of the emperor to this memorandum indicated how anxious he was to be secured against French attack. In one place he wrote: "Warum sollen wir Öst[er]reich nur gegen Russland mit unserer ganzen Macht unterstützen, u[nd] uns gegen Angriff Frankreichs mit einer Neutralität Öst[er]reich begnügen? was wir für Öst[er]reich gegen Russland tun, muss Öst[er]reich für uns gegen Frankreich tun." *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, III, 106, 109.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 110. The opposition of the emperor is indicated very clearly in the diary of Radowitz. Radowitz, II, 86-108. Lady Emily Russell, wife of the British ambassador in Berlin, wrote to Queen Victoria: "Perhaps one of the most wonderful results of . . . [Bismarck's] personal influence has been to overcome the Emperor's reluctance to ratify the alliance with Austria, which his Majesty deemed contrary to the feelings and traditions of the House of Hohenzollern." Buckle, III, 59.

³⁷ It is undoubtedly true that the Austro-German alliance was an important part of Bismarck's plan to secure the isolation of France, and this opinion was expressed by Saint-Vallier in a letter written early in 1880. Daudet, 169. One writer has asserted that the alliance was prompted by rumored negotiations between St. Petersburg and Paris (Otto Hamman, *Der Misverstandene Bismarck*, 18), but it is certain that Bismarck had begun conversations with Andrassy previous to any rumors concerning a Franco-Russian rapprochement.

Bismarck's suspicion that Russia sought an alliance with France began with a remark made by Andrassy to Reuss, the German ambassador in Vienna, September 8, 1879 (*Grosse Politik*, III, 81 note), causing the chancellor to instruct Hohenlohe to secure information in Paris. *Ibid.*, p. 82 note. The latter reported that no official proposals had been made, but that advances had been made to Waddington in private conversations. *Ibid.* The correctness of this report is to be verified in a later conversation between the

Vienna Bismarck ascertained from Hohenlohe the exact temper of France and how the journey to the Austrian capital would be interpreted.³⁸ The reply received was satisfactory, and then the chancellor informed Paris that during his sojourn in Vienna he would assure the French ambassador of Germany's most sincerely peaceful feelings.³⁹ He accordingly called upon Teisserenc de Bort, the French ambassador in Vienna, and assured him that the intimacy between Austria and Germany ought not to disquiet or arouse French susceptibilities nor impair the good relations between France and Germany.⁴⁰

French foreign minister and his successor, Charles de Freycinet. Freycinet, II, 110-111. Later, October 17, Lord Salisbury informed Count Münster, the German ambassador in London, that quite recently Russia had made attempts to clear the way for an understanding with France (*Grosse Politik*, IV, 13), and upon another occasion Bismarck told Lord Dufferin that these overtures were made to France by General Obrutchev, who had been sent to assist at the French military maneuvers. Lyall, I, 304. This latter information was made public in March 1880 by the Berlin correspondent of the *Standard* (London). He wrote: "It was General Obrutcheff, General Miloutin's adjutant and private secretary, who had to go to France on this ominous errand. Prince Gortschakoff, of course, approved the mission; but there seems lately to have been an attempt made to show that the Russian Emperor was not cognisant of what was going on, or at least that he did not know the full extent to which the Russian advances were carried in Paris." The *Standard*, 19 March 1880.

The Russian government later denied that such advances had been made to France, for, in 1886, Giers told Bülow: "Die Franzosen kennen nicht die russischen Verhältnisse. Sie haben übrigens schon einmal versucht, Deutschland gegen uns misstrauisch zu machen, damals als Waddington behauptete, Obrutschew wäre nach Frankreich geschickt worden, um dieses für eine Allianz mit Russland gegen Deutschland zu gewinnen." *Grosse Politik*, VI, 106-107. Also see Von Schweinitz, II, 75, 77, 97-98.

³⁸ The *Times*, 20 September 1879; *Journal des Débats*, 30 September, 1879.

³⁹ *Journal des Débats*, 30 September 1879.

⁴⁰ Daudet, 160-167; Heinrich von Poschinger, Also Sprach Bismarck, II, 340-341. The assurances given by the Hungarian press that Bismarck's visit to Vienna was not dangerous to France were regarded as unnecessary in the latter country. One of the Parisian journals wrote: "mais, en vérité, quel besoin avons-nous de pareilles assurances? Sommes-nous le moins du monde inquiets pour notre sécurité? Nous est-il arrivé de trahir la moindre appréhension? Avons-nous jamais dit ou pensé que M. de Bismarck allât à Vienne pour nouer contre nous de noirs desseins?" *Journal des Débats*, 23 September 1879. Another journal remarked: "Les Anglais . . .

When the chancellor returned from Vienna he invited the French ambassador to spend several days with him at Varzin,⁴¹ and Waddington immediately instructed Saint-Vallier to ascertain the exact content of the Austro-German agreement.⁴² The replies given to the French ambassador were no less satisfactory than those which Teisserenc de Bort had received. Again Bismarck repeated that France had nothing to fear from the Austro-German alliance,⁴³ and Waddington seemed assured by this reply.⁴⁴ Notwithstanding these positive statements a vague uneasiness existed in France. Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Salisbury:⁴⁵

Waddington is menaced with an interpellation on the Austro-German understanding. This understanding is, of course, extremely unpalatable to the French, and among them the general belief is that it binds Austria to assist Germany, in case of need, to defend Alsace and Lorraine against France. Waddington has the most positive assurances from Bismarck, Andrassy, and Haymerle that there is nothing against France in it, but this is not enough for the cavillers.

n'ont pas hésité à se féliciter du succès obtenu par M. de Bismarck à Vienne. Ils y ont vu le gage du maintien immédiat de la paix, parce que la Russie, qui seule pourrait être tentée de faire la guerre, s'en gardera en présence de l'alliance austro-allemande et des sentiments pacifiques de la France. Ce sont ces sentiments indubitables qui nous permettent de voir, sinon grande satisfaction, du moins sans inquiétude aucune, le dénouement des conférences de Vienne." *Le Siècle*, 29 September 1879.

⁴¹ Daudet, 171; Bourgeois and Pagès, 195.

⁴² Daudet, 171-172. The French minister of foreign affairs was especially anxious to know whether there had been a mutual guarantee of territory. He wrote: "Y a-t-il garantie des territoires actuels des deux monarchies? C'est la point capital pour nous et aussi le plus difficile à établir complètement. Il est important que vous reveniez de Varzin avec une conviction faite sur ce point."

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ In a letter of November 24, 1879, he informed Saint-Vallier: "Il vous a exprimé les mêmes assurances à plusieurs reprises et en termes explicites dans le cours des entretiens que vous avez eus avec lui à Varzin et je ne puis qu'en prendre acte." Bourgeois and Pagès, 195-196.

⁴⁵ Newton, II, 195. In general, British statesmen regarded the Austro-German alliance with favor (Cecil, II, 371), because it would serve to check Russia. But it would not have been received with "glad tidings of great joy" had it been directed against France. Concerning this Queen Victoria wrote to her daughter: "The value of such an alliance, however, would be greatly *diminished* in my eyes, and I am certain in that of this country, if it were misconceived and were supposed to be of such a character as would give umbrage to France. This would be a great misfortune." Buckle, III, 53; Ponsonby, 187.

Meanwhile it became more difficult for the Waddington ministry to maintain itself.⁴⁶ The internal policy of the government was attacked by the Republican Left under the leadership of Henri Brisson,⁴⁷ while Waddington endeavored to disprove the charges of weakness and vacillation.⁴⁸ The ministry was finally sustained by a vote of confidence introduced by the Republican Union,⁴⁹ but it was evident that its existence was short lived. Attacks continued, and the ministry slowly disintegrated, resigning December 23, 1879.⁵⁰ President Grévy then summoned Charles de Freycinet to form a ministry of which he was to be minister of foreign affairs.⁵¹ The fall of the friendly Waddington government caused much speculation as to the future relations between France and Germany. Saint-Vallier had already resolved not to remain at his post in Germany if Waddington did not remain in power,⁵² and consequently he submitted his resignation to the new minister of foreign affairs.⁵³ The latter forwarded letters of recall, but earnestly requested the ambassador to delay presenting them.⁵⁴

In Germany the French cabinet change was received unfavorably.⁵⁵ The German press regarded Freycinet as a dis-

⁴⁶ As early as September 26, 1879, Waldersee wrote: "unser sicherster Freund ist der Minister Waddington, doch glaubt man, dass er den November nicht überleben wird." Waldersee, I, 196.

⁴⁷ *Journal Officiel* 1879, Chambre, Ext., IX, 10676-10677.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 10677-10679.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 10687.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11570. The last days of the Waddington ministry are described in Waddington, chap. xi.

⁵¹ *Journal Officiel*, 1879, IX, 11570; Hohenlohe, II, 286; Freycinet, II, 94-95. Charles de Freycinet was born November 14, 1828, and after being graduated from the *École Polytechnique* devoted himself to mathematics and engineering. He was in the service of the second empire as a sanitary engineer, and during the Franco-German war he was a member of the committee of national defence. After the war he resumed his engineering work, but in 1876 he was elected to represent the department of the Seine in the senate. When the Dufaure ministry came to power in December 1877, Freycinet was named minister of public works. He retained this position in the Waddington ministry of February 1879.

⁵² Daudet, 97.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ "The resignation of M. Waddington has been received with suspicion, and almost with irritation at Berlin; and those feelings have

ciple of Gambetta and accordingly expressed the warning that Germany would have to look towards France with a more watchful eye.⁵⁶ The new minister of foreign affairs, however, hastened to assure the German government that there would be no change in foreign policy and that the friendly relations between the two countries would not be altered.⁵⁷ In order to give additional assurance to Germany the minister of foreign affairs requested Saint-Vallier to remain in Berlin,⁵⁸ and the latter finally consented.⁵⁹ This proved to be very gratifying to the emperor and empress.⁶⁰ The fear that Bismarck was hostile to the new ministry was dispelled by Hohenlohe at Freycinet's official New Year's reception. Upon this occasion the German ambassador remarked:⁶¹

I am charged by Prince Bismarck to tell you in the name of my Government, that notwithstanding the regret we feel at the depar-

not been lessened by the retirement of the Comte de St. Vallier, the French Ambassador in Germany." The Times, 2 January 1880. From a German source we have the following: "Das neue Ministerium in Paris ist nun fertig. Freycinet ist Präsident und Minister des Auswärtigen. Unser Freund Waddington sowie der verständige Say sind ausgeschieden und durch weit mehr links stehende Persönlichkeiten ersetzt. Es ist ein völlig gambettistisches Ministerium geworden. Ich halte die Lage danach sehr ernst. Solange Grévy Präsident bleibt, wird nichts Extremes unternommen werden; man wird es aber vorbereiten, und sein Rücktritt ist dann der Moment, wo wir aufpassen müssen. Wahrscheinlich wird Saint-Vallier sein Demission einreichen, dies ist an sich schon ein ernstes Zeichen, dann er hat sich in Übereinstimmung mit Waddington und Grévy stets für den Frieden eingesetzt." Waldersee, I, 199.

⁵⁶ The Times, 2 January 1880.

⁵⁷ Freycinet wrote to Saint-Vallier: "Nous souhaitons de conserver avec l'Allemagne en particulier les rapports amicaux que vous aviez été chargé d'établir et que vous avez su assurer à la satisfaction mutuelle des deux gouvernements. Notre sentiment à cet égard ne saurait varier." Bourgeois and Pagès, 186. At the same time Freycinet assured Waddington: "Il ne s'agit pas, en effet, de modifier la politique extérieure." Freycinet, II, 98. Hohenlohe reported to his government: "In der äusseren Politik wird sich wenig ändern." Hohenlohe, II, 286. Also see the Saturday Review (London), XLIX, 35.

⁵⁸ The Times, 7 January 1880.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 7 February 1880; Daudet, 187.

⁶⁰ Daudet, 187.

⁶¹ The Times, 2 January 1880; The Spectator (London), LII, 2; Ibid., p. 35; Hohenlohe, II, 287-288. One Paris journal wrote: "Il est évident pour toute personne que n'aveuglent pas les préven-

ture of the Comte de St. Vallier,⁶² we see no reason why our relations with the present Cabinet should not bear the same impress of the same sentiments of cordiality and peace we felt and manifested with the preceding Cabinet.

Despite these expressions of good-will the year 1880 witnessed frequent hostile manifestations between France and Germany. Early in the year a bill had been submitted to the German bundesrat whereby the army was to be augmented in view of the increase in population,⁶³ and later Bismarck resorted to his favorite method of emphasizing the threatened dangers from Russia and France in order to secure the passage of the bill in the reichstag.⁶⁴ The French press received the news of the army bill with reserve,⁶⁵ but the unexpected summons of Hohenlohe to Berlin caused some concern in Paris.⁶⁶ At first it was thought that he was returning merely to attend the debates upon the military bill,⁶⁷ but it was soon ascertained that the chancellor desired him to assume the position of secretary of state for foreign affairs *ad interim*.⁶⁸ This recall intensified the feeling caused by the

tions de l'esprit de parti que les paroles du prince de Hohenlohe ont dépassé les limites de simples politesses diplomatiques." *Le Siècle*, 6 January 1880.

⁶² When this was spoken it was still thought that Saint-Vallier was going to retire from his post in Berlin.

⁶³ Heinrich Schulthess, *Europäischer Geschichtskalender*, 1880, pp. 47-52; *Annual Register*, 1880, pp. 161-162. The new septennate was to regulate the army from April 1, 1881, to March 31, 1888.

⁶⁴ Hohenlohe made this entry in his diary February 22, 1880: "Der Artikel der 'Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung,' der von der aggressiven Stellung Russlands und Frankreichs spricht, hat viel Sensation gemacht und wird mit Besorgnis kommentiert. Nachher erfuhr ich beim Reichskanzler, dass er den Artikel geschrieben hat, um auf die Abgeordneten einzuwirken, damit sie für das Militärgesetz stimmen. Er lachte, als ich ihm von der Wirkung sprach." Hohenlohe, II, 290. A similar opinion was expressed by Blowitz in *The Times*, 29 January 1880.

⁶⁵ *The Times*, 2 February 1880. "La presse européenne est unanime à reconnaître que l'opinion publique, en France, s'est montrée très réservée, très prudente à la nouvelle de l'augmentation des forces allemandes." *Le Siècle*, 6 February 1880.

⁶⁶ *The Times*, 24 February 1880; *Le Siècle*, 28 February 1880; *Ibid.*, 29 February 1880; *Le Figaro*, 28 February 1880; *Ibid.*, 29 February 1880.

⁶⁷ *The Times*, 2 February 1880.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 27 February 1880; Hohenlohe, II, 289-290. Baron von Bülow, secretary of state for foreign affairs, died October 20, 1879, at Frankfurt.

army bill, since the presence of the German ambassador in Paris was considered a guarantee of peace.⁶⁹ Bismarck, on the other hand, affected to regard it as conclusive that good relations existed between France and Germany, otherwise Hohenlohe would not have been recalled.⁷⁰ The latter gave similar assurances to Saint-Vallier and Freycinet,⁷¹ promising to return to Paris in September.⁷²

Soon after the alarm of February and March the relations between the two countries became more cordial. Bismarck did nothing to aggravate the difficulties between France and Russia arising out of the Hartmann affair,⁷³ but endeavored to facilitate an understanding.⁷⁴ Events in Great Britain also caused a change in German policy, for the chancellor drew nearer to Russia in order to prevent a British move in that direction. Gorchakov and Bismarck frankly discussed Russo-German difficulties June 3, and effected a complete reconciliation.⁷⁵ At the same time the chancellor assisted France with her north African enterprises in order to remove her thoughts from a war of revenge and to make her forget Alsace-Lorraine.⁷⁶

⁶⁹ The Times, 27 February 1880; Ibid., 28 February 1880; Ibid., 1 March 1880.

⁷⁰ Hohenlohe, II, 292.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 292-293; The Times, 2 March 1880; Ibid., 5 March 1880.

⁷² Radowitz of the German foreign office was sent to Paris *en mission extraordinaire* in order to relieve Hohenlohe. Hohenlohe, II, 290; Radowitz, II, 124. The new German representative assured Freycinet that his mission was one of peace and conciliation. The Times, 19 April 1880. Similar assurances were given to Grévy. Ibid., 20 April 1880; Radowitz, II, 128-129.

⁷³ Leo Hartmann, a Russian Nihilist, was arrested in Paris upon the request of Russian authorities, since he was accused of being the instigator of a plot to assassinate the tsar at Moscow December 1, 1879. The French government was unconvinced of his identity and accordingly refused to extradite him. The Russian government became vexed and recalled Prince Orlov, the Russian ambassador to France; but Bismarck advised France not to withdraw her representative in St. Petersburg as a reply to Russia. Annual Register, 1880, p. 21; Daudet, 192; Freycinet, II, 112; The Times, 31 March 1880; Ibid., 2 April 1880; Von Schweinitz, II, 106.

⁷⁴ Daudet, 193-194.

⁷⁵ Hohenlohe, II, 298; Daudet, 193-194.

⁷⁶ Bourgeois and Pagès, 202-203. At the time France was interested in a trans-Sahara railway project, and the German chancellor

The policy of supporting France in Africa was well illustrated at the conference on Moroccan affairs which met in Madrid from May until July 1880.⁷⁷ The European powers had been negotiating with the Moroccan government relative to the irregular protection afforded to Moorish subjects by their diplomatic and consular representatives in Morocco,⁷⁸ but no agreement was reached. The British representative at Tangier, Sir John Drummond Hay, then proposed a meeting

thought this an excellent method whereby to divert her attention from the Rhine. In a despatch of April 8 he wrote to Hohenlohe: "Unser Verständigungsgebeit mit Frankreich erstreckt sich von Guinea bis nach Belgien hinan und deckt alle romanischen Lande; nur auf deutschen Eroberungen braucht Frankreich verzichten, um uns befreundet zu bleiben. Je weniger wir ihm Einbrüche nach Osten hin gestatten können, desto mehr sind wir—wie ja auch unsre Orientpolitik während der letzten Jahre bewiesen hat—bereit, ihm zu Entschädigungen in jeder anderen Richtung zu helfen. Nicht nur die neuerdings durch das Sahara-Eisenbahnprojekt angedeutete Politik, betreffs welcher Ew. pp. in dem abschriftlich beigelegten Bericht aus Tanger einige Angaben finden, sondern auch das Streben Frankreichs nach vermehrter Einflussnahme auf die übrigen romanischen Staaten verleiht kein deutsches Interesse; die Abwesenheit politischer Bedenken gestattet uns vielmehr anzuerkennen, dass das französische Volk, welches dank der stärkeren Beimischung germanischen Blutes als die kräftigste unter den romanischen Nationen dasteht, die Stellung einer zivilisatorischen Vormacht in der romanischen Welt sowohl wie ausserhalb Europas beanspruchen kann. Wenn daher Frankreich die Ausbreitung seiner politischen Operationsbasis als seinen Interessen entsprechend erachtet, so kann es dafür nicht nur auf unsere Enthaltung, sondern unter Umständen sogar auf unsere Rückendeckung rechnen, sofern nur unsere Stellung in Deutschland und unser einziger Anspruch, Herren im eigenen Hause zu sein, nicht gefährdet wird." *Grosse Politik*, III, 395-396.

With regard to the trans-Sahara railway project the chancellor wrote to the minister-resident in Tangier: "Mit Befriedigung habe ich daraus ersehen, dass die französische Regierung bemüht ist, für den nationalen Tatendrang ein Feld zu suchen, wo eine Kollision mit unsern Interessen nicht vorliegt." *Ibid.*, pp. 396-397. The question of the trans-Sahara railway is discussed by Oskar Lenz, "Die Eisenbahnprojecte der Franzosen in der Sahara und der Sudan," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, XXIX, 392-404.

⁷⁷ As early as February 22, 1880, Bismarck and Hohenlohe discussed the reported designs of France upon Morocco. The chancellor remarked that Germany could only be pleased if France took Morocco, for then the former could concede French extension in Africa as a compensation for Alsace-Lorraine. Hohenlohe, II, 291.

⁷⁸ Cd. 2707. Correspondence Relative to the Conference Held at Madrid in 1880 Respecting the Right of Protection of Moorish Subjects by the Diplomatic and Consular Representatives of Foreign Powers in Morocco, 1-33.

in Madrid to regulate this question.⁷⁹ The British government adopted this suggestion,⁸⁰ and Spain was asked to sponsor the conference. Invitations were issued to the European powers and to the United States to name representatives to a meeting in Madrid.⁸¹ The German government, having no interest in Morocco, informed Saint-Vallier that its delegate to the conference would be instructed to conform his conduct to that of his French colleague.⁸² Count Solms-Sonnenwalde, German ambassador in Madrid, was instructed that it was not necessary for Germany to place herself in the foreground, but "on account of general political reasons to go hand in hand with France who has justifiable interests to represent in Morocco by reason of her neighboring Algerian possessions."⁸³ The French ambassador, Admiral Jaurès, was then informed of these instructions.⁸⁴ The Madrid conference met from May to July 3, 1880, discussing the protection of Moorish interpreters, domestic servants, and licensed brokers.⁸⁵ During the course of the conference the French government called upon Germany to give it further support,⁸⁶ and this was accorded by the latter.⁸⁷ Freycinet

⁷⁹ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Livre Jaune, 1880, Question de la Protection Diplomatique et Consulaire au Maroc, 32-34.

⁸² Grosse Politik, III, 398; Livre Jaune, 1880, Question de Maroc, 36.

⁸³ Grosse Politik, III, 398.

⁸⁴ Livre Jaune, 1880, Question de Maroc, 50-51. Bismarck, on one occasion, said to Saint-Vallier: "Je suis et serai toujours prêt à appuyer et à seconder l'action de la politique française autant qu'elle ne tournera pas ses vues sur ses anciennes provinces d'Alsace-Lorraine. Je regarde comme un devoir de lui faciliter la recherche de compensations et d'avantages dans des régions éloignées de celles où nous pouvons nous heurter, dans l'Afrique septentrionale spécialement dont je regarde les contrées comme placées dans la sphère de sa légitime influence." Émile Bourgeois, Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangère, IV, 26.

⁸⁵ The protocols of the conference are to be found in Cd. 2707, pp. 96, 101, 105-109, 118-126, 128-135; Livre Jaune, 1880, Question de Maroc, 147-278.

⁸⁶ Grosse Politik, III, 398-399.

⁸⁷ Hohenlohe wrote to the German ambassador in Madrid: "Der Herr Reichskanzler hat . . . bestimmt, dass wir bei der marokkanischen Konferenz die französische Politik in Marokko ohne Einschränkung zu unterstützen haben werden." Ibid., 399.

instructed Saint-Vallier July 2 to thank the German chancellor for his support,⁸⁸ and it was done without delay.⁸⁹

The friendly relations between France and Germany were suddenly disturbed by an incident that occurred at Cherbourg. President Grévy accompanied by Gambetta and many other dignitaries went to that city August 10 to bestow flags upon the navy and to review the fleet,⁹⁰ and on the evening of the same day Gambetta delivered an address to a commercial group which resulted in exciting German opinion. The French statesman said in part:⁹¹

For ten years not one word of rashness or temerity has escaped our lips. There are times in the history of peoples when right undergoes eclipses and it is then for nations to be masters of themselves They should wait in calmness, with their hands and arms as free at home as abroad. Great reparation may issue from right. We or our children may hope for it, for the future is forbidden to none It is a necessity, when France has been seen to fall so low, to raise her up that she may resume her place in the world. If our hearts throb it is for this object and not in search of a sanguinary ideal; it is in order to retain intact what remains of France; it is that we may know whether there is in things here below an inevitable justice which will come at its due time.

The German press seized upon this utterance as ample proof that France was patiently biding her time and slowly maturing plans for revenge.⁹² At home Gambetta was attacked by his political enemies as an advocate of war,⁹³ and Freycinet, alarmed by the attitude of the German press, sought to allay suspicion by a pacific address at Montauban.⁹⁴

⁸⁸ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Question de Maroc*, 134.

⁸⁹ Saint-Vallier informed Freycinet: "J'ai exprimé le désir que le Prince de Bismarck sût que nous lui sommes reconnaissants de l'exactitude avec laquelle le Représentant de l'Allemagne s'est attaché à réaliser les promesses d'appui amical que m'avait faites le Chancelier avant l'ouverture de la Conférence, et j'ai constaté les heureux effets de notre entente dans l'affaire marocaine." *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Question de Maroc*, 134.

⁹⁰ Deschanel, 246; Hanotaux, IV, 549; Radowitz, II, 145.

⁹¹ *Discours et Plaidoyers Politiques de M. Gambetta*, IX, 67-68; Deschanel, 246-247; Hanotaux, IV, 550.

⁹² *The Times*, 13 August 1880; *Ibid.*, 14 August 1880; Radowitz, II, 145-146.

⁹³ *Le Siècle*, 14 August 1880.

⁹⁴ *The Times*, 20 August 1880; *Le Siècle*, 21 August 1880; *The Spectator*, LIII, 1054; Deschanel, 249; Radowitz, II, 146.

The French minister of foreign affairs explained that France had emerged from the isolation to which events had condemned her, but that she would never undertake an adventurous foreign policy. He concluded by saying: "The situation . . . is good at home and abroad. Abroad it is peace—profound peace—peace without boasting and without weakness."⁸⁶ Notwithstanding these peaceful assurances suspicion in Germany was not laid aside, in fact, it was made greater on account of the emperor's address to his troops upon the anniversary of Sedan.⁸⁶

Freycinet's description of the internal situation of France was too optimistic; for a month later he resigned as president of the council of ministers.⁸⁷ The fall of Freycinet was viewed with regret in Berlin,⁸⁸ for it seemed that Gambetta had advanced one more step towards power. President Grévy, however, did not summon Gambetta to form a ministry, but entrusted Jules Ferry with the task.⁸⁹ The latter selected

⁸⁶ The Times, 20 August 1880.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 3 September 1880. Blowitz deplored the fact that "the word of an irresponsible man [Gambetta] had been sufficient to destroy in an hour the feelings of peace and concord which ten years of reciprocal care had begun to produce between two nations whose antagonism keeps the world in anxiety and whose union would almost lead to universal peace."

⁸⁷ A struggle had arisen over the decrees of March 29 and 30, 1880, concerning the expulsion of Jesuits and non-authorized communities. The decrees allowed the Jesuits three months to disperse and evacuate their establishments, and provided that non-authorized communities should become regulated within three months under penalty of dissolution. Freycinet endeavored to mitigate the harshness of the decrees by coming to some agreement with Rome, but dissension within the ministry prevented this. Hanotaux, IV, 525-528, 540-547, 551-554; Rambaud, 120-121. The latter circumstance caused Freycinet to resign. Journal Officiel, 1880, VIII, 10061; Freycinet, II, 152; Deschanel, 248. Bismarck did not think that foreign affairs were instrumental in bringing about the downfall of the ministry. He remarked to his personal physician, Dr. Eduard Cohen: "Die Kabinettsfrage in Frankreich habe gar nichts mit der auswärtigen Politik zu tun. Freycinet habe nur in sehr erklärlicher Weise vor den Konsequenzen des strikten Vorgehens gegen die Jesuiten Bedenken gehabt." Brauer-Marcks-Müller, Erinnerungen an Bismarck, 314.

⁸⁸ The Times, 21 September 1880; Radowitz, II, 147.

⁸⁹ Journal Officiel, 1880, VIII, 10105; Rambaud, 122, 128; Hanotaux, IV, 557-558. Jules Ferry was born in the department of the Vosges April 5, 1832. He was educated at the Collège de Saint-Dié

Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, a venerable student of Greek learning, as his minister of foreign affairs,¹⁰⁰ and this appointment was received with great satisfaction in Germany.¹⁰¹ The first official act of the new foreign minister was to send a reassuring circular despatch to French diplomatic agents:¹⁰²

My first duty is to request you to assure the government to which you are accredited that the new cabinet will make no change in the foreign policy of its predecessor. France has never attached a greater value than now to the maintenance of peace, so fruitful of advantage for her prosperity and honor. This system inaugurated by the wisdom of M. Thiers . . . has been followed with constancy for the last ten years and has borne excellent fruit. We shall remain faithful to so happy a tradition and do everything to develop still further the good relations which the French Republic maintains with other governments.

This pacific statement made great impression in Berlin and did much to allay the suspicion with which the new ministry had been greeted.¹⁰³

and the Lycée de Strasbourg, and then entered the field of law and journalism in Paris. After having achieved notoriety as a contributor to the Paris papers he was elected in 1869 as a member of the corps législatif. During the Franco-German war he was a member of the committee of national defense and the mayor of Paris during the stormy period of the Commune. Later he served as minister to Athens, vice-president of the national assembly, and a member of the chamber of deputies. As minister of public instruction in the ministries of Waddington and Freycinet he effected many reforms in education, especially freeing it from clerical influence.

¹⁰⁰ Journal Officiel, 1880, VIII, 10105; Rambaud, 122, 128; Radowitz, II, 147; Hanotaux, IV, 558; Georges Picot, *Notices Historiques*, I, 107-148.

¹⁰¹ Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was an admirer of Prince Bismarck, writing to the editor of the *Deutsche Revue* as follows: "Quant à sa [Bismarck] politique étrangère, on la considère en France comme basée sur un vaste programme, très profond en lui-même et assurément utile au maintien de la paix européenne." Quoted in *Le Figaro*, 23 September 1880. In commenting upon this letter the editor of *Le Figaro* says: "Evidemment, après cela, l'Allemagne ne pourra supposer que l'excellent M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire soit le complice d'une politique agressive." Another contemporary journal remarked: "As M. St. Hilaire is a profound admirer of Prince Bismarck, the appointment may be considered as a sop to those who were alarmed by the Cherbourg speech." *The Saturday Review*, L, 380. Also see the *Times*, 24 September 1880.

¹⁰² *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires de Monténégro*, II, 66-67. A similar declaration was made to the senate. *Journal Officiel*, 1880, *Sénat*, Ord., IX, 10903-10905.

¹⁰³ *The Times*, 29 September 1880. Bismarck's personal physician

Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire soon faced the intricacies of the Montenegrin problem which had been awaiting solution for more than two years. Article XXIV of the Treaty of Berlin had indicated the boundaries which were to mark the independent state of Montenegro,¹⁰⁴ but when it came to be known that the districts of Gussinje and Plava¹⁰⁵ were to be ceded to Montenegro the Mohammedan Albanians of those districts joined with their co-religionists in other parts of Albania to form a league to prevent any annexation by neighboring countries.¹⁰⁶ In accordance with their program the Albanians formed armed bands in the Gussinje and Plava districts to prevent the Montenegrins from taking possession of them, and the latter, being defeated in several battles gave up their attempts to win the territory by force of arms.¹⁰⁷ The Porte thereupon entered into negotiations with Montenegro for the purpose of ceding other territory in place of Gussinje and Plava.¹⁰⁸ The two powers came to an agreement April 12, 1880,¹⁰⁹ and the powers signatory to the Treaty of Berlin then ratified the proposed cession.¹¹⁰

noted the following quotation: "Die Franzosen seien jetzt nicht zu fürchten. Sie haben die Schrecken des Krieges im eigenen Lande kennen gelernt und wünschen, namentlich in der Provinz, entschieden den Frieden.—Grévy und Barthélemy sind ruhige Leute." Brauer-Marks-Müller, 316-317. Radowitz noted in his diary: "Ich bekam von Fürst Bismarck den Auftrag, unser volles Vertrauen in die Fortdauer der guten Beziehungen unter den neuen Männern auszusprechen und wurde zu diesem Zwecke von Jules Ferry und Barthélemy gemeinsam, nicht ohne eine gewisse Feierlichkeit, empfangen." Radowitz, II, 148.

¹⁰⁴ Livre Jaune, 1878, *Affaires d'Orient*, Congrès de Berlin, 285.

¹⁰⁵ The districts of Gussinje and Plava are situated in northeastern Albania. At present the latter is under Montenegro.

¹⁰⁶ Annual Register, 1880, p. 201; *The Spectator*, LI, 1141.

¹⁰⁷ Cd. 2711. Correspondence Respecting the Montenegrin Frontier, 23. The Albanians received assistance from Turkey in order to carry on their warfare. Livre Jaune, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, II, 29-30.

¹⁰⁸ Livre Jaune, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, II, 33.

¹⁰⁹ Cd. 2711, pp. 55-56.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 65-67; Livre Jaune, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 114. This agreement of April 18 between Turkey and Montenegro was known as the Corti compromise, for the Italian statesman was successful in bringing it about. France and Germany were not

Turkey made no effort to withdraw from the ceded territory, and the Albanians then threatened to wage war upon Montenegro. Fearing that hostilities might ensue the powers presented an identic note to the Porte, June 11, demanding that the agreement with Montenegro be executed.¹¹¹ The Porte replied June 24, offering to carry out the protocol of April 18 if the necessary time were allowed, but at the same time expressed its willingness to consider any other mode of settlement which might be suggested by the powers.¹¹² Accordingly an identic note was delivered to the Porte, June 26, indicating as an equivalent of the agreement of April 18 a rectification of frontier east and west of Lake Scutari, comprising the district of Dulcigno.¹¹³ Again the Porte was reminded that if it did not accept this proposal, it would be under the necessity of fulfilling immediately the agreement of April 18.¹¹⁴ The Turkish government gave an unsatisfactory reply July 15,¹¹⁵ and the powers, anxious for a quick settlement of the question, presented a third identic note August 3. Again they recommended the cession of Dulcigno, but as an alternative permitted execution of the agreement of April 18 within three weeks. If neither of these proposals was accepted the powers then expected the Porte to join them in assisting the prince of Montenegro to take possession by force.¹¹⁶ After some delay the Turkish government replied that it consented "in principle" to the cession of Dulcigno, but again requested an extension of time.¹¹⁷

The policy of delay practised by the Porte caused Great

especially interested in the dispute, maintaining a reserved attitude and supporting any proposal satisfactory to Turkey, Montenegro, and Austria.

¹¹¹ Cd. 2711, pp. 117-118.

¹¹² Cd. 2711, pp. 134-135; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 226-227.

¹¹³ Cd. 2711, p. 152; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 234.

¹¹⁴ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 234.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-283; Cd. 2711, pp. 164-165.

¹¹⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 334-335; Cd. 2711, p. 205.

¹¹⁷ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, I, 360-361; Cd. 2711, pp. 225-226.

Britain to propose coercive measures in order to bring about a settlement of the question.¹¹⁸ Arrangements were made to have a combined fleet support the military action of the prince of Montenegro, but it was provided that no troops were to be landed or operations undertaken on shore.¹¹⁹ As a further safeguard a *protocole de désintéressement* was signed by the powers upon the proposal of Great Britain.¹²⁰ The fleet gathered at Gravosa, a port on the Adriatic Sea, September 14 under the command of Admiral Seymour,¹²¹ and the following day the Porte endeavored to have the project of a naval demonstration abandoned.¹²² The British admiral, however, demanded that Dulcigno should be surrendered to the Montenegrins,¹²³ but the Turkish authorities refused to do so.¹²⁴ Seymour then endeavored to arrange a joint attack with the prince of Montenegro,¹²⁵ but the latter feared that this would be regarded as an act of war by Turkey and accordingly sought to ascertain how much support he could expect from the powers.¹²⁶ They, however, were not disposed to assume responsibility for protecting Montenegro, nor would they concur with the British proposal to seize Smyrna as a pledge for the surrender of Dulcigno.¹²⁷

The Porte issued a note October 12 stating that "with the object of averting the naval demonstration" it would cede the district of Dulcigno to Montenegro.¹²⁸ A Turkish military

¹¹⁸ Fitzmaurice, II, 217.

¹¹⁹ Cd. 2711, pp. 256-257.

¹²⁰ Cd. 2752. Correspondence Respecting the Montenegrin Frontier, 2. Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires du Monténégro, II, 32.

¹²¹ Newton, II, 228.

¹²² Cd. 2758. Further Correspondence Respecting the Montenegrin Frontier, 12-14.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 9.

¹²⁴ Ibid., pp. 22, 43.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

¹²⁶ Cd. 2758, p. 47; Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires du Monténégro, II, 80-81.

¹²⁷ Lord Granville wrote to Lady Granville October 9: "The Concert of Europe is gone to the d---l. Austria, Germany, and France won't join in the Smyrna expedition." Fitzmaurice, II, 223. Also see Buckle, III, 148. Goschen expressed the opinion that the British fleet would have to be sent to the Dardanelles before a settlement could be reached. Elliot, I, 200.

¹²⁸ Cd. 2758, p. 111.

force was sent to the disputed area November 24, and after an encounter with the Albanians entered the city.¹²⁹ The formal surrender was made to Montenegro several days later¹³⁰ and the fleet dispersed December 5.¹³¹ Whether the Porte's sudden decision was in consequence of the British threat to seize Smyrna¹³² or the result of the influence of France and Germany is not certain.¹³³ The action of France in the Montenegrin dispute was attacked at home by the members of the Right,¹³⁴ but Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire maintained that France had to participate as a member of the European concert.¹³⁵ French and German policy had been in accord during the entire period of the dispute and no new causes of friction had arisen between them. These friendly relations continued throughout the first ministry of Ferry, being especially evident during the events that culminated in the acquisition of Tunis by France.

¹²⁹ Cd. 2758, p. 179; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, II, 199.

¹³⁰ Cd. 2758, p. 184.

¹³¹ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires du Monténégro*, II, 212-213.

¹³² *Annual Register*, 1880, p. 210.

¹³³ Fitzmaurice, II, 220; Newton, II, 232; Arthur C. Gardiner, *The Life of Sir William Harcourt*, I, 378; *The Saturday Review*, L, 473, 721.

¹³⁴ Gontaut-Biron attacked the policy of the government in the Greek and Montenegrin questions, indicating that France was engaging in disputes which concerned her only in a secondary degree. *Journal Officiel*, 1880, *Sénat*, Ext., X, 11743-11758.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11750.

CHAPTER IV

THE ACQUISITION OF TUNIS BY FRANCE

Although France had enjoyed a preponderant influence in north Africa since the time of Louis Philippe, she gradually lost it during the period of the second empire. The condition of France immediately after the war of 1870-71 made it impossible for her to give any attention to colonial expansion. Thiers had devoted his energy to payment of the indemnity, the liberation of the territory, and the solution of internal problems. Moreover, any attempt to regain her predominance would have brought about European complications. Italy could not regard with equanimity any increase of French power, and Germany was not disposed to support such extension.¹ As early as December 1873 Arnim warned Decazes not to seize Tunis,² and later the German commodore at Tunis informed the bey that the interests of German citizens should be placed upon the same footing as those of other foreigners.³ These unfriendly incidents did not deter France from endeavoring to restore her influence in Tunis, for there were continued rumors of French activity.⁴

Bismarck, however, soon changed his policy of opposition to French expansion in north Africa. He perceived that such an exertion of energy in the basin of the Mediterranean would be a drain upon the resources of France and turn her thoughts from a war of revenge.⁵ During the crisis of 1875

¹ Bismarck explained his earlier policy as follows: "Wir haben uns einige Jahre früher solchen Versuchen widersetzt, weil es uns unmittelbar nach unserem Kriege mit Frankreich, und solange der Friedensvertrag noch nicht ausgeführt war, angemessen schien, französischen Machtäusserungen entgegenzutreten, um die Überhebung, welche der französischen Politik eigen ist, nicht aufkommen zu lassen." *Grosse Politik*, I, 303.

² Hohenlohe, II, 199. Lyons in a despatch to Granville placed this incident in January, 1874. Newton, II, 60.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁴ *Grosse Politik*, I, 303.

⁵ The chancellor wrote to Hohenlohe January 10, 1875: "Im regelmässigen Lauf der Dinge ist es aber für uns in erster Linie

a clear indication was given that Germany would not regard with disfavor French activity in Tunis.⁶ When the war scare of that year was at its height Decazes expressed the wish to Hohenlohe that France and Germany might carry out some common policy and thereby relieve the tension of the existing situation.⁷ Shortly afterwards Bülow indicated several fields in which the two governments might act in concert, especially in north Africa.⁸ But at the time nothing was done. France had not recovered sufficiently from the effects of the war to be able to support a colonial campaign and in all probability Bismarck's sincerity was not trusted.

A favorable opportunity for the accomplishment of the chancellor's design did not present itself until the time of the Congress of Berlin. Here he was called upon to act as the arbiter between Great Britain and Austria on the one hand, and Russia on the other. Consequently it was of importance to him to have the active support of the French plenipotentiaries.⁹ When, therefore, Austria was entrusted with the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Great Britain took control of Cyprus,¹⁰ it was thought necessary to offer some compensation to France.¹¹ Waddington was greatly

kein Nachteil und kein zu bekämpfendes Bestreben, wenn die französische Politik in Nordafrika und dem türkischen Orient ein Feld ihrer Tätigkeit sucht. Die Absorbierung der Kräfte, welche Frankreich dort verwendet und festlegt, und die Handel, welche sich dort schafft, bilden einen Abzug für seine aggressiven Tendenzen gegen Deutschland." *Grosse Politik*, I, 303.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 262-264.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 225.

¹⁰ The Cyprus convention was concluded June 4, 1878, by Great Britain and Turkey. The former guaranteed to defend by force of arms the Asiatic possessions of the sultan, and the latter assigned the island of Cyprus for British occupation and administration. Cd. 2057. Correspondence Respecting the Convention between Great Britain and Turkey of June 4, 1878, pp. 2-5. Salisbury gave Waddington a full explanation of the motives which prompted Great Britain to make this agreement. Cd. 2138. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Turkey; *Livre Jaune*, 1878, *Congrès de Berlin*, 304-316. Additional information is to be found in Buckle, III, 111-113.

¹¹ Erich Marcks, *Otto von Bismarck, ein Lebensbild*, 199.

surprised when he learned of the Cyprus convention,¹² and seeking out Lord Beaconsfield he threatened to leave the congress.¹³ The British, however, were ready to meet the emergency by offering France a free hand in Tunis.¹⁴ Beaconsfield merely remarked: "Do there what you judge suitable and England will accept your decisions."¹⁵

Bismarck took advantage of this situation to urge upon France a policy of colonial expansion and to hasten a rapprochement with Germany.¹⁶ He expressed surprise to the French plenipotentiaries that France was so lenient towards Tunis, saying: "Its possession will be the safeguard for your security and your influence in the Mediterranean basin. Go there. You will not find me there, and I will make it my duty to support you in any manner that I am able."¹⁷ At the same time he informed the British and Italian plenipotentiaries that if France judged it appropriate to seize Tunis she would have German support.¹⁸

It is said that when Tunis was first offered to Waddington

¹² Waddington alluded to the great surprise caused in France by the convention in his despatch to the French ambassador in London. *Livre Jaune*, 1878, Congrès de Berlin, 309. The prince of Wales was instrumental in mollifying the injured feelings of the French statesmen. Sydney Lee, *King Edward VII*, I, 336-338, 437.

¹³ Hanotaux, IV, 386.

¹⁴ Salisbury knew that the proposed convention with Turkey would cause alarm in France, and as early as May 11 suggested to Lyons the possibility of offering some compensation to her. Newton, II, 139; Cecil, II, 270. Münster, the German ambassador in London, had already informed Salisbury of the French desire for Tunis. *Grosse Politik*, II, 291.

¹⁵ Charles de Moüy, "Souvenirs d'un Diplomate," in *Revue de Deux Mondes*, fifth series, XXIV, 55. Salisbury, too, is reported to have said to Waddington: "Machen Sie mit Tunis, was Ihnen beliebt; England wird nicht dawider sein." Moritz Busch, *Unser Reichskanzler*, II, 120. Additional information is to be found in Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 342; Waddington, 150; Crispi, 77-78; Ernest Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik*, 1888-1914, p. 10; Albert Billot, *La France et l'Italie, Histoire des Années Troubles*, 1881-1899, I, 22. The writer must acknowledge his debt in the preparation of this chapter to the articles of W. L. Langer, "The European Powers and the French Occupation of Tunis," in the *American Historical Review*, 1925-1926.

¹⁶ Bourgeois and Pagès, 191.

¹⁷ Daudet, 86-87.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

he merely replied that he wished "to return with empty hands,"¹⁹ but it was finally decided to accept the British and German proposal. Consequently a motion was prepared in order to have the congress ratify the British offer,²⁰ but MacMahon and his ministry would not give their approval, fearing complications with Italy.²¹ Waddington, however, realized the value of the British proposal, and subsequently called upon Salisbury to confirm the conversation as to Tunis.²² The British foreign secretary replied: "If France occupied Tunis tomorrow, we should not even remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little difficult, because we must avoid giving away other people's property without their consent, and also because it is no business of ours to pronounce beforehand on the considerations which Italy would probably advance upon that subject."²³

It was from Italy that France expected opposition in Tunis, for the former had begun a vigorous policy in north Africa. In October 1878 the Italian government appointed Signor Maccio as consul in Tunis,²⁴ and from the time of his arrival he was the avowed opponent of the French consul, Théodore Roustan. Waddington quickly perceived the gravity of the Italian menace, and October 13, 1878 he wrote to the

¹⁹ Adam, 211; Freycinet, II, 34.

²⁰ Hanotaux, IV, 388.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Waddington, 151. There is conflicting opinion upon this question, for Constant maintains that MacMahon desired decisive action. Estournelles de Constant, *La Politique Française en Tunisie*, 172 note. Also see *Le Figaro*, 11 April, 1881.

²² Cecil, II, 332-333; Newton, II, 154. Lord Granville acquainted Queen Victoria with this episode April 14, 1881. He wrote: "The whole question is difficult and delicate, and made more so by some impulsive declarations of Lord Salisbury at Berlin. Mr. Waddington addressed a despatch to London after the return of the British Plenipotentiaries, reminding Lord Salisbury of a conversation at Berlin, in which in answer to complaints about Cyprus Mr. Waddington said that Lord Salisbury had answered, 'Prenez Tunis; Carthage ne doit pas rester aux barbares.' He said that Lord Beaconsfield had held the same language. But Mr. Waddington desired to come from Berlin with clean hands." Buckle, III, 209.

²³ Newton, II, 155. Waddington later gave the history of the entire question in an address before the senate. *Journal Officiel*, 1882, Sénat, Ord., I, 903-904.

²⁴ Constant, 88; Alexander M. Broadley, *The Last Punic War*, I, 173-174.

French ambassador in Rome: "We cannot permit any other power to form an establishment upon the territory of the regency, nor to occupy any point whatever. It is absolutely necessary for the Italian government to understand thoroughly that Italy cannot entertain thoughts of conquering Tunis without clashing with the good-will of France, and without risking a conflict with her."²⁵

At the same time it was feared that Great Britain was endeavoring to rid herself of the promise made by Salisbury.²⁶ But before entering upon any definite policy it was deemed advisable to sound the German authorities. Saint-Vallier accordingly informed Bülow January 2, 1879 that France soon intended to proceed against Tunis with an ultimatum,²⁷ and eventually to send an expedition to occupy several points along the coast. He represented that Italian intrigues were behind the procedure of the bey of Tunis, and that France would like to place an obstacle before Italy at the proper time.²⁸ The following day Herbert Bismarck assured the French ambassador that Germany considered the French claims as justifiable, and would support them as far as possible.²⁹

Saint-Vallier spent the next few days with Bismarck at Friedrichsruh³⁰ in order to discuss the problems of Tunis and Rumelia.³¹ The chancellor immediately launched into the former question by saying: "Well, I believe the Tunisian

²⁵ Anonymous, "Les Préliminaires du Traité de Bardo," in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, VIII, 403. This is based upon original materials in the Quai d'Orsay.

²⁶ The British consul, Sir Robert Wood, had coöperated with Maccio in opposing the French in Tunis.

²⁷ At the time the "Sancy" question was pending. Sancy, a French citizen, had received from the bey of Tunis a concession to establish a ranch for the breeding of horses. There had been some breach of contract, and the bey, supported by Maccio, abrogated the concession. Constant, 83-84; Broadley, I, 174-178.

²⁸ Grosse Politik, III, 387-388. Hohenlohe had reported recently upon the provocative rôle played by Wood in the dispute between France and Tunis.

²⁹ Grosse Politik, III, 388.

³⁰ Daudet, 88.

³¹ Grosse Politik, III, 388.

pear is ripe and that it is time for you to pluck it; the insolence of the bey has been the August sun upon this African fruit which now may spoil or be stolen by another if you leave it upon the tree too long.”³² He then hastened to declare that he regarded Waddington and Saint-Vallier as pledges of peace and good accord between France and Germany, and that he desired to give necessary satisfaction to French public opinion. If France turned to expansion in the Mediterranean it would be of value in mitigating the grievance and sorrow which she held against Germany.³³

The eagerness with which Bismarck offered his support to France caused distrust in Paris. Saint-Vallier endeavored to fathom the chancellor's motives, thinking that he desired either to become the arbiter between France and Great Britain, or to awaken suspicion in the latter country by making her believe that close relations existed between France and Germany.³⁴ Probably neither conjecture was entirely correct. At bottom Germany desired to satisfy the *amour propre* of the French by supporting them in the Tunis enterprise, thereby preparing the way for more friendly relations. This would also serve to preoccupy France in north Africa, and the successes won there would strengthen the position of the Waddington ministry at home.³⁵ Bismarck was equally concerned in fostering good accord between France and Great Britain, for he knew that as long as this existed there would

³² Bourgeois and Pagès, 192, 365-366; Daudet, 89. At the same time Bismarck promised that if Italy appealed to Germany he would merely say that French action in Tunis was imperative. Grosse Politik, III, 389.

³³ Bourgeois and Pagès, 366; Daudet, 90, 92.

³⁴ Bourgeois and Pagès, 368.

³⁵ Bismarck was especially anxious for the peaceably inclined Waddington ministry to remain in power. Herbert Bismarck wrote to Radowitz: “[Bismarck] hielte es für eine europäische Notwendigkeit, Waddington in Frankreich am Ruder zu erhalten.” Grosse Politik, III, 395. The chancellor expressed the same desire in several letters to a member of the federal council. He wrote: “Waddington muss als ein friedlich gesinnter Staatsmann unterstützt werden.” Upon another occasion he said: “Unsere ganzen Bemühungen sind darauf gerichtet, die jetzigen französischen Staatsmänner am Ruder zu erhalten.” Lucius, 177, 548.

be no danger of a Franco-Russian rapprochement.³⁶ Hence the chancellor desired no discord between the two western powers on account of the question of Tunis. Accordingly he had Bülow speak to Lord Odo Russell, the British ambassador, concerning Sir Richard Wood's conduct at Tunis.³⁷ As a result of this Great Britain recalled the offending consul.³⁸

The important questions which arose through the Treaty of Berlin were the subjects of negotiation throughout 1879,³⁹ and consequently the fate of Tunis was only of secondary importance. Difficulties with Russia caused by the eastern question made Bismarck so uneasy that he sought an alliance with Austria,⁴⁰ and even undertook negotiations with Great Britain.⁴¹ However, the attitude of Waddington towards the

³⁶ Bourgeois and Pagès, 193. Herbert Bismarck in a despatch to Bülow quoted the chancellor as saying: "Ich glaube nicht dass es sehr leicht sein würde, die Franzosen in das russische Lager und zu antienglischer Politik hinüberzudrängen; wenn aber ihr durch unglücklichen Krieg ohnehin gereiztes Nationalgefühl bei scheinbar berechtigten Reklamationen gegen eine kleine Macht wie Tunis verletzt werden sollte, so ist doch schwer zu berechnen, ob sich die bisherige friedliche und gegen England nicht unfreundliche Politik nicht in neue Wege begeben könnte." *Grosse Politik*, III, 388. Bismarck spoke in a similar manner to Lord Dufferin. The latter wrote: "As long as . . . [France and Great Britain] are friends and act together in the East, France is unlikely to fall into the hands of Russia, but if we shake her off like a woman of doubtful virtue, into the arms of Russia she will go." Lyall, I, 306.

³⁷ *Grosse Politik*, III, 388; Bourgeois and Pagès, 367.

³⁸ Newton, II, 173-174; Constant, 79.

³⁹ Especially the questions of the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers.

⁴⁰ Above, pp. 61-63.

⁴¹ Bismarck instructed Radowitz September 14, 1879, to have Münster ascertain as far as possible from Beaconsfield what the policy of Great Britain would be if Germany began to refuse the exacting demands of Russia and consequently became involved in a quarrel with her. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 4. The German ambassador visited Beaconsfield at Hughenden Manor, September 27, and discussed the question. Buckle, III, 49. The British prime minister said that if Germany and Great Britain came to an agreement, that is, if Germany would assist her in the east, then she would stand prepared to see that France did not bestir herself in the event of a conflict between Russia and Germany. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 9. Beaconsfield authorized Salisbury to open conversations with Münster, and these took place, October 15, at Hatfield. Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 491; Cecil, II, 368-369; *Grosse Politik*, IV, 11-14; Lee, I, 471-473. Nothing definite was concluded, and the subject was not renewed. Cecil, II, 639; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 491. With regard to this

overtures made by Russia in the autumn of 1879 caused Bismarck to feel assured that he had nothing to fear in the west.⁴² Hohenlohe reported that France would go along with Germany and Great Britain,⁴³ and the French foreign minister gave similar assurances to Salisbury.⁴⁴ Bismarck was then all the more determined to foster the good relations between France and Great Britain in order to prevent a rapprochement between France and Russia.⁴⁵

During the early months of 1880 the Franco-Italian conflict in Tunis became more acute. The Rubattino incident⁴⁶ caused the French government to act quickly; and early in July Freycinet⁴⁷ informed General Cialdini, Italian ambassador to France, that he would oppose any attempt to modify the status quo in Tunis.⁴⁸ The French ambassador in Rome expressed the same views to Cairoli, the Italian minister of foreign affairs.⁴⁹ It seemed as if France might endeavor to end the Tunis question at the time, but several events indicated that a propitious moment had not arrived.

The British elections of 1880 resulted in a Liberal victory,⁵⁰ and it was uncertain what effects the advent of a Gladstone ministry would have upon the diplomacy of Europe.⁵¹ France feared that Germany would change her

alliance offer see the discussion by Plehn concerning the contemporary meaning of *Bündnis*. Plehn, 164-165.

⁴² Above, p. 63, note 37.

⁴³ *Grosse Politik*, III, 392.

⁴⁴ Cecil, II, 364; Daudet, 171.

⁴⁵ Hohenlohe, II, 280.

⁴⁶ A French company had purchased a Tunisian railway in order to complete its system terminating at Bona, Algeria. An Italian competitor, having found a flaw in the transaction, succeeded in having the sale declared invalid. The railway was subsequently purchased by Rubattino, and later the Italian government granted him a subsidy in order to make the venture successful. Constant, 92-96; Broadley, I, 186-188. Also see the article by Ernest Daudet, "La France en Tunisie," in *Le Figaro*, 12 May 1880.

⁴⁷ Freycinet became minister of foreign affairs December 27, 1879.

⁴⁸ *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, VIII, 413-415.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Annual Register*, 1880, pp. 54-56; Morley, II, 609-612. Much interesting material concerning the formation of the Gladstone ministry is to be found in Queen Victoria's journal and memoranda. Buckle, III, 80-85, 87-90.

⁵¹ Lord Odo Russell wrote to the queen's secretary, Sir Henry

previous policy, for it was thought that the chancellor would effect a rapprochement with Russia in order to prevent British efforts in that direction.⁵² This policy, if adopted by Germany, meant that she would no longer endeavor to foster Anglo-French accord. The effect of this upon French policy in Tunis was evident.⁵³ Then again, there was disagreement in France as to the expediency of taking Tunis. Although Gambetta had not yet been won over to the plan,⁵⁴ the French minister of foreign affairs instructed Roustan to submit a treaty to the bey of Tunis providing for a formal protectorate.⁵⁵ However, before this could be accomplished the Freycinet ministry fell.⁵⁶

Again the question of Tunis lapsed into quiescence, only to be awakened by the efforts of Italy to establish a telegraph cable from Sicily to Tunis.⁵⁷ The French ambassador hurried to interview Bismarck at Friedrichsruh, and endeavored to have the chancellor exercise his influence in Italy in order to persuade the latter to adopt a less aggressive attitude in Tunis.⁵⁸ Bismarck promised his moral and diplo-

Ponsonby: "The unexpected result of our elections and the consequent change of administration at home is viewed with anxious interest abroad, and may affect the European situation." Buckle, III, 74. Then, too, Gladstone's violent anti-Austrian speech at Edinburgh March 17, 1880 (*Annual Register*, 1880, p. 47), caused much embarrassment to Great Britain and also threatened her relations with Germany. Fitzmaurice, II, 200-206. Gladstone later made a public apology for his injudicious language. *Annual Register*, 1880, pp. 63-64; *Saturday Review*, XLIX, 615-616.

⁵² Saint-Vallier expressed this opinion in a despatch to Freycinet. *Bourgeois and Pagès*, 200, 371.

⁵³ At the same time it was uncertain whether Lord Granville, the new secretary of state for foreign affairs, would adhere to the policy of his predecessor. His note of June 17, 1880, to Lord Lyons certainly gave the French no encouragement. Cd. 2886. *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Tunis*, 5.

⁵⁴ Deschanel, 260-261.

⁵⁵ Freycinet, II, 168.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Crispi, 86. Cialdini was opposed to such action at the time. He wrote: "French influence, banished from Europe by Prince Bismarck, has transferred its energy to Africa, where it need not fear a conflict with Germany. We shall never obtain concessions from France by means of diplomacy and reasoning." *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Hohenlohe*, II, 306-307.

matic support, saying that he would invite Italy to live upon good terms with France.⁵⁹ The French statesmen were again disposed to take decisive measures in Tunis, but their plans were frustrated by European complications. At this time there was pending with Great Britain the case of the "Enfida claims,"⁶⁰ and from Italy and Austria came rumors of alliance negotiations.⁶¹ March 13 Tsar Alexander II was assass-

⁵⁹ Bourgeois and Pagès, 203 note. Bismarck is also reported as having said upon this occasion: "Ausserhalb Europas macht was Ihr wollt." Aus Conrad Haussmanns Politischer Arbeit, 62. Hohenlohe noted in his journal a conversation held with Bismarck on the same day of Saint-Vallier's visit. He wrote: "[Bismarck] betonte, dass wir den Franzosen offen sagen könnten, wir freuten uns, wenn sie anderweite Interessen verfolgen, wie in Tunis, Westafrika, oder im Orient, und dadurch abgehalten würden, ihre Blicke nach der Rheingrenze zu richten. Damit ist aber nicht gesagt, dass wir Frankreich in Verwicklungen hineinhetzen wollten. Wir seien ruhige Zuschauer und würden Frankreich nicht inkommodieren, wenn es anderweitig engagiert sei, denn wir hätten von Frankreich nichts zu verlangen als Ruhe und Frieden." Hohenlohe, II, 306.

In writing of Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire's diplomatic measures to defend French interests in Tunis, Ernest Daudet said: "Nous sommes en mesure d'affirmer qu'il trouve, sur ce terrain, des encouragements à Berlin; que l'Allemagne est demeurée constamment fidèle à l'attitude qu'elle avait promise, lors du Congrès de 1878, et que, depuis lors, en toutes circonstances, elle a agi et parlé, sur cette question de Tunis, conformément aux vues de la France. Nous ne sommes pas assez pessimiste pour penser que ces encouragements cachent un piège." Le Figaro, 8 January 1881.

⁶⁰ The "Enfida" case arose out of the conflicting claims of a French company, the Société Marseillaise, and a British subject, Joseph Levy, to an estate in Tunis. The case was to be decided by the *lex loci*, but the French endeavored to awe the bey by sending a war vessel to Tunis. This caused much disturbance in Great Britain, and she also sent a cruiser to Tunis. The British government, however, finally yielded to the claim of the French company. Cd. 2908. Correspondence Respecting Mr. Joseph Levy's Claim to the Right of Preemption to the Enfida Estate in Tunis; Newton, II, 238-240; Broadley, I, 198-202; S. L. Gwynn and C. M. Tuckwell, The Life of Sir Charles Dilke, I, 379-380.

⁶¹ King Humbert of Italy grew more and more alarmed with the increase of French influence in Tunis, and he felt the necessity of an arrangement with the central powers by which the Italian possessions in Africa would be guaranteed and protected against French aggression. Pribram, I, 133. Indirect inquiries were then made in Berlin and Vienna. Ibid. Bismarck rejected the Italian advances, saying that "the road to Berlin led through Vienna." Crispi, 95. Austria, however, was willing to negotiate a treaty of neutrality

sinated,⁶² and there immediately arose the fear of a new

with Italy; and accordingly Count Maffei, secretary-general of the minister of foreign affairs, submitted a draft treaty to Austria "as a first step towards more intimate relations." *Grosse Politik*, III, 185; Pribram, I, 133; Crispi, 96. The basis of the treaty was to be "respect of the status quo in the orient as established according to the Treaty of Berlin." Pribram, I, 133; Crispi, 97.

These negotiations took place in January 1881, a month previous to Humbert's visit to Vienna. Pribram, I, 133. The German ambassador in Rome had full knowledge of the negotiations between the two governments (Crispi, 96), but Bismarck, at the time, was not anxious for an agreement with Italy. November 8, 1880, Limburg-Stirum of the German foreign office wrote to von Berchem, German chargé d'affaires in Vienna: "Ein Versprechen. . . [Italien] gibt dem anderen Teile kein Bürgschaft, wenn Italien kein Interesse hat, dasselbe zu halten; auch in Form eines Vertrages gekleidet, würde dasselbe keine Sicherheit der Erfüllung gewähren; es wäre für die Erhaltung des Weltfriedens absolut wertlos." *Grosse Politik*, III, 188.

Negotiations between Austria and Italy continued until May 1881 (Pribram, I, 133-134; Crispi, 98), but Bismarck still continued to oppose the idea of an alliance with Italy. May 19, Limburg-Stirum wrote to von Keudell, German ambassador in Rome: "Die Ansichten eines italienischen Ministeriums bieten keine Bürgschaft für das Verhalten seiner Nachfolger. Wenn Österreich auf einen solchen Vertrag eingehen wolle, so werden wir ihm nicht abraten; aber eine Anregung oder Vermittelung in Wien nicht übernehmen. Wir würden von einen solchen Schritt Schaden und keinen ausgleichenden Nutzen haben; Schaden weil die Franzosen dadurch gegen Österreich, und wenn sie unsere Vermittelung in der Sache erführen, was bei den häufigen Ministerwechseln in Rom und dem Mangel an Diskretion in Wien wahrscheinlich sei, direkt gegen uns gereizt werden; keine kompensierenden Nutzen, weil die Sicherheit dafür fehle, dass ein solcher Vertrag unter Umständen, wo er in Wirksamkeit treten sollte, von dem alsdann am Ruder befindlichen Machthaber würde gehalten werden können." *Grosse Politik*, III, 190.

A recent German writer gives the following reason for Bismarck's attitude towards Italy: "Der Grund, weshalb er jetzt voll Misstrauen und Eifersucht auf die Versuche eines österreichisch-italienischen Abkommens schaute, lag darin, dass er gerade damals an dem Neubau des Dreikaiserbündnisses baute und hierbei grosse Schwierigkeiten am Ballhausplatz zu überwinden hatte. Er fürchtete, dass Österreichs Interesse an dem Dreikaiserbündnisse um so geringer werde, je besser es sich mit Italien stehe." Otto Becker, *Bismarck und die Einkreisung Deutschlands*, I, 50.

⁶² Annual Register, 1881, p. 270; Lyall, I, 319-320; Frederick Hamilton, *The Vanished Poms of Yesterday*, 162-166; Émile Flourens, *Alexandre III, Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre*, 54-57; Ernest Daudet, *Soixante Années du Règne des Romanoff*, 228-229; Von Schweinitz, II, 151-152.

league of three emperors.⁶³ But notwithstanding this, France was still assured of German support in Tunis.⁶⁴

A minor incident soon afforded the French government an opportunity to complete its designs upon Tunis. The raid of a Tunisian tribe upon Algiers led to the dispatch of a

⁶³ Sir Charles Dilke, British under secretary of state for foreign affairs, informed Gambetta that the league of three emperors was revived again and that France was once more isolated. Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 379; Newton, II, 237; Ernest Daudet, *La Mission du Comte de Saint-Vallier*, 246-249. The waning influence of Gorchakov and the rise of Giers in the Russian foreign office made possible the renewal of friendly relations between Russia and Germany. The Russian government named Saburov as ambassador to Berlin January 4, 1880, and soon thereafter he began conversations with Bismarck concerning a policy upon which Austria, Russia, and Germany might agree. A renewal of the league of three emperors was especially agreeable to the kaiser, but Austria showed no enthusiasm for the Russian proposals. The other two powers, however, proceeded with negotiations, submitting a draft treaty to Austria in January, 1881. The latter was slow to acquiesce since she considered her position in the Balkans insufficiently protected. It was not until June 18, 1881, that the treaty was finally signed by the three powers.

The chief benefit to Germany was contained in the first paragraph of Article I: "Dans le cas où l'une des Hautes Parties Contractantes se trouverait en guerre avec une quatrième Grande Puissance, les deux autres maintiendront à son égard une neutralité bienveillante et voueront leurs soins à la localisation du conflit."

Bismarck considered this an important step in his policy to isolate France. In a despatch of January 17, 1881, to Prince Henry VII Reuss, German ambassador in Vienna, the chancellor wrote: "Der Artikel I gewährt für Deutschland die Sicherheit gegen Beteiligung Russlands an französischen, und für Österreich-Ungarn gegen Ermutigung italienischer oder italienisch-französischer Unternehmungen durch Russland. Die italienische Regierung, insbesondere wenn die republikanische Partei französisch Anlehnung findet, ist vielleicht nicht immer imstande, gesetzlose Unternehmungen zu verhindern, wenn solche von russischer Seite Ermutigungen fänden, und in Frankreich haben wir bei der zweideutigen Haltung Gambettas keine Sicherheit für die Fortdauer der jetzigen friedliche Politik uns gegenüber. Aber es ist nicht wahrscheinlich, dass Österreich von Italien oder Deutschland von Frankreich werde angegriffen werden, wenn nicht Aussicht auf russische Beteiligung gegen den Angegriffenen vorher zur Wahrscheinlichkeit geworden ist. Der Artikel I würde die Quelle für solche russischen Ermutigungen abschneiden."

The negotiations between the three imperial governments can be traced in: Grosse Politik, III, 139-179; J. Y. Simpson, "Russo-German Relations and Sabouroff Memoirs," in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, LXXXII, 1111-1123; LXXXIII, 60-75; Richard Fester, "Saburov und die Russischen Staatsakten über die Russisch-Deutschen Beziehungen von 1879 bis 1890," in *Die Grenzboten*, Number 16, pp. 55-65; Number 17/18, pp. 86-100.

⁶⁴ Daudet, 248.

French expeditionary force,⁶⁵ and soon the army stood before the capital.⁶⁶ While victories were being gained in Africa the French foreign minister was watching anxiously the actions of Great Britain and Italy. Lord Granville was very much annoyed by French activity in Tunis,⁶⁷ and seriously considered raising the European concert against France.⁶⁸ Italy, on the other hand, endeavored to negotiate a treaty with Austria in order to protect and guarantee Italian possessions in Africa against French aggression.⁶⁹ But Germany continued to give her support to France.⁷⁰ Bismarck informed Saint-Vallier and General Pittié,⁷¹ April 8, that France should go ahead in Tunis and not trouble herself about the Italians,⁷² and several days later he told the

⁶⁵ Livre Jaune, 1870-1881, Affaires de Tunisie, 301; Constant, 110-111; Broadley, I, 210; Journal des Débats, 3 April 1881; Le Figaro, 3 April 1881; Buckle, III, 210. The raid was but one of a great number, for the governor-general of Algeria reported 2,379 "principaux crimes et délits" attributable to the Tunisians. Livre Jaune, 1881, Affaires de Tunisie, Supplément, 62-63. In urging the government to act promptly the Tunis correspondent of Le Figaro wrote: "L'Allemagne l'a dit, et l'a redit; elle voit le protectorat de la France à Tunis logique et même nécessaire." 5 April 1881.

⁶⁶ Hanotaux, IV, 657-660.

⁶⁷ Granville wrote to Lyons April 5: "I am told that the French are determined to establish their Protectorate. This will be very awkward at the moment. . . . The Italians wish us to move vigorously in the matter; the Italian government seems alarmed at the excitement of their chamber." Newton, II, 241. Later he wrote to Gladstone: "I own to jealousy of France getting an overwhelming preponderance in the Mediterranean." Fitzmaurice, II, 234. The Times remarked editorially: "We must be pardoned for considering that the disinterment of Lord Salisbury's conversation of nearly three years ago to justify what looks like a *parti pris* is a piece of sharp practice unfamiliar to our political usages." 12 April 1881.

⁶⁸ Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 380. Sir Charles Dilke dissuaded Granville from following this course.

⁶⁹ Pribram, I, 133.

⁷⁰ Bismarck realized that Great Britain and Italy would resent French activity in Tunis, and that probably ill-feeling would result. His second motive was that France should expend men and money in Tunis, and at the same time become more isolated. Moritz Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History, II, 276-277. One contemporary journal remarked: "Germany openly says that she would like to see France annex Tunis, as the French might see in Tunis a compensation for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and be thus kept happy and quiet." The Saturday Review, LI, 549.

⁷¹ Pittié was the chief of the military cabinet of the French president.

⁷² Hohenlohe, II, 310. In speaking of Pittié's reception by the

ministerial council that the German press ought to observe the most extreme restraint with regard to Tunis in order to allay any suspicion in France.⁷³

With the rapid advance of the French troops⁷⁴ the bey of Tunis lost all hope of foreign intervention,⁷⁵ and May 12 a protectorate was established over him.⁷⁶ After the treaty of Bardo had been signed and ratified⁷⁷ the minister of foreign affairs feared that difficulties would be raised by other European powers. Accordingly Saint-Vallier was instructed to ascertain Bismarck's attitude towards French colonial expan-

emperor, Daudet said: "Il a recueilli de lui dans les termes les plus bienveillants l'assurance que l'Allemagne voyait sans appréhension comme sans mécontentement, la France organiser à Tunis la défense et la protection de ses intérêts. . . . Reçu dans cette journée par le prince de Bismarck, le général Pittié a trouvé chez le chancelier de l'Empire le même accueil que chez l'Empereur . . ." *Le Figaro*, 9 April 1881. Bismarck also gave additional proof of his sincerity by preventing the dispatch of a Turkish army corps which was to oppose the French. Bourgeois, IV, 27.

⁷³ Lucius, 207.

⁷⁴ Constant, 147-177.

⁷⁵ The bey of Tunis requested Great Britain and other powers to "interpose their friendly offices" (Cd. 2887. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Tunis, 50), but to no avail. He then appealed to Lord Granville to mediate, and the latter proffered his good offices. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79, 82. These, however, were not accepted by France. Cd. 2888. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Tunis, 4-5. The following extract gives the views of Queen Victoria, May 17, 1881: "Saw Lord Granville, and talked over most of the topics of the day, but with no satisfactory result. He lamented over things, shrugged his shoulders, but is weak as water, regretted the French attack on, and apparent seizure of, Tunis, but only trying to put the blame on Lord Salisbury, hinting that nothing well could be said, on account of Cyprus." Buckle, III, 219.

⁷⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires de Tunisie*, Supplément, 38-40, 42; Broadley, I, 310-319; *Journal des Débats*, 14 May 1881. Lyons wrote to Granville May 13: "Barthélemy St. Hilaire certainly foreshadowed the Tunisian Treaty accurately when he said that it would very much resemble a protectorate. It is so like one that it would be difficult to point out a difference." Newton, II, 243.

⁷⁷ *Journal Officiel*, 1881, *Chambre*, Ord., I, 992; *Ibid.*, 1881, *Sénat*, Ord., I, 732. Clémenceau was the chief opponent of the treaty in the chamber of deputies primarily because "it chilled friendships cemented upon the battlefield." *Ibid.*, 1881, *Chambre*, Ord., I, 982.

Le Siècle replied to the strictures of Clémenceau as follows: "Nous avons cru jusqu'ici que la France pouvait prendre en Afrique des précautions pour assurer la sécurité de l'Algérie sans pour cela abandonner aucune des traditions de sa politique continentale. . . . il nous semblait qu'on pouvait avoir un oeil fixé sur Tunis et l'autre regardant au delà des Vosges." 27 May 1881.

sion.⁷⁸ The chancellor assured the French ambassador that Germany would remain faithful to the promises made to Waddington,⁷⁹ and would maintain the attitude of a sympathetic neighbor in a cause which was that of civilization against barbarism.⁸⁰

This attitude of Germany prevented any hostile demonstration against France,⁸¹ and it is quite certain that Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire was really grateful for German support. He wrote to the editor of the *Deutsche Rundschau*, May 12, expressing his gratitude to the German government and the press for their friendly position during the past few months.⁸² At the same time he made an official acknowledgement to Bismarck saying that he would not be restrained by any insinuations and attacks from expressing his appreciation and thankfulness for the support granted by Germany. He attributed the sudden moderation of the Porte and the fact that Italy received no support in Europe to Germany's disinclination to embarrass France.⁸³

The task of France in Tunis did not cease May 12, but necessitated a protracted war.⁸⁴ Those who saw these large expenditures of men and money marvelled at the success of Bismarck's policy.⁸⁵ The chancellor was now anxious to

⁷⁸ Daudet, 211. Also see Rambaud, 292.

⁷⁹ Daudet, 210-211.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 380.

⁸² *The Times*, 23 May 1881.

⁸³ *Grosse Politik*, III, 400. At the same time Saint-Hilaire wrote a private letter to Bismarck saying: "Wir können das Verhalten Deutschlands in dieser wichtigen Frage nur rühmen, und bereitwillig gebe ich der Dankbarkeit Ausdruck, die wir der deutschen Regierung schuldig sind." Moritz Busch, *Unser Reichskanzler*, II, 124.

⁸⁴ Hanotaux, IV, 692-698; Constant, 213-257.

⁸⁵ The British ambassador in Berlin wrote to Lord Granville: "Prince Bismarck is in great spirits since the French have gone into the Tunis trap, which he baited for them at the Congress, and chuckles over the security Germany will enjoy from a diminished army in France with increased occupation in Africa." Fitzmaurice, II, 236. Lord Lyons wrote to Granville in the same vein: "A little while ago dread of Germany made . . . [the French] unwilling to send a regiment or a ship to a distance from France, but since the Tunis affair, they have gone into the trap he has set for them with their eyes open. They feel sure of his support and encouragement in any distant enterprises, and the surer of it in proportion to the

offer a still wider field for French activity. Busch, under secretary of state for foreign affairs, wrote to Hohenlohe July 16, 1881:⁸⁶

There is a wide field in the Mediterranean in which we could allow France an entirely free hand, and . . . [Bismarck] has not given up hope that French policy will come to understand in the end how a friendly German empire with forty-five million inhabitants would be more beneficial and a stronger support to French activities than a million Alsace-Lorrainers. France could be assured that we would never oppose her justifiable policy of expansion in the Mediterranean, and there are reasons for the assumption that Russia would behave in the same manner as Germany. Under these circumstances France need not trouble herself about England; the latter was without allies, would always remain isolated and revolutionary, and on that account would suffer continual injuries to her power and prestige.

In France much opposition to Ferry's colonial policy had arisen, and the electoral campaign of the summer of 1881 centered about this question.⁸⁷ The new chamber of depu-

hostility such enterprises may provoke in England and Italy. They thus find a cheap way of gratifying their vanity, and of advancing some of their apparent interests. This coquetting with Bismarck does, moreover, divert their thoughts from Alsace and Lorraine." Newton, II, 247. Blowitz expressed his opinion as follows: "People who now see all the embarrassments of the Tunis expedition, the African insurrections, who perceive that 100,000 men are about to be stationed in Africa, and that France has aroused the susceptibilities of the Powers exclaim, 'What a man Prince Bismarck is! He foresaw all this when he encouraged France to take Tunis; he is now rubbing his hands.'" The Times, 14 July 1881.

Some of the French, however, did not take a similar view. One journal said: "Nous avons dit qu'on peut approuver l'expédition de Tunis sans . . . vouloir entrer dans l'alliance allemande et en subir les conséquences. . . . En ce qui concerne l'Allemagne, la satisfaction que l'expédition tunisienne lui a fait éprouver s'explique naturellement. Elle espère que l'activité et l'espérances de la France se tourneront désormais de ce côté, elle espère peut-être plus encore que nous serons obligés d'immobiliser un nombre de troupes considérable en Afrique, et que nos forces continentales en seront gravement affaiblies. . . . Ces prévisions se réaliseront-elles? Il ne tient qu'à nous qu'il n'en soit rien. En ce qui nous concerne, autant nous avons considéré l'expédition de Tunis comme nécessaire, autant nous condamnons une occupation permanente qui immobiliserait en Tunisie un effectif de plus de cinq ou six milles hommes, ou des projets de travaux publics qui imposeraient de lourdes charges à notre budget." Le Siècle, 30 May 1881.

⁸⁶ Grosse Politik, III, 401. When Hohenlohe read this to Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire the latter restricted himself to a smile of assent "without venturing to express his thoughts." Ibid., note.

⁸⁷ Rambaud, 296.

ties met October 28, and a few days later Ferry expressed his intention to resign.⁸⁸ Debates then began upon the ministry's policy in Tunis,⁸⁹ culminating in an order of the day which was unacceptable to the government.⁹⁰ November 10 the Ferry ministry resigned.⁹¹ President Grévy then summoned Gambetta to form a new ministry.⁹² It was believed in France that the accession of Gambetta to power would cause difficulties with Germany, but this supposition proved to be without foundation.⁹³

While in Paris Saint-Vallier asked Hohenlohe whether Germany would continue to have confidence in the pacific intentions of the French government in view of Gambetta's entry into the ministry.⁹⁴ The German ambassador assured him that the government in Berlin would maintain previous amicable relations with the new ministry,⁹⁵ and this view was heartily endorsed by the chancellor.⁹⁶ In order to give

⁸⁸ Journal Officiel, 1881, Chambre, Ord., II, 1918; Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry, V, 4; Journal des Débats, 6 November 1881.

⁸⁹ Clémenceau again was one of the chief opponents of the Ferry ministry. Journal Officiel 1881, Chambre, Ord., II, 1967-1975.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 1998.

⁹¹ Ibid., 1881, IV, 6345-6346; Rambaud, 306; Deschanel, 265; Hanotaux, IV, 719; Joseph Reinach, Le Ministère Gambetta, 60; Journal des Débats, 11 November 1881.

⁹² Journal Officiel, 1881, IV, 6345-6346; Deschanel, 265.

⁹³ Shortly before Gambetta became president of the council of ministers it was announced that he had just returned from Germany. Blowitz immediately conjectured that an interview with Bismarck took place during the sojourn. The Times, 12 October 1881. Later, in an address at Havre, the French statesman declared that he went to Germany in order to inspect various seaports. Ibid., 27 October 1881; Freycinet, II, 188. It is certain that Gambetta did not see Bismarck upon this occasion. Hohenlohe, II, 321; Moritz Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History, II, 307.

⁹⁴ Hohenlohe, II, 321; Grosse Politik, III, 402 note.

⁹⁵ Hohenlohe, II, 322.

⁹⁶ Hatzfeldt wrote to Hohenlohe as follows: "Die darin wiedergegebene Frage des Grafen, ob wir der französischen Regierung infolge des Eintritts Gambettas ins Kabinett unser Vertrauen entziehen und dementsprechend auch dem französischen Vertreter mit verminderten Vertrauen begegnen werden könnte Fürst Bismarck, wie Ew. pp. erwartet haben werden, nur verneinen. Seine Durchlaucht billigte durchaus die Erklärung Ew. pp. dass die Bildung des Ministeriums Gambetta keine Änderung unseres Wunsches, gute Beziehungen mit Frankreich zu erhalten, herbeiführen werde, und fügte hinzu, dass wir uns jedenfalls freuen würden, den Grafen St. Vallier als Botschafter zu behalten, da derselbe nicht nur bei Seiner

additional assurance that German policy would remain unchanged Herbert Bismarck wrote "that the formation of the new French ministry . . . will remain without influence upon our foreign policy, since we wish to maintain, now as formerly, the principle of the strictest independence of France in the regulation of her internal affairs."⁹⁷ Contrary to the wishes of the German government Saint-Vallier decided to resign, although he informed the emperor that it in no manner implied apprehension of a change in French foreign policy.⁹⁸ The French ambassador then presented his letters of recall to Emperor William I, December 16, assuring him that the French Republic desired to maintain good relations with the empire.⁹⁹

Majestät persona grata, sondern auch ein erfahrener und mit unseren Verhältnissen vertrauter Diplomat sei." Grosse Politik, III, 402.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 403.

⁹⁸ The Times, 18 November 1881. It was said that Saint-Vallier resigned on account of his opposition to Gambetta's proposed reform of the senate and the internal policy of the new premier. Le Figaro, 20 November 1881. Gambetta, however, was very much opposed to Saint-Vallier's resignation. Paul Vassili (pseud.), France from Behind the Veil: Fifty Years of Social and Political Life, 237.

⁹⁹ Daudet, 303.

CHAPTER V

THE QUESTION OF EGYPT

The question of Egypt has played an important part in European diplomacy since 1863. In that year Ismail succeeded to the throne,¹ and soon afterward he began extravagant expenditures upon internal improvements and for the gratification of his personal desires.² Finding that Egypt could not bear the strain of such increased financial burdens the khedive turned to Europe for funds,³ finally selling his Suez Canal Company shares to the British government in 1875.⁴ Shortly after this purchase the latter investigated the finances of the khedive,⁵ and the report of the British commissioner indicated that bankruptcy was almost inevitable.⁶ Ismail, faced with insolvency,⁷ then endeavored to

¹ Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, I, 11.

² When Said-Pasha died the public debt of Egypt amounted to £3,293,000. His successor increased it rapidly, so that by 1876 the funded debt had risen to £68,110,000 in addition to a floating debt of £26,000,000. *Ibid.*; Wilfred S. Blunt, *The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, 11-12.

³ The khedive's decree for the conversion and consolidation of the Egyptian debt revealed that loans were made in 1862, 1864, 1865, 1867, 1868, 1870, and 1873. Cd. 1284. Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 62-65; Charles de Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 148-149. A review of Egyptian finances has been made recently by Leland H. Jenks, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875*, pp. 311-325.

⁴ Cd. 1391. Correspondence Respecting the Purchase by Her Majesty's Government of the Suez Canal Shares Belonging to the Egyptian Government; Monypenny and Buckle, V, 439-452; Gardiner, I, 293-294; Holland, I, 159-162; Newton, II, 85-94; Fitzmaurice, II, 157-158, 249; Blunt, 16; Freycinet, 150-154; Lang, II, 82-86.

⁵ Stephen Cave, a treasury official, was sent to Egypt upon the request of the khedive. Cd. 1396. Correspondence Respecting Mr. Cave's Special Mission to Egypt, 2-8; Annual Register, 1875, p. 283; Monypenny and Buckle, V, 453; Freycinet, 154-155.

⁶ Cave reported that "for the present large amount of indebtedness there is absolutely nothing to show but the Suez Canal, the whole proceeds of the loans and floating debt having been absorbed in payment of interest and sinking funds, with the exception of the sum debited to that great work." Cd. 1425. Report by Mr. Cave on the Financial Condition of Egypt, 8. For a critical view of Cave's mission and report see Blunt, 16-18.

⁷ The khedive suspended the payment of treasury bills April 8,

reform his financial system by creating a commission of the debt to represent the holders of Egyptian bonds,⁸ and by consolidating the national debt.⁹ The interests of the bondholders were not considered sufficiently protected by the khedival decrees, but the Goschen-Joubert mission succeeded in obtaining some modification of the decree of May 2, 1876.¹⁰ This arrangement was then embodied in the decree of November 18, 1876, which among other things provided for the strict supervision of receipts and expenditures by European controllers.¹¹

Notwithstanding this attempted reform the financial condition of Egypt did not improve.¹² The situation became so grave that the commissioners of the debt proposed a complete inquiry into the fiscal system,¹³ and this was agreed to by the

1876. Cd. 1484, p. 39; Cromer, I, 12; Monypenny and Buckle, V, 441; Elliot, I, 167.

⁸ In order to execute the decree of May 2, 1876, the khedive invited Great Britain, France, Austria, and Italy to name commissioners of the debt, but Great Britain would not appoint a member because she was dissatisfied with the financial arrangements made by the decree. Cd. 1484, pp. 54-57, 70, 77, 79; Cd. 2233. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 1-3; Cromer, I, 12-13.

⁹ Cd. 1484, p. 69.

¹⁰ Goschen and Joubert were named by the British and French bondholders to safeguard their interests in Egypt. Annual Register, 1876, pp. 112-113; Elliot, I, 167-170; Freycinet, 160-161; Cromer, I, 13; Monypenny and Buckle, V, 58, 441; Cd. 2233, pp. 9-19; Wolff, II, 141.

¹¹ Cd. 2233, pp. 23-33. By this decree the controller-general of receipts was given power to collect all revenue and to deposit it in the treasury. In addition to his control over revenue collectors he had the power to nominate or suspend these officials, but only through the ministry of finance. The chief function of the controller-general of expenditures was to supervise payments made by the treasury. He was also to collaborate with the controller-general of receipts in preparing the budget, but in this work the controllers had little positive influence.

The British government named Mr. Romaine controller-general of revenue, and the French government named Baron de Malaret controller-general of expenditure. Cromer, I, 14; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 441; Freycinet, 165. At the same time Sir Evelyn Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) was named as British commissioner of the debt. Cromer, I, 15; Elliot, I, 170-171.

¹² Cromer, I, chap. iii. Also see the gloomy reports of Sir Hussey Vivian, agent and consul-general at Cairo, to Lord Derby. Cd. 2233, pp. 86-88, 93-94.

¹³ This occurred January 9, 1878. Cd. 2233, pp. 111-113; Cromer, I, 42.

khedive.¹⁴ After having examined the methods of taxation and expenditure¹⁵ the commissioners submitted their report recommending the adoption of a system of ministerial responsibility and the substitution of a fixed civil list for the revenue derived from the khedival domain.¹⁶ Ismail accepted the report of the commissioners¹⁷ and, August 28, he summoned Nubar Pasha to form a ministry.¹⁸ The latter instituted a new departure in Egyptian affairs by naming an Englishman, Rivers Wilson, as minister of finance and a Frenchman, de Blignières, as minister of public works.¹⁹ The dual control established in November 1876 now came to an end, but the commissioners of the debt still continued to function.

The Nubar ministry struggled with the financial question without success.²⁰ It received but little support from the khedive,²¹ for he still longed to return to irresponsible personal rule. He entered into intrigues against his prime minister,²² and finally succeeded in ridding himself of this Armenian adviser through a military revolt, February 18, 1879.²³ The European ministers were retained,²⁴ but their

¹⁴ Ismail at first desired a partial inquiry, but he finally consented to a complete investigation. *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 8-9, 18-19; Cd. 2233, pp. 103-104, 129-130; Cromer, I, 43-45.

¹⁵ Cromer, I, 46-54.

¹⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 27; Cd. 2233, pp. 292-293; Cromer, I, 61; Freycinet, 169.

¹⁷ Cd. 2233, pp. 286-287.

¹⁸ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 119-120; Cd. 2233, pp. 292-293; *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 212; Freycinet, 169.

¹⁹ Cd. 2233, pp. 293-294; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 124; Cromer, I, 63; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 442; Newton, II, 171; Fitzmaurice, II, 249; Cecil, II, 334; Lee, I, 448; Freycinet, 169; Hanotaux, IV, 490. Also see: E. de Blignières, "Le Contrôle Anglo-Française en Égypte," in *Revue Bleue*, XXX, 129-136.

²⁰ Cromer, I, 63-66.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68; Blunt, 34-35. Both the British and French governments warned the khedive that the success of the ministry depended upon his support. Cd. 2397. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 1-3, 5; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 142-143.

²² Cd. 2397, p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-28; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 148-150; Cromer, I, 74-77; Cecil, II, 348; Newton, II, 171; Blunt, 35-37; Freycinet, 171-172; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 442.

²⁴ *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 213; Cromer, I, 77; Newton, II, 174.

fall from power was already presaged. France and Great Britain then set forth conditions which would have to be complied with in forming another ministry,²⁵ and these were accepted by the khedive when he formed a new ministry March 9.²⁶ The Tewfik ministry was no more successful than its predecessor. Ismail was opposed to the financial policy followed by Rivers Wilson,²⁷ and it was evident that the European ministers would be dismissed at an opportune moment.²⁸ In April the khedive proposed the formation of a purely native ministry and the reestablishment of the dual control.²⁹ In view of this Wilson and Blignières were dismissed.³⁰

Neither France nor Great Britain felt certain about what policy to follow after the dismissal of the European ministers.³¹ The financial houses in France desired their government to intervene,³² but such action did not find favor with Lord Salisbury.³³ Waddington apparently desired the sultan

²⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 161-165; Cd. 2397, p. 50.

²⁶ Cd. 2397, p. 54; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 166-168; *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 215.

²⁷ Cd. 2397, pp. 54, 65-66; Cecil, II, 352.

²⁸ Cd. 2397, pp. 65-66.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-83; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 169-192.

³⁰ Cromer, I, 103; Cecil, II, 351; Newton, II, 174; Fitzmaurice, II, 250; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 442; Freycinet, 174-175; *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 215; Cd. 2397, p. 83.

³¹ During the period from 1875 to 1882 the European powers generally conceded that the paramount interests of France and Great Britain entitled them to a privileged position in Egypt. After the Congress of Berlin an exchange of notes between the two western powers indicated that they were to enjoy a "parity of influence" in that country. Cecil, II, 331. Lord Salisbury explained his policy in a letter to Sir Stafford Northcote as follows: "When you have got a neighbor and faithful ally who is bent on meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested—you have three courses open to you. You may renounce—or monopolise—or share. Renouncing would have placed the French across our road to India. Monopolising would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share." *Ibid.*, pp. 331-332.

³² Newton, II, 175; Cecil, II, 352.

³³ The foreign minister wrote to Lord Lyons: "It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French Government to go into partnership with the bondholders; or rather, to act as Sheriff's officer for them. But to us it is a new and embarrassing sensation." Newton, II, 175; Cecil, II, 352.

to displace the khedive,³⁴ but at the same time Turkish intervention was repugnant to him.³⁵ Consequently no immediate action was taken, and the two governments merely informed the khedive that if he persisted in declining the assistance of European ministers then the two cabinets would "reserve to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and prosperity of the country."³⁶ After a short time Waddington and Salisbury instructed their agents at Cairo to represent to the khedive that he would do wisely to abdicate in favor of his son.³⁷ This had no effect,³⁸ but the sultan then intervened and deposed Ismail by issuing an imperial *iradé* June 26, 1879.³⁹

The overthrow of Ismail was not accomplished through the sole efforts of France and Great Britain, but with the assistance of Germany and Austria. Germany had taken little interest in the Egyptian question⁴⁰ until the publication of the khedival decree of April 22, 1879 regulating the debts of the government.⁴¹ Count Münster informed Salisbury that the German Government intended to protest against this as "an open and direct violation of the international engagements contracted at the institution of the Judicial Re-

³⁴ Newton, II, 175, 178.

³⁵ Lee, I, 449; Newton, II, 175. Salisbury was not anxious to have the khedive deposed. He wrote to Lyons that "we might stand by and look on for a few months till the Khedive has knocked himself to pieces, which he inevitably will do." Newton, II, 179.

³⁶ Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires d'Égypte, 278-281; Cd. 2397, pp. 157-159.

³⁷ Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires d'Égypte, 320-321; Cd. 2352. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 9.

³⁸ Cd. 2352, p. 12; Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires d'Égypte, 324-325.

³⁹ Cd. 2352, pp. 12-13; Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires d'Égypte, 336-339; Cromer, I, 140; Cecil, II, 354; Newton, II, 185; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 445; Lee, I, 450; Blunt, 49-50; Freycinet, 178.

⁴⁰ The refusal of the khedive to pay certain claims awarded by the courts brought forth a protest from Germany. Münster told Lord Derby: "Prince Bismarck wishes for united action on the subject by all the Powers, if only to avoid the possibility of separate action on the part of some of them." Cd. 2233, p. 161.

⁴¹ Cd. 2397, pp. 160-161; Livre Jaune, 1880, Affaires d'Égypte, 274-278.

form," but at the same time he assured the British foreign minister that Germany intended to adhere to her former policy of "leaving the defence of general European interests, with which those of Germany are identified, to the effectual care of the friendly Powers most interested."⁴² Bülow, the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, also assured Saint-Vallier that Germany did not intend to encroach in any manner upon necessary reforms in Egypt where Anglo-French accord was exercised.⁴³ Salisbury was perplexed by Bismarck's sudden interest in Egyptian finance,⁴⁴ but he supported the protest of the German government⁴⁵ in order "to push the Khedive a little nearer the edge."⁴⁶ The French government also supported the German protest,⁴⁷ with the result that the khedive was forced to promise to execute the decrees of the mixed tribunals.⁴⁸ Accordingly, when the French and British representatives invited the khedive to abdicate they were supported by their German and Austrian colleagues.⁴⁹ In this manner Germany repaid the two western powers for their support in the financial question.

After Ismail was deposed the other European powers withdrew from Egyptian affairs in order to await further action by France and Great Britain.⁵⁰ Moreover, the latter powers

⁴² Cd. 2352, pp. 3-4. The imperial consul-general at Cairo, Baron Saurma, delivered the German protest to the khedive May 18, and a few days later the Austrian consul-general did likewise. *Ibid.*, p. 6; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 308; Cecil, II, 353.

⁴³ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 309-310.

⁴⁴ Salisbury supposed that Bismarck was prompted to intervene in order to protect the interests of Bleichröder, a German capitalist.

⁴⁵ Cd. 2352, p. 8.

⁴⁶ Cecil, II, 353.

⁴⁷ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 311-312; Cd. 2352, p. 8.

⁴⁸ *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 312. The Paris correspondent of the Times remarked that the unexpected interference of Germany in Egypt resulted in restoring the good understanding between the powers, especially France and Great Britain. Hitherto opinion had been that Germany sought to make Egypt a cause of dissension between the western powers. The Times, 13 June 1879.

⁴⁹ Cd. 2352, p. 12; *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 324-325; Radowitz, II, 85. French policy in Egypt was discussed by Waddington in the chamber of deputies July 31, 1879. *Journal Officiel*, 1879, *Chambre*, Ord., VII, 7892-7893.

⁵⁰ The Times, 8 August 1879.

had to decide whether they would participate in the restoration of the dual control.⁵¹ Both Salisbury and Waddington were in favor of reverting to the earlier form of control,⁵² but they insisted upon reserving to themselves the right to settle the functions of the controllers.⁵³ Accordingly Baring and Blignières were appointed controllers,⁵⁴ their powers being determined by the khedival decree of November 15, 1879.⁵⁵ The restoration of the dual control was not effected without opposition. Austria, considering her position in Egypt insufficiently protected, proposed the appointment of an additional controller to represent the interests of Austria, Germany, and Italy,⁵⁶ but France and Great Britain would not accept this plan.⁵⁷ The efforts of Austria to gain the support of Germany in this matter were without result, for Bismarck considered justifiable the desire of France and Great Britain for a privileged position in Egypt. Moreover, he preferred to give the western powers a mandate for the protection of German nationals and interests.⁵⁸ The chancellor's motives in doing this were explained in the following communication from Herbert Bismarck to Radowitz:⁵⁹

The chancellor desires chiefly to procure by this act a trifling satisfaction for France, which in reality had quite important interests in Egypt. He desires to treat France courteously, to comply with her wishes in this matter, and to afford her some success in order not to overthrow the present French ministry. From this

⁵¹ Cromer, I, 158; Cd. 2549. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 13-14. Cherif Pasha, the head of the new Egyptian ministry, suggested to France and Great Britain that a return to dual control was desirable.

⁵² Newton, II, 188-189; Cecil, II, 355; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 445.

⁵³ Cd. 2549, p. 5.

⁵⁴ Cromer, I, 159; Newton, II, 189; Cecil, II, 356; Monypenny and Buckle, VI, 445; Cd. 2549, pp. 46, 68; Freycinet, 184.

⁵⁵ The decree of November 15, 1879, gave the controllers wide powers of investigation, but no administrative functions; they were given the rank of ministers, but without a right to vote; and they could not be relieved of their duties without the previous consent of their governments. *Livre Jaune*, 1880, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 378-379; Cd. 2549, p. 138.

⁵⁶ Cd. 2549, pp. 112-113, 120-121, 125-126.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

⁵⁸ *Grosse Politik*, III, 394.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 395.

latter more important viewpoint we could make minor concessions in Egypt, and the chancellor would like to emphasize this to Baron Haymerle as the chief motive for his inclination towards complaisance. . . . He considered it an absolute European necessity to retain Waddington in power, and would be very happy and feel pacified if Baron Haymerle shared this opinion.

The two controllers-general, Baring and Blignières, worked in harmony, and soon beneficial results became evident.⁶⁰ It seemed that these officials might succeed in bringing Egypt out of financial chaos, but subsequent events proved such hope illusory. While progress was being made in the civil administration of Egypt nothing was being done to reform the army, although there was manifest discontent in it.⁶¹ The military revolt of January 30, 1881, caused the removal of the minister of war,⁶² and subsequently some reforms were made. These, however, proved unsuccessful.⁶³ Insubordination in the army increased, culminating when Arabi and his troops demanded that the khedive should dismiss his ministry, convene a parliament, and raise the strength of the army to 18,000 men.⁶⁴ Tewfik accepted these demands and

⁶⁰ Baring wrote to Sir Edward Malet, British consul-general at Cairo: "On the whole, I think the start has been favourable. If we can only sit tight for six months, I believe we may pull the thing through." Cromer, I, 164. He addressed Lord Lyons in the same vein. Newton, II, 203-204.

⁶¹ Auckland Colvin, *The Making of Modern Egypt*, 9; Cromer, I, 176.

⁶² Some of the Egyptian officers presented their grievances in a petition, and at a council of ministers it was decided to court-martial the malcontents. Colonel Ahmed Arabi and two other officers were arrested and placed on trial, but they were rescued by their troops amid scenes of great disorder. The khedive then had to dismiss his minister of war, a measure that the army desired. *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 1-3; Cromer, I, 176-179; Colvin, 10; Blunt, 104-107; Morley, III, 73; Freycinet, 192-195; *Annual Register*, 1881, pp. 361-362.

⁶³ In April, 1881, the pay of all ranks of soldiers was increased from twenty to thirty per cent., and a commission was named to investigate the conditions of service, pay, pensions, and military schools. *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 9-10, 20-24; Cromer, I, 180-181; *Annual Register*, 1881, pp. 364-367.

⁶⁴ Cd. 3161. *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt*, 1-3; Cromer, I, 183-187; Fitzmaurice, II, 252; Morley, III, 73; Colvin, 10-11; Rambaud, 258; Freycinet, 198; Blunt, 109-116; *Annual Register*, 1881, pp. 367-368. Also see the article by John Ninet, "Origin of the National Party in Egypt," in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, XIII, 117-134.

in September a new cabinet was formed under Cherif Pasha.⁶⁵ Several army reforms were instituted by the decrees of September 22,⁶⁶ and shortly afterwards a khedival decree was issued convoking a chamber of delegates.⁶⁷

During these events France and Great Britain maintained "an attitude of a calming and pacifying character."⁶⁸ The sultan of Turkey, however, perceived an opportunity to increase his influence in Egypt, and it was generally believed that he would send troops there.⁶⁹ Turkish intervention was objectionable to France,⁷⁰ and Lord Granville, desirous of avoiding a difference with her,⁷¹ agreed to send British warships to Alexandria in order to meet any emergency that might arise during the visit of the Turkish military commissioners.⁷² Notwithstanding its deference to France in this question the British government still believed that Turkish intervention was the best solution for the Egyptian problem. Granville was of the opinion that the tie which connected Turkey and Egypt was a valuable safeguard against foreign intervention and "were it to be broken, Egypt might at no very distant future find herself exposed to danger from rival

⁶⁵ Cd. 3161, p. 11; *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 30; Cromer, I, 189; Blunt, 116; *Annual Register*, 1881, pp. 371-372.

⁶⁶ The army decrees dealt with leave, pay, retirement, and promotion. *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 58-61.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34, 61-72.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30; Cd. 3161, p. 6.

⁶⁹ *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 31; Cd. 3161, pp. 7, 12; Cromer, I, 195-196.

⁷⁰ France, to be sure, did not desire to see any increase of Turkish power in north Africa, for at the time she was engaged in the Tunisian war. Lyall, II, 8-9.

⁷¹ It was well understood in Great Britain that any serious difference with France would bring about unhappy consequences. Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Granville: "A split with us would very probably lead to France throwing herself into the arms of Bismarck, and he would encourage all her ambitious aims out of Europe, and, in particular, those the prosecution of which would widen the breach between her and England; or, in other words, be especially annoying and inconvenient to us." Newton, II, 259. The British ambassador's judgment was vindicated by subsequent events.

⁷² Despite the disapproval of France and Great Britain the sultan sent a military commission to Egypt to report upon the existing situation. The war vessels of the two powers were to depart as soon as the Turks left Egypt. *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 34-41, 43, 48-49; Cd. 3161, pp. 23, 31, 33, 38, 40, 58, 67-68.

ambitions."⁷³ Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire informed Lord Lyons that he agreed "generally" with this view,⁷⁴ but soon France and Great Britain entered upon a more vigorous policy.

The advent of Gambetta to the ministry of foreign affairs⁷⁵ caused some uneasiness to British statesmen. Would he take advantage of Bismarck's support to bring about a favorable settlement of the Egyptian question? Lyons wrote to Granville:⁷⁶

The change which has come over the relations between France and Germany opens to . . . Gambetta the door for a comparatively safe yet ambitious Foreign Policy. Will he resist the temptation? . . .

At this moment, however, neither France nor Germany appears to apprehend an attack or to be prepared to make one. Each appears to consider the other too strong to be attacked with impunity. Certainly Gambetta would not find the nation in heart to follow him in defying Germany. If therefore his policy or his passions incline him to do something striking to flatter the national vanity, how is he to find the means? The Tunis affair has given Bismarck an opportunity of showing him. It has enabled the Chancellor to convince the French that they will have the countenance of Germany in any enterprise in which they may engage out of Europe.

How far this may be part of a great plan of Bismarck's to secure German supremacy in Europe by pushing Austria into the Levant, Russia into Asia, and France into Africa and the Mediterranean, and by shutting up England in her own islands, we need not inquire. In any case it must suit Prince Bismarck to see France making acquisitions of territory or influence, which weaken her military force in Europe, throw burdens on her finances, and make ill blood between her and other Powers.

Gambetta, however, did not turn to Germany for aid. He preferred a cordial understanding with Great Britain,⁷⁷ since he was convinced that this was necessary for the successful solution of the Egyptian question.⁷⁸ The French statesman interviewed Lord Lyons December 14 in order to ascertain if the time had not come for the two governments most directly

⁷³ Cd. 3161, pp. 72-73; *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 50-52.

⁷⁴ *Livre Jaune*, 1881, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 53; Cd. 3230. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 7.

⁷⁵ For the accession of the Gambetta ministry, above, p. 95.

⁷⁶ Newton, II, 264-265.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-269; Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 454.

⁷⁸ Fitzmaurice, II, 253. A biographer of Gambetta wrote: "Dans la pensée de Gambetta, le condominium dans la vallée du Nil était la pierre angulaire de l'entente anglaise." Deschanel, 271.

interested in the tranquillity of Egypt to concert their action still more closely.⁷⁹ Granville remained cautious chiefly because he considered it inexpedient to formulate measures for future action.⁸⁰ Gambetta, on the other hand, continued to persevere, finally proposing a joint declaration to the khedive promising the support of France and Great Britain.⁸¹ The British foreign minister consented,⁸² and January 8, 1882, the French and British agents assured the khedive that their governments considered the "maintenance of His Highness on the Throne . . . as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and general prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France are equally interested."⁸³

The other European powers were no longer indifferent when they suspected that joint intervention was presaged in the note of January 8.⁸⁴ The French chargé d'affaires in Berlin, Count d'Aubigny, wrote to his government January

⁷⁹ Cd. 3230, p. 21; Livre Jaune, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 4.

⁸⁰ Fitzmaurice, II, 255; Livre Jaune, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 10; Cd. 3230, p. 23.

⁸¹ Cd. 3230, p. 24; Livre Jaune, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 10.

⁸² Livre Jaune, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 11-13; Cd. 3230, pp. 25, 34-35. Herbert Bismarck interviewed Lord Granville January 7, 1882, and he reports him as saying: "Nach den Berichten unseres General-konsuls in Kairo sieht der Khedive sehr schwarz und ist vollständig mutlos: um ihm den Rücken zu stärken und unseren Wunsch, den jetzigen Zustand der Dinge womöglich erhalten zu sehen, zum Ausdruck zu bringen, haben wir und Frankreich unsere Vertreter in Ägypten mit Instruktionen versehen, welche beide zu einer gleichen Sprache ermächtigen." *Grosse Politik*, IV, 27. Notwithstanding his adherence to Gambetta's proposals Granville still preferred Turkish intervention. He told Herbert Bismarck that isolated English action was absolutely excluded and Anglo-French action very dangerous. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

⁸³ The two governments also assured the khedive that they resolved "to guard by their united efforts against all causes of complications, internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt . . ." Cd. 3230, pp. 34-35, 37; Livre Jaune, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 27-29. Additional information is to be found in Fitzmaurice, II, 256; Newton, II, 270; Morley, III, 75; Lee, I, 454; Freycinet, 211. The effect of the dual note in Egypt is described by John Morley, "Egyptian Policy, a Retrospect," in the *Fortnightly Review*, new series, XXXII, 103-104. Also Cromer, I, 228-235.

⁸⁴ Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 220; Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 217. For the attitude of Russia see Von Schweinitz, II, 181-182.

10 that Austria, Germany, Russia and Italy were not disposed to allow Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, but preferred the dispatch of Turkish troops after previous understanding between the Porte and the cabinets of Paris and London.⁸⁵ Turkey also protested against the language of the joint note,⁸⁶ and in Egypt it brought about the fusion of the national and military parties.⁸⁷ Internal difficulties in Egypt⁸⁸ convinced Gambetta that joint intervention would soon be necessary, causing him to make inquiries in London concerning such action.⁸⁹ Lord Granville regarded this as unwarranted,⁹⁰ for he still adhered to his earlier choice—Turkish intervention. Knowing that France would not accept this he then proposed that the two western powers should act as the mandatories of Europe.⁹¹ Nothing resulted from this,⁹² for January 26 the Gambetta ministry retired

⁸⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 30.

⁸⁶ *Cd.* 3230, pp. 45-47.

⁸⁷ *Cromer*, I, 234-235; *Blunt*, 143-145.

⁸⁸ At the time the Egyptian chamber of notables was engaged in a dispute with the ministry and the controllers-general concerning the control of the budget. Granville was disposed to make concessions to the notables, but Gambetta was opposed. The former then accepted the viewpoint of the French statesman. *Fitzmaurice*, II, 257; *Blunt*, 146-147; *Cromer*, I, 237-238; *Freycinet*, 223; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 56-57.

⁸⁹ *Fitzmaurice*, II, 257.

⁹⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 58-59.

⁹¹ Sir Charles Dilke made the following entry in his diary: "On January 15th, 1882, I started the idea that England and France should not act as England and France only, but should ask Europe for a mandate, and on the 16th Lord Granville took it up, and wrote Lord Lyons in its favour on the 17th." *Gwynn and Tuckwell*, I, 454-455.

⁹² The British ambassador in Paris was not at all favorable to Granville's proposal, for he considered it an abandonment of the "exceptional position which England and France have taken up in Egypt." *Newton*, II, 271. Bismarck's opinion of Granville's policy is set forth in a despatch from Hatzfeldt of the German foreign office to Prince Henry VII Reuss, German ambassador in Vienna. He wrote: "Beim Herrn Reichskanzler hat sich seit dem letzten dualistischen Auftreten der Westmächte die Ansicht noch befestigt, dass England gegenwärtig mit einem Mangel an Vorsicht, wie er in der langen Geschichte dieses Landes kaum seinesgleichen hat, regiert wird; dass es ganz dem französischen Leitseil verfallen ist und nur noch auf französische Freundschaft rechnet."

"Die deutsche Politik wird nicht in erster Linie durch diese Vorgänge berührt. Aber für die allgemeine europäische Lage ist

from office after having been defeated on the question of constitutional revision.⁹³

President Grévy then summoned Freycinet to form a new cabinet, and the latter finally consented to perform the task.⁹⁴ The new French minister of foreign affairs had formulated no definite policy with regard to Egypt, so Granville again urged the substitution of the European concert for Anglo-French intervention.⁹⁵ At the same time the other European powers protested against the joint note of January 8, declaring that the status quo in Egypt should not be modified without a previous understanding between the great powers and

es bedauerlich, das englische Kabinett von einem Abenteuer zum andern gleiten zu sehen.

“Wenn England, mit Frankreich isoliert, in Ägypten einschreitet, so wird es dadurch in eine gewisse Spannung mit den übrigen im Orient interessierten Mächten, binnen kurzem jedoch in eine noch grössere Spannung mit Frankreich selbst geraten, denn die Einigkeit der beiden Mächte wird nach Ansicht des Herrn Reichskanzlers bei den starken Sonderinteressen die England hat, nicht vorhalten, wenn die endgültige Auseinandersetzung in Ägypten selbst an die Reihe kommt.” *Grosse Politik*, IV, 30-31.

⁹³ *Journal Officiel*, 1882, *Chambre, Ord.*, I, 57; *Journal des Débats*, 27 January 1882; *Le Figaro*, 27 January 1882; Deschanel, 274-276; Reinach, 590; Freycinet, 230; Hanotaux, IV, 761-762; Newton, II, 277. The fall of Gambetta was regarded with deep satisfaction in Germany, for it was considered a new pledge of peace. The *Times*, 28 January 1882; Reinach, 597. German feeling was epitomized by Waldersee: “Es scheint wirklich, als ob wir durch den Sturz Gambettas einer grossen Gefahr entgangen seien; er hat sicher in Russland mit unseren Feinden Fühlung gehabt.” Waldersee, I, 219.

⁹⁴ *Journal Officiel*, 1882, I, 545-546; *Journal des Débats*, 31 January 1882; Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 212; Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 230. The resignation of Saint-Vallier (above, p. 96) had made it necessary for Gambetta to replace him with a representative who would be persona grata in Berlin. He named Baron Chaudron de Courcel, the political director of the foreign office (*Journal Officiel*, 1881, IV, 7155), but before the new ambassador could assume his duties the Gambetta ministry had fallen. Freycinet, however, retained him (Ernest Daudet, *La Mission du Baron de Courcel*, 1-2), and he was well received by the German court. Bernhard Schwertfeger, *Die Belgischen Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges*, 1885-1914, I, 9.

⁹⁵ Newton, II, 277; Freycinet, 230-231; Lee, I, 455. Freycinet did not desire to enter upon the same activity in Egypt as his predecessors had done in Tunis, hence he was not disposed to interpret the dual note as contemplating material intervention. Newton, II, 278; Freycinet, 233-234; Fitzmaurice, II, 259; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 115-116; *Cd.* 3230, p. 81.

the suzerain.⁹⁶ This protest enabled Granville to internationalize the Egyptian question, and February 6 he proposed that "France and England should communicate with the other Powers . . . as to the best mode of dealing with the affairs of Egypt."⁹⁷

Freycinet and his colleagues decided the best course was to enter into relations with the other powers,⁹⁸ so he informed Lord Lyons that France agreed to Great Britain's proposal, reserving her "adhesion to any military intervention in Egypt."⁹⁹ Accordingly the European powers were then invited "to enter upon an exchange of views as to the best mode of dealing with the question."¹⁰⁰ The powers agreed to this,¹⁰¹ but as yet France and Great Britain were not ready for a European conference. Bismarck was gratified to see

⁹⁶ Cd. 3230, p. 80; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 114. Freycinet later expressed the opinion that Bismarck would not allow the occasion to pass without asserting his authority, and that the other European powers did not desire the problem to be solved by France and Great Britain. He asserts that the German chancellor was prompted by his desire to flatter Russia in order to facilitate the formation of a new league of three emperors; to serve the malice of Italy, which had not pardoned France on account of Tunis; and to increase German influence at Constantinople. Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 222, 224; Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 231-232.

⁹⁷ Cd. 3230, p. 84; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 121-122; Fitzmaurice, II, 259. Granville probably came to this decision after the cabinet held February 1. Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 456.

⁹⁸ Bourgeois and Pagès, 205; Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 226; Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 236-237. One journal remarked: "Le jour même où il prenait le pouvoir, M. de Freycinet avait fait savoir aux représentants des grandes puissances que pour cette question comme pour toutes celles qui intéressent l'Europe, il entendait revenir à la politique d'union et d'action commune que M. Gambetta semblait vouloir sacrifier à une politique d'isolement ou d'entente avec l'Angleterre seule." *Le Figaro*, 11 February 1882.

⁹⁹ Cd. 3249. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 3; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 124-126.

¹⁰⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 142-143; Cd. 3249, p. 10. French policy in respect of the Egyptian question was debated in the chamber of deputies February 23. It was thought by some deputies that France would lose her privileged position in Egypt by internationalizing the question, but Freycinet maintained that this was not so. *Journal Officiel*, 1882, *Chambre, Ord.*, I, 172.

¹⁰¹ *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 143-145; Cd. 3249, pp. 32, 33, 34, 38.

the Egyptian question internationalized,¹⁰² but he assured Courcel that if France and Great Britain were disposed to act, and the other powers gave their mandate, he would adhere to this solution.¹⁰³ For his part, however, Germany would not assist in any intervention. Lord Ampthill (formerly Lord Odo Russell) expressed this opinion in his despatch to Lord Granville, saying that "although the chancellor liked the compliment of being asked to put his finger in the pie, he would not send the celebrated Pomeranian to Egypt if intervention were called for."¹⁰⁴

Meanwhile the internal affairs of Egypt were rapidly approaching a crisis. The khedive had convoked the chamber of notables December 26, 1881,¹⁰⁵ and soon afterwards this body quarreled with the cabinet.¹⁰⁶ Tewfik was not in a position to resist, consequently a new ministry was named February 5 in which Arabi was minister of war.¹⁰⁷ At the same time the powers of the controllers diminished steadily,¹⁰⁸ culminating in the resignation of the French representative.¹⁰⁹ Greater power was being acquired by Arabi, and an alleged plot against his life in April brought the ministry into sharp

¹⁰² The chancellor had already expressed the hope that Freycinet would be more "European" than his predecessor. Fitzmaurice, II, 259.

¹⁰³ Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 228-229. Bismarck still believed that France and Great Britain would become embroiled in Egypt. Courcel reported to his government: "Bismarck m'a dit avoir éprouvé une vive appréhension lorsqu'il avait vu la France et l'Angleterre prendre initiative d'une démarche qui pouvait les engager dans une action isolée en Égypte, parce qu'il était personnellement convaincu qu'une action entreprise dans ces conditions amènerait des froissements entre les deux Puissances et qu'un conflit, ou même la menace d'un conflit entre la France et l'Angleterre, provoquerait une perturbation désastreuse pour la prospérité du monde entier." *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 147.

¹⁰⁴ Fitzmaurice, II, 260.

¹⁰⁵ Cromer, I, 225; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 8-9; Cd. 3230, p. 25; Blunt, 137.

¹⁰⁶ Cromer, I, 243; Cd. 3230, p. 80; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 114.

¹⁰⁷ *Annual Register*, 1882, p. 359; Cromer, I, 243; Blunt, 153; Freycinet, 243; Cd. 3230, p. 83; *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 117.

¹⁰⁸ Cromer, I, 257; Cd. 3249, pp. 28-29.

¹⁰⁹ *Livre Jaune*, 1881-1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 157-158; *Ibid.*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 18; Freycinet, 247.

conflict with the khedive.¹¹⁰ This caused apprehension for the safety of the latter and for the safety of the Europeans resident in Egypt, but France and Great Britain were still unable to agree upon a common policy.¹¹¹ Finally, however, the two governments decided to send warships to Alexandria to protect the life and property of Europeans.¹¹² As a further measure of precaution the other European powers were requested to advise the Porte to abstain from any interference in Egypt.¹¹³

This naval demonstration proved to be a complete failure. The previous approval of the sultan had not been requested, causing him to protest against Anglo-French action.¹¹⁴ Other European powers were offended because they had not been consulted, and they refused to make representations to the Porte.¹¹⁵ Meanwhile the military party at Cairo was becoming

¹¹⁰ When Arabi became minister of war he promoted many of the native Egyptian army officers (Cromer, I, 257; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 15), and this was supposed to have caused discontent among the Turkish and Circassian officers. Freycinet, 252; Cromer, I, 262. Soon afterwards twenty-seven of the latter were arrested for plotting against the life of Arabi. *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 32-34. Later they were tried by a court-martial and condemned to exile in the Sudan. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 47-48; Cd. 3249, p. 99; Cromer, I, 262. The French and British representatives at Cairo advised the khedive not to ratify the sentence of the court (Cd. 3249, p. 100; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 48), and May 9 Tewfik commuted the sentence to banishment from Egypt. *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 60-61.

¹¹¹ Freycinet suggested, April 4, that Tewfik be deposed, but the British government would not consent to such action. Newton, II, 280-281; Cromer, I, 260-262; Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 457; Blunt, 203. Granville, in turn, proposed an Anglo-French-Turkish military mission, which was rejected by the French cabinet. Cd. 3249, pp. 92, 93, 101, 103, 105; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 45-46, 49-50, 67; Newton, II, 281; Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 457.

¹¹² The joint fleet was sent to Alexandria upon the suggestion of the French government. *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 69-71, 73-74, 77-78; Cd. 3249, pp. 118, 119-120.

¹¹³ Cd. 3249, p. 136; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 87.

¹¹⁴ *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 104-106; Cd. 3249, p. 137; Cd. 3251. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 3.

¹¹⁵ Austria, Italy, Germany, and Russia acted in concert in this question. Both France and Great Britain assured the four powers that they never "proposed to land troops or to resort to a military occupation of the country." Cd. 3251, p. 27; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 118. With regard to the action of Germany

ing so strong that the British and French representatives advised Tewfik to dismiss his advisers upon the arrival of the joint squadron.¹¹⁶ The ministry resigned May 26,¹¹⁷ but the pressure exerted by the military party upon Tewfik was so great that he soon restored Arabi to the ministry of war.¹¹⁸ Panic now reigned in Egypt,¹¹⁹ and June 11 riots occurred in Alexandria, resulting in the death of fifty Europeans.¹²⁰ France and Great Britain now realized that the time for half measures was past.

Freycinet was still opposed to Turkish intervention,¹²¹ but he finally agreed to it provided the Turkish forces were summoned by France and Great Britain and operated under their control.¹²² Granville accepted this, suggesting, however, that the Porte should be invited to intervene in Egypt by the other powers also.¹²³ Thereupon the French government proposed a European conference to consider "the conditions on which coercive measures should be adopted if such measures were to become indispensable."¹²⁴ Granville adhered to this pro-

Lord Ampthill wrote: "Courcel is very low, as he had reckoned with certainty on German support at Constantinople. Kalnoky and Giers were offended at not having been previously consulted about our naval demonstration; and Bismarck . . . was easily persuaded not to forsake his allies, who merely asked for inaction." Fitzmaurice, II, 264.

¹¹⁶ Cromer, I, 271. Sir Edward Malet wrote to his government, May 19, that "in order to arrive at a settlement, the first step must necessarily be the resignation of the Ministry now in power and the surrender of the military leaders." Cd. 3251, p. 11.

¹¹⁷ Cromer, I, 274; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 129; Cd. 3251, pp. 38-39.

¹¹⁸ Cd. 3251, p. 49; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 142; Cromer, I, 278; Newton, II, 283; Fitzmaurice, II, 262-263.

¹¹⁹ Cd. 3251, p. 60.

¹²⁰ Cromer, I, 287; Morley, III, 81; Fitzmaurice, II, 265; Newton, II, 285; Lee, I, 455; Blunt, 251; Freycinet, 271-272; *Annual Register*, 1882, pp. 364-365.

¹²¹ Lord Dufferin wrote to Sir William White, British minister plenipotentiary in Bucharest, June 30: "The French abhor the notion of Turkish military intervention, and though we drag them to the pond we may have difficulty in making them drink," Edwards, 205. A similar view was expressed in *The Spectator*, LVI, 917-918, 981.

¹²² *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 70; Cd. 3249, p. 128; Gwynn and Tuckwell, I, 457.

¹²³ Cd. 3251, p. 36; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 121; Morley, III, 79; Fitzmaurice, II, 262.

¹²⁴ *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 148-149; Cd. 3251,

posal¹²⁵ and the other European powers concurred.¹²⁶ After signing a *protocole de désintéressement*¹²⁷ the conference opened in Constantinople June 23 without the presence of the Porte.¹²⁸

German diplomacy in the Egyptian question was beset with difficulties from two sides. On the one hand, Bismarck desired to see the Anglo-French entente continue; on the other, he had to take cognizance of the desires of Austria, Russia, and Italy. On the whole, however, he appeared to be more sympathetic with France and Great Britain, since he considered their material interests in Egypt to be far greater than those of the other European powers.¹²⁹ To this a second decisive factor can be added—the chancellor desired Freycinet to remain in power in order to prevent the reappearance of a ministry headed by Gambetta.¹³⁰

p. 36. Freycinet discussed the Egyptian question in the chamber of deputies June 1, justifying his policy as follows: "Et pourquoi devons nous faire appel au concert Européen? Parce que nous n'avons pas la possibilité, nous n'avons pas le pouvoir de resoudre par nous-mêmes les questions qui peuvent surgir en Égypte." *Journal Officiel*, 1882, *Chambre. Ord.*, I, 757. The policy of the government was sustained. *Ibid.*, p. 763. Freycinet's declaration was well received in Germany. *The Times*, 2 June 1882; *Ibid.*, 3 June 1882.

¹²⁵ *Cd.* 3251, pp. 58-59; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, I, 153.

¹²⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 5-7. The Porte refused to participate in the conference because it had just sent a mission to restore order in Egypt. *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 9; *Cd.* 3295. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 18-20. For the work of this mission see *Cromer*, I, 284-289; *Newton*, II, 284-285.

¹²⁷ *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 46, 50, 55, 61, 67-68, 94-95; *Cd.* 3295, pp. 86, 91, 92.

¹²⁸ *Cd.* 3295, p. 133; *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 78, 80; *Hohenlohe*, II, 327; *Lyall*, II, 16. With regard to the inauspicious beginning of the conference Freycinet wrote: "Les attermoiements de la Porte et les complaisances de M. de Bismarck, toujours préoccupé d'accroître son influence à Constantinople, furent la cause de ce regrettable retard." Freycinet, 267.

¹²⁹ *Grosse Politik*, III, 394.

¹³⁰ The Berlin correspondent of the *Times* expressed the opinion that Bismarck's policy since February 1882 was prompted by his desire to do nothing that might bring trouble to the friendly government of Freycinet and facilitate the return of Gambetta to power. *The Times*, 23 May 1882. Blowitz made a similar statement shortly afterwards. *Ibid.*, 31 May 1882.

Lord Lyons repeatedly wrote in a similar vein. In a despatch of

The conference in Constantinople progressed very slowly with its discussion of Turkish intervention in Egypt,¹³¹ but July 6 it was determined to invite the Porte to send troops under specified conditions.¹³² Meanwhile the internal situation in Egypt grew worse. The British government was convinced that no durable arrangement was possible without the overthrow of Arabi, and soon an opportunity presented itself by which this could be effected.¹³³ Egyptian fortifications had been erected at Alexandria,¹³⁴ becoming so formidable

May 26 to Lord Granville he said: "there is an impression here that in order to keep Gambetta out of office, Bismarck may help Freycinet to eat his words." Newton, II, 283. Again, June 20, he wrote: "I think Germany will be very little inclined to urge the despatch of Turkish troops. Bismarck's great object appears to be to keep Freycinet in, and he fears, not without some reason, that when the first Turkish soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet will fall at Paris." Ibid., II, 288.

The American minister to Germany, Aaron A. Sargent, informed secretary of state Frederick T. Frelinghuysen: "While M. de Freycinet declares in the Chamber of Deputies that France will act in accord with the remainder of Europe upon this question, and 'accept the responsibilities, decisions and means of action of the European concert,' it is stated on apparently good authority that Prince Bismarck is favorably impressed with these declarations, and confirmed in his desire to give his moral support to the present French Government, and save it from troubles likely to bring about its fall, which would return Gambetta to power, whose name is, correctly or otherwise, synonymous [sic] with a policy of restlessness and adventure." MSS. German Despatches, XXXI, number 19. In a later despatch, July 10, Sargent wrote: "there is an apparent feeling of concord between the administration of M. de Freycinet and the Chancellor. But French politics are always uncertain, and back of the present French Executive there looms up the shadow of Gambetta, the *enfant terrible* of the Republic, to German eyes. Mr. Gambetta is not chary of his views upon German subjects." Ibid., number 45.

¹³¹ Livre Jaune, 1882, Affaires d'Égypte, II, 80, 83, 91, 106; Cd. 3391. Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, I-2, 12, 30, 47, 53, 68, 87, 93; Lyall, II, 16-18.

¹³² Cd. 3391, pp. 93-95; Livre Jaune, 1882, Affaires d'Égypte, II, 108-110. The invitation provided that during the stay of the Turkish troops the status quo should be maintained and that the occupation should not exceed three months. If the Porte accepted this invitation its provisions were to be embodied in a treaty between Turkey and the six European powers.

¹³³ Cromer, I, 293.

¹³⁴ As early as June 3 the British government was informed that batteries were being raised at Alexandria in proximity to the French and British squadrons. Cd. 3295, p. 10. The attention of the Porte was called to this and two days later Arabi was instructed to cease warlike preparations. Ibid., p. 21. About a month later work was resumed on the batteries.

that the British admiral was instructed to prevent any further construction.¹³⁵ Lord Lyons informed Freycinet of this,¹³⁶ but the French council of ministers decided not to become a party to the ultimatum.¹³⁷ Consequently Admiral Seymour demanded that work on the fortifications cease, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, he destroyed the Egyptian batteries by bombardment July 11 and 12, 1882.¹³⁸

Great Britain had no desire to divorce herself from the European concert, and accordingly proposed that she and France should protect the Suez Canal with the sanction of Europe.¹³⁹ Freycinet accepted this proposal,¹⁴⁰ and the naval credits which he requested were voted July 19 by the chamber of deputies.¹⁴¹ The debates in this body, however, revealed much opposition. Gambetta endeavored to relieve the deputies of their fear that Bismarck was preparing a trap for France in Egypt, but at the same time he exhorted them "never to break the English alliance."¹⁴² Notwithstanding

¹³⁵ Cd. 3391, p. 69; Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 104. Lord Northbrook informed Queen Victoria that Arabi had resumed work upon the fortifications of Alexandria, and that Admiral Seymour had been instructed to prevent this. Buckle, III, 304-305. The queen approved this measure. Ibid., III, 305, 308-309.

¹³⁶ Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 104; Cd. 3391, p. 71.

¹³⁷ Cd. 3391, pp. 83-84; Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 105. Freycinet assured the chamber of deputies, July 6, that France would not intervene in Egypt without the previous consent of that body. *Journal Officiel*, 1882, *Chambre, Ord.*, II, 1176.

¹³⁸ Cd. 3391, pp. 105, 120-121; Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 120; *Annual Register*, 1882, p. 367.

¹³⁹ Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 124, 135; Cd. 3391, pp. 134, 139-140.

¹⁴⁰ Cd. 3391, p. 140; Livre Jaune, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 135-136.

¹⁴¹ *Journal Officiel*, 1882, *Chambre, Ord.*, II, 1332.

¹⁴² Concerning Bismarck's plans Gambetta said: "Ah! je sais bien qu'on dit: M. de Bismarck, il a à la fois toutes les habilités et toutes les suggestions; toutes les fois que la France a un intérêt, ou un dessein, ou un désir, s'il se trouve, par hasard, que la politique allemande n'y est pas directement contraire, il faut se méfier: le piège consiste à présenter à la France comme le résultat d'un encouragement et comme une exhortation de la politique allemande ce qui est la défense traditionnelle, antique, de ses plus grands intérêts.

"Messieurs, il y a eu un temps où cette politique existait, et cependant alors il n'y avait pas de Prusse . . . c'est justement un hommage à rendre à ce politique aussi ferme et aussi maître de lui-même qu'audacieux à certaines heures, qu'il ne s'occupe que des

this, suspicion of German policy in Egypt was not easily allayed, although the opponents of the government voted the naval credit.¹⁴³ It soon appeared, however, that the European powers would not confer a mandate upon France and Great Britain.¹⁴⁴ Hohenlohe informed Freycinet July 28 that Austria, Russia, Italy, and Germany were of the opinion Turkey should be requested first to defend the canal; then if she refused to undertake this the powers interested might act.¹⁴⁵

In France feeling prevailed that the Germans were taking advantage of the Egyptian question in order to cause difficulties for France, and when Freycinet introduced a bill requesting credits for the defence of the canal ¹⁴⁶ the non-interventionists gained a victory. Clémenceau again led the attack, and this time with success.¹⁴⁷ The first article of the bill was rejected by a vote of 416 to 75, causing Freycinet to resign as president of the council and minister of foreign

choses qui se rapportent directement à l'intérêt allemande. Or, il a dit et répété bien souvent que toutes ces querelles ne valaient pas les os de la carcasse d'un Poméranien. On l'oublie trop. Il ne faut pas mettre M. de Bismarck dans toutes les combinaisons et dans toutes les affaires." Ibid., p. 1319.

¹⁴³ Clémenceau was primarily interested in keeping the French army from being scattered in many parts of the world. He said: "Je ne veux juger les intentions de personne, mais enfin, une chose me frappe: il me semble qu'on nous pousse du côté de la Méditerranée, il me semble qu'on cherche à nous éparpiller sur les rivages de l'Afrique; de même qu'on a poussé l'Autriche en Herzégovine et en Bosnie, il me semble qu'on nous a poussés en Tunisie et qu'on nous pousse en Egypte." Ibid., p. 1330. The senate discussed and passed the navy credits July 25. Ibid., Sénat, Ord., II, 910.

¹⁴⁴ Livre Jaune, 1882, Affaires d'Égypte, II, 145; Cd. 3391, pp. 190, 202.

¹⁴⁵ The sultan had agreed to send troops to Egypt, hence it was thought proper to request him to undertake the defence of the canal. Cd. 3391, pp. 241, 243-244. The action of Germany in refusing a mandate was very unexpected. Freycinet, 298.

¹⁴⁶ Journal Officiel, 1882, Chambre, Ord., II, 1494.

¹⁴⁷ He complained that the French army was being scattered over Africa; he implored the deputies not to risk the army in adventures whose ends could not be foreseen. In concluding he remarked: "Messieurs, la conclusion de ce qui se passe en ce moment est celle-ci: L'Europe est couverte des soldats; tout le monde attend, toutes les puissances se réservent leur liberté pour l'avenir; réservez la liberté d'action de la France." Ibid., p. 1509.

affairs.¹⁴⁸ The following day, July 30, Hohenlohe informed Freycinet that Germany was ready to propose the collective protection of the canal in the form France preferred.¹⁴⁹ Similar communications arrived from Russia, Italy, and Turkey,¹⁵⁰ but too late.¹⁵¹ The decision of the chamber of deputies meant that France had withdrawn from Egypt. Her reasons for retiring were numerous: the difficulties of the Tunis expedition caused disinclination to undertake other adventures in Africa; the requirements of an Egyptian campaign were overestimated; and finally, the inability to dispel the belief that Bismarck was preparing a trap for her in Egypt.¹⁵²

With the failure of the Anglo-French proposal for the protection of the canal the Constantinople conference endeavored to agree upon a new measure. Count Corti, Italian ambassador to Turkey, proposed a "purely maritime service for the police and supervision of the Canal, in which all the Powers should be invited to take part."¹⁵³ Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Germany adhered to this proposal, but France took no action.¹⁵⁴ Bismarck then urged the latter to accept

¹⁴⁸ Freycinet, *Souvenirs*, II, 239.

¹⁴⁹ *Livre Jaune*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 166.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1882, *Affaires d'Égypte*, II, 167; *Ibid.*, pp. 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 5.

¹⁵¹ Freycinet has expressed the opinion that if these assurances had arrived earlier he would have never fallen. Freycinet, II, 240; Freycinet, *La Question d'Égypte*, 312-313. The delay was due to faulty telegraphic transmission. Germany regretted the fall of Freycinet from power. *The Times*, 1 August 1882. Concerning this Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Granville: "Hohenlohe seemed, I hear, dreadfully put out by the result of the division yesterday. It was Bismarck's communication which gave Freycinet the *coup de grace*. Hohenlohe had evidently hoped that it would save him, by giving him an excuse to withdraw the Bill." Newton, II, 292. It was also rumored that if Freycinet resumed office the German government would be willing to support the eastern policy of the French cabinet as much as possible. *The Times*, 3 August 1882. A similar statement is made by Lyons: "All is still uncertain as to who the new French Ministers will be. Grévy is doing his best to keep Freycinet, and Hohenlohe is working in the same direction, which is not wise." Newton, II, 292. Also see *Le Figaro*, 4 August 1882.

¹⁵² Morley, III, 82-83; Newton, II, 294.

¹⁵³ Cd. 3391, p. 261; *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 7-8.

¹⁵⁴ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 20-21; Cd. 3391, pp. 266, 321.

the Corti plan,¹⁵⁵ and August 14 the French representatives in Constantinople agreed to the Italian measure.¹⁵⁶ Meanwhile Lord Granville had engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange the terms upon which the Porte was to intervene in Egypt.¹⁵⁷ The swift course of events in that country and the general indecision of the powers then convinced Gladstone that Great Britain probably would have to undertake alone the restoration of order in Egypt.¹⁵⁸ July 20 the cabinet decided to send an expeditionary force to Alexandria,¹⁵⁹ naming Sir Garnet Wolseley to command the British army "in support of the authority of His Highness the Khedive, as established by the Firmans of the Sultan and

¹⁵⁵ Bourgeois and Pagès, 376-378. The French ambassador in Berlin wrote to the new minister of foreign affairs, Duclerc, a long despatch setting forth German policy with respect to the Egyptian question. He attributed the reserve and prudence of the Berlin cabinet to desire not to quarrel with France or Great Britain, but at the same time to increase German political influence in the Mediterranean. He also believed to be sincere Germany's declarations that her principal care in the Egyptian question was to guard the maintenance of peace between the powers. The reason why the chancellor desired France to reassert her influence in Egypt is given as follows:

"Notre abstention aujourd'hui lui ferait craindre pour plus tard un réveil soudain et violent. Elle sait que le jour où nous verrions Marseille dépérir et notre commerce atteint dans l'une de ses fibres vitales, c'est-à-dire la richesse de la France, cette richesse, dont nous sommes si fiers, sérieusement compromise, alors une profonde indignation s'emparerait de la nation et cette rancune accumulée pourrait bien se tourner contre l'Allemagne. Je manquerais à mon devoir si je vous laissais penser que l'Allemagne envisage sans inquiétude une semblable éventualité." *Ibid.*, p. 378.

¹⁵⁶ Livre Jaune, 1882-1883, Affaires d'Égypte, 28-29.

¹⁵⁷ A resumé of these negotiations is given in Granville's lengthy despatch of October 5, 1882, to Lord Dufferin, British ambassador in Constantinople. Cd. 3407. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 2-9.

¹⁵⁸ The prime minister made the following statement in the house of commons July 24: "We do not feel able to be satisfied that we should fully have discharged our duty without endeavoring to bring to bear adequate means of converting the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to a state of peace and order. During the time that yet remains to us we shall still look to the co-operation of the Powers of civilized Europe; if it be in any case open to us. . . . If, after having exhausted all chances, . . . we shall not, . . . shrink from undertaking the duty by the single power of this country." Parliamentary Debates, third series, CCLXXII, 1586.

¹⁵⁹ Morley, III, 83.

existing international agreements, . . . and to suppress a military revolt in that country.”¹⁶⁰ The ensuing campaign was brief, for September 13 the Arabist revolt was crushed at Tel-el-Kebir.¹⁶¹

The military occupation of Egypt by the British made Great Britain all the more desirous of gaining German support, although there was nothing disquieting in the attitude of France.¹⁶² Crown Prince Frederick William informed Bismarck that Great Britain desired to enter into more intimate relations with Germany,¹⁶³ and the replies of the chancellor and under-secretary of state Busch indicated that German policy had been favorable to Great Britain in the Egyptian question.¹⁶⁴ Lord Granville freely acknowledged this.¹⁶⁵ Thus assured of German support the British cabinet decided to

¹⁶⁰ Cd. 3391, pp. 295-296.

¹⁶¹ Spencer Childers, *The Life and Correspondence of H. E. C. Childers*, II, chap. xii; Frederick B. Maurice and George C. A. Arthur, *The Life of Lord Wolseley*, chap. vii; *The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley* (edited by Sir George Arthur), chap. vii.

¹⁶² The French ambassador congratulated Granville upon the success of the British army at Tel-el-Kebir. The British foreign secretary replied that although the common action of the two powers was suspended the entente between them still existed. *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 48-49.

¹⁶³ *Grosse Politik*, IV, 31.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, 32-36; Fitzmaurice, II, 274-276. A writer unfriendly to Germany says: "On the continent of Europe the English occupation of Egypt found ostensible favor only with Prince Bismarck, who diplomatically welcomed it as a wedge likely to keep France and England asunder." Lee, I, 459. A more weighty judgment is contained in Amphyll's despatch of January 20, 1883, to Granville: "The key to Bismarck's policy is to be sought in the true interests of Germany, and that those interests require the maintenance of the Anglo-French alliance, and of intimate relations between England and Germany." Fitzmaurice, II, 273.

¹⁶⁵ At this time Herbert Bismarck, who was in London, wrote to his father: "Auf Deine Bemerkung, dass uns die guten Beziehungen zu England und die Freundschaft der britische Nation wichtiger seien, als das Schicksal Ägyptens, erwiderte Granville, dass die Sympathien für Deutschland hier in letzter Zeit wesentlich zugenommen hätten, nicht nur in der Presse und im Volke, sondern auch bei der Königin: man finge an, im Lande zu verstehen, dass die deutsche Politik England viel genutzt habe." *Grosse Politik*, IV, 39. Granville made the following report concerning Herbert Bismarck's visit: "Count Herbert Bismarck came here today, on his way to the Isle of Wight, from Ostend. He said that his father would be glad that I should know that the German interest in Egypt was so small that he could not consider any settlement of the Egyptian question to be of as great weight as his desire that

come to an understanding with France concerning Egypt.¹⁶⁶ October 22 Granville informed Herbert Bismarck that it had been decided "to abolish the control," and to propose to France that the khedive should name one financial controller.¹⁶⁷ Lord Lyons accordingly acquainted the French government with this decision,¹⁶⁸ but Duclerc, the minister of foreign affairs, rejected it.¹⁶⁹ Numerous notes were exchanged during November,¹⁷⁰ but the British government stood firm and refused to accede to the wishes of France to maintain the condominium.¹⁷¹ After having offered

there should be friendly relations between the two countries." Buckle, III, 332.

Also see Sir Charles Dilke's remarks to Herbert Bismarck. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 41. In reply to the charge that English policy in Egypt estranged Austria and Germany, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs assured the house of commons that "at no time were the relations . . . closer between this country and Austria and Germany than at the present time." *Parliamentary Debates*, third series, CCLXXIII, 1895. Count d'Aunay, French chargé d'affaires in London, reported this statement to his government. *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 30-31. Dilke later told Herbert Bismarck that Tissot, the French ambassador to Great Britain, hurried back to London and inquired whether Great Britain had a secret understanding with Germany, and whether the former desired to conclude a commercial treaty with France on favorable terms. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 40.

¹⁶⁶ Granville wrote to Gladstone October 2: "I agree with you that the Control must be abandoned. I do not think the French will struggle much for it, but will try to substitute something in which they have a fair share." Fitzmaurice, II, 304.

¹⁶⁷ *Grosse Politik*, IV, 42.

¹⁶⁸ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 65-67; Cd. 3447. Correspondence Respecting the Anglo-French Financial Control, 7-8.

¹⁶⁹ Cd. 3447, p. 10; *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 72-76.

¹⁷⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 76-77, 82-83, 86-92, 97-107; Cd. 3447, pp. 14, 20-22; 25-29.

¹⁷¹ Cromer, I, 340; Newton, II, 296-297. Lyons wrote November 3: "The thing most favourable to our coming to an understanding with France, is the very general belief among Frenchmen that Bismarck is egging indirectly both England and France on to a quarrel." Newton, II, 296-297. In fact, Bismarck in a conversation with Hohenlohe said that Germany "must look on quietly if the French and English locomotives should happen to collide," but even in such a case Germany would not threaten France as long as she kept away from the Rhine. Hohenlohe, II, 329. France probably desired German support in her negotiations with Great Britain, because in a conversation with the German ambassador Duclerc said: "I do not know what advice your government is giving to England, but I believe that your interests are the same as ours." *Ibid.*, II, 331-332.

other compensations in vain¹⁷² Granville finally ceased negotiations.

December 31, 1882, an event occurred that caused many to speculate about the future relations between France and Germany. That day Léon Gambetta died. The German people felt that they had been relieved of what they considered a standing danger,¹⁷⁴ and the press did not hesitate to make this clear.¹⁷⁵ The *Berliner Tageblatt* wrote: "Gambetta, the man of implacable revenge, is dead, and his decease will bring us more peace than diplomatic alliances. . . . The New Year's bells which rang in the death of Gambetta have sent us chimes of peace over the Vosges."¹⁷⁶ The British, on the other hand, feared the consequences of Gambetta's death.

¹⁷² The presidency of the *caisse de la dette* was offered to France, but Duclerc refused it, claiming that it could not be considered as a compensation for the abolition of the dual control. Cd. 3447, pp. 32-33; *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 107, 109-113; 114-117, 118-121; Newton, II, 298-299, 303.

¹⁷³ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 121-131. Gladstone informed Queen Victoria: "After long delays, and indirect courses, the Government of France now declines to accept in principle the arrangement which has been proposed under your Majesty's sanction, by way of succession to rather than substitute for, the dual control. This being so, your Majesty's advisers do not propose to enter into controversy, but to bring about forthwith the execution of the arrangement in Egypt itself, and to make known their proceeding to France and the Powers . . ." Buckle, III, 366-367. At this time it seems that Germany was more in sympathy with British policy in Egypt than with that of France, probably on account of Great Britain's decisive action after the bombardment of Alexandria. At least Herbert Bismarck informed the German chargé d'affaires in London that no opposition would be made to any new arrangements in Egypt. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 46. Also see Buckle, III, 332.

¹⁷⁴ *The Times*, 2 January 1883; Daudet, 16-17; Lucius, 246.

¹⁷⁵ *The Times*, 3 January 1883; *Ibid.*, 4 January 1883.

¹⁷⁶ Quoted in *The Times*, 4 January 1883. The American minister to Germany wrote: "Gambetta peculiarly represented the gospel of revenge to the German mind. His public utterances, down to a recent period, showed the spirit that animated the Dictator of Tours. . . . While Gambetta lived, there was no feeling of security in Germany that he might not use his magnetic power to again precipitate France upon Germany. This was by no means a sentiment of fear; for Germany has reason to believe, that it could cope with France in any future struggle. It was rather a feeling of unrest at the thought that an undesirable struggle might be forced upon Germany where no successful combat could bring higher glory than that already reaped." MSS. German Despatches, XXXII, number 95.

Lord Lyons wrote January 9 to Lord Granville: "If, as seems likely, the death of Gambetta leads to the decay of the spirit of revenge upon Germany, this will . . . increase the danger of all other Powers from the restlessness of France, and will in particular increase the difficulties in Egypt."¹⁷⁷ But the internal difficulties of France made the Egyptian question assume less importance.¹⁷⁸ At the same time the German government repeated its assurances to Great Britain with regard to Egypt,¹⁷⁹ and Granville renewed his thanks for the friendly attitude of Germany.¹⁸⁰ Sir William Harcourt, secretary of state for home affairs, told Herbert Bismarck: "We are uncommonly grateful to Prince Bismarck, for he has done us a great service by the friendly attitude of German policy during the summer. . . We all know very well that Prince Bismarck could have upset the cart at any moment if he had wished, and we gratefully acknowledge that he did not do so."¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁷ Newton, II, 308.

¹⁷⁸ Soon after the death of Gambetta Prince Jerome Napoleon issued a manifesto in which he proclaimed himself ready to assume the leadership of the people. He was arrested at once, and then a long struggle began to expel the members of the royal family from France. *L'Année Politique*, 1883, p. 9 ff.

¹⁷⁹ Herbert Bismarck (now first secretary to the London embassy) wrote to his father: "Auf meine Bemerkung, dass das Motiv dieser Haltung lediglich das Wohlwollen sei, welches wir für England hegten, und dass unser Wunsch nach wie vor dahin ginge, ein gute Einvernehmen zwischen England und Frankreich zu sehen, erwiderte Lord Granville unter dem wiederholten Ausdruck seiner Erkenntlichkeit: 'Ich kann Ihnen sagen, dass unser Kabinett jetzt ohne Ausnahme hiervon durchdrungen ist. Mir persönlich war schon seit Jahr und Tag kein Zweifel darüber geblieben, dass Deutschland nicht Anstoss nimmt, wenn wir mit Frankreich auf freundschaftlichem Fusse stehen.'" *Grosse Politik*, IV, 47.

¹⁸⁰ Granville remarked to Herbert Bismarck that during the course of the past year it had been repeatedly represented to him from French sources that German policy worked toward estranging France and Great Britain. The former said he replied that these suspicions were unfounded; and, on the contrary, the chancellor indicated in all of his despatches that Germany ardently wished to see preserved the close relations between the western powers. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48. Bismarck was also using his good offices in Constantinople in order to persuade the Porte to come to an understanding with Great Britain concerning Egypt. Mahmud Moukhtar, *La Turquie, l'Allemagne, et l'Europe*, 53.

¹⁸¹ *Grosse Politik*, IV, 48.

Soon after Granville discontinued negotiations with France as to the dual control he indicated to the powers the future position of Great Britain in Egypt;¹⁸² and Duclerc, on the other hand, announced to the French parliament that "we have only to resume our liberty of action" in that region.¹⁸³ The former, however, performed deeds, while the latter engaged in words. Lord Dufferin, British ambassador in Constantinople,¹⁸⁴ was sent to Egypt to report upon the measures necessary "for the maintenance of peace, order, and prosperity in Egypt, for the stability of the Khedive's authority, and for the fulfillment of obligations towards foreign powers."¹⁸⁵ After months of labor the British commissioner submitted a report,¹⁸⁶ the most important parts of which dealt with the reorganization of the administrative agencies and future provision for a representative government.¹⁸⁷ The dual control was subsequently abrogated by the khedive,¹⁸⁸ and Sir Auckland Colvin was named financial adviser to the Egyptian government.¹⁸⁹ At the same time Sir Evelyn Baring was accredited as consul-general and diplomatic agent.¹⁹⁰

When Baring arrived in Cairo he began negotiations with Granville to reduce the British army of occupation,¹⁹¹ but subsequent events proved this to be inexpedient. In the Sudan an Egyptian army under Hicks Pasha was annihilated by the forces of the Mahdi, a religious fanatic who had been in rebellion since 1881.¹⁹² In addition to the war thus

¹⁸² Cd. 3462. Correspondence Respecting the Reorganization of Egypt, 34-35.

¹⁸³ Journal Officiel, 1883, Chambre, Ord., I, 24-25; Ibid., Sénat, Ord., I, 12-13.

¹⁸⁴ Lyall, II, 32.

¹⁸⁵ Cd. 3462, pp. 11-12.

¹⁸⁶ Lyall, II, 39; Cromer, I, 341-345; Colvin, 26-37; Milner, 77-81; Chirol, 66-67; Fitzmaurice, II, 305.

¹⁸⁷ Cd. 3529. Further Correspondence Respecting the Reorganization in Egypt, 40-95; Lyall, II, 39-45.

¹⁸⁸ Cd. 3529, p. 32.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., pp. 38-39; Colvin, 38.

¹⁹⁰ Cromer, I, 345; Cd. 3844. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 12.

¹⁹¹ Cd. 3844, pp. 50-51, 69.

¹⁹² The rise of the Mahdi and the subsequent revolt is set forth in Cromer, I, chaps. xix-xxvii; Ibid., II, chaps. xxviii-xxix; F. R.

entailed the burden of the British government was made more onerous by the resentment of France. In the latter country two ephemeral ministries¹⁹³ finally gave way to a more forceful one under Jules Ferry.¹⁹⁴ Lord Lyons looked upon the advent of the latter with some misgivings, for he feared that an aggressive colonial policy would be resumed.¹⁹⁵ The intense "anglophobia"¹⁹⁶ that prevailed in France throughout 1883 and 1884 served to increase the apprehension of the British ambassador. Great Britain, naturally, became more anxious to retain the support of Germany; France, on the other hand, also desired to win it.

The expenses incurred by the Egyptian government in the suppression of the Mahdi; the money required for the payment of the Alexandria indemnities;¹⁹⁷ and the operation of the law of liquidation made it impossible to escape an annual deficit.¹⁹⁸ It became evident that Egypt would have to con-

Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Soudan; W. S. Churchill, *The River War*; A. E. Hake, *The Journals of Major-General C. C. Gordon*; Fitzmaurice, II, 319-320, 324-329, 378-406; Chirol, 48-51; Milner, 86-91; Childers, II, chap. xiv; Holland, I, chap. xviii; *Ibid.*, II, chap. xix; Bernard Mallet, *The Earl of Northbrook*, 173-178; G. Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, I, chaps. viii-xvi; Gwynn and Tuckwell, II, 28-46; *Annual Register*, 1883, pp. 389-390; *Ibid.*, 1884, pp. 387-395. Much material is also to be found in the following Blue Books: Cds. 3844; 3845; 3852; 3878; 3879; 3881; 3969; 3970; 3998; 3999; 4000; 4001; 4100; 4132; 4203; 4278; 4600.

¹⁹³ Duclerc resigned January 29, 1883, and Armand Faillières was named as his successor. *Journal Officiel*, 1883, I, 522.

¹⁹⁴ The second Ferry ministry took office February 21 (*Ibid.*, pp. 961-962), with Paul Challemel-Lacour as minister of foreign affairs. In September 1883, Ferry took over this office. *Lettres de Jules Ferry*, 347-348.

¹⁹⁵ Lyons wrote to Granville: "I only hope that the new Ministry will not try to divert public attention from home difficulties by a 'spirited' Foreign or Colonial Policy. Egypt is always a source of trouble ready to their hand, if they want to produce excitement. I think the great thing is to avoid touching the Law of Liquidation or the administration of the security for the loans; in short, to avoid giving them any pretext for saying that the material interests of France are injured, and the guarantee she held weakened." Newton, II, 312.

¹⁹⁶ Newton, II, chap. xvi.

¹⁹⁷ A mixed commission had been named to ascertain the indemnity to be paid for the destruction of life and property during the Alexandria riots. *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Indemnités Egyptiennes*.

¹⁹⁸ Fitzmaurice, II, 328; Childers, II, 196-205.

tract a loan and seek to modify the law of liquidation.¹⁹⁹ The latter, however, required the consent of the European powers who were parties to the agreement.²⁰⁰ Consequently Granville suggested a conference of European powers in order to make the necessary modifications.²⁰¹ Ferry accepted this proposal, but expressed a desire that France and Great Britain should discuss previously the questions at issue.²⁰²

Conversations between Ambassador Waddington²⁰³ and Lord Granville took place during May and June, 1884.²⁰⁴ The former gave assurances that France did not desire to reestablish the condominium,²⁰⁵ and the latter, in turn, promised to withdraw the British army of occupation from Egypt beginning in 1888; to extend the powers of the *caisse de la dette*; and to propose some plan for the neutralization of Egypt.²⁰⁶ In Great Britain the opinion prevailed that Germany would endeavor to foment a quarrel between the western powers,²⁰⁷ but this proved to be without foundation. The rumor that Germany had encouraged France to request a definite date for the departure of British troops from Egypt was emphatically denied by Hatzfeldt.²⁰⁸ On the contrary,

¹⁹⁹ Childers, II, 205; Fitzmaurice, II, 329.

²⁰⁰ Fitzmaurice, II, 329. The state of Egyptian finances and suggested remedies are discussed in *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 8-17.

²⁰¹ Cd. 4000. Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 1; *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 5-7; Rambaud, 265.

²⁰² Newton, II, 325; *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 17-18. It was generally supposed in Great Britain that France would endeavor to regain her former position in Egypt by means of the conference. Fitzmaurice, II, 329; Newton, II, 325.

²⁰³ Waddington was named French ambassador to Great Britain in July 1883. *Journal Officiel*, 1883, III, 3729.

²⁰⁴ Much information is to be derived from Dilke's notes upon cabinet decisions concerning the Egyptian question. Gwynn and Tuckwell, II, 48-55. Lyons' despatches also give valuable comment upon the negotiations. Newton, II, 329-332. Also see Buckle, III, 498-500.

²⁰⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 18-22; Cd. 4047. Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 11-13.

²⁰⁶ Cd. 4047, pp. 13-15; *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires d'Égypte*, 22, 24, 31-32; Rambaud, 264-265; Fitzmaurice, II, 330.

²⁰⁷ Gwynn and Tuckwell, II, 47.

²⁰⁸ The German crown prince informed the secretary of state for foreign affairs that he had learned secretly that Great Britain was under the impression that Germany urged France to make this request. *Grosse Politik*, IV, 57.

he said, Germany had been of service to Great Britain by persuading France and Turkey to accept a conference.²⁰⁹

At home Ferry was attacked for having yielded too much to Great Britain, but he was able to defend himself successfully.²¹⁰ However, the agreement between the western governments did not prove to be well established. The representatives of the European powers met in London June 28,²¹¹ and it soon became evident that there was a great divergence between France and Great Britain. Lord Granville's proposals²¹² were not acceptable to Waddington,²¹³ and, on the other hand, the British foreign minister saw insurmountable objections to the plans of the French.²¹⁴ August 2 Granville announced to the conference that "we have not been able to find . . . a satisfactory basis for the arrangement of Egyptian finance."²¹⁵ Thus, despite the objections of Waddington, the conference came to a close.²¹⁶

²⁰⁹ Daudet, 53; Grosse Politik, IV, 57.

²¹⁰ Ferry adopted the view that the Egyptian question was purely European, and that France and Great Britain were not competent to solve it alone. *Journal Officiel*, 1884, *Chambre, Ord.*, I, 1455, 1494; *Journal des Débats*, 27 June 1884.

²¹¹ Cd. 4128. Protocols of Conference Held in London Respecting the Finances of Egypt, I.

²¹² Great Britain proposed to guarantee a loan of £8,000,000 at four and one-half per cent.; that the rate of interest on all other loans should be reduced one-half per cent.; that the sinking fund should be suspended; and that the charge for the army of occupation should not exceed £300,000 annually.

²¹³ Cd. 4128, p. 15. France objected strenuously to any reduction of the interest rate.

²¹⁴ Cd. 4128, pp. 35, 36, 37. Waddington had submitted proposals which were intended to increase the powers of the commissioners of the debt. In discussing the London conference a French correspondent said: "La France n'oublie pas que partout où il y a un Anglais il y a un ennemi de son influence et de son extension coloniale. Il suffit de se rappeler la Tunisie, l'Égypte, le Tonkin et Madagascar pour ne pas douter qu'entre Angleterre et la France il y aura un jour une lutte bien autrement acharnée que celle qui nous laissa vaincus dans notre duel avec l'Allemagne et qui a fait de cette puissance une alliée qui nous appui dans toutes les circonstances, en Tunisie, en Égypte, à la Conférence de Londres, où M. de Dehrentall agit avec M. de Blignières, M. de Munster avec M. Waddington." *Le Figaro*, 25 July 1884.

²¹⁵ Cd. 4128, p. 37.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39. Waddington endeavored to have the conference adjourned, but Granville made the cloture absolute. For further discussion of the conference see: *Annual Register*, 1884, pp.

Soon after the failure of the conference the Duc de Broglie declared in an interview: ²¹⁷

It was not difficult from the first to see that all Germany's politeness to France simply aimed at making us fall out with England. Germany cannot bear to see these two great nations on good terms. . . . The great point is whether Germany desires a rupture between France and England in order to draw France towards herself or to move England against France; but that is Prince Bismarck's secret, and consequently we should not have furthered his plans.

Subsequent events proved that the chancellor carried out the first policy—of drawing France towards Germany. This was largely on account of the sharp controversy between Germany and Great Britain in Africa.²¹⁸ The German government was somewhat surprised by the conduct of its representative at the London conference on Egyptian finance,²¹⁹ but in a

71-86; Fitzmaurice, II, 331, 334-335; Gwynn and Tuckwell, II, 55-57; Rambaud, 270; Childers, II, 205-207; The Times, 30 July 1884. Herbert Bismarck's conversation with Joseph Chamberlain, president of the board of trade, throws considerable light upon British policy in Egypt. Grosse Politik, IV, 75-76.

Herbert Bismarck's conversation with the Russian ambassador, Baron de Staal, is also of interest. The latter is reported as saying: "Fürst Bismarck kann jetzt wieder eine sehr grosse politische Rolle spielen. . . . Er hat es jetzt in der Hand Ägyptens Schicksal und was damit zusammen hängt, zu bestimmen, ja nachdem er sich für England oder Frankreich entscheidet." Herbert Bismarck wrote: "Ich erwiderte, dass Euere Durchlaucht schwerlich eines von beiden tun würden, da unsere Politik mehr auf Zurückhaltung angewiesen wäre, und dass, soviel ich von verstande, die deutsche Politik der französischen und der englischen Staatskunst wohl freie Spiel zur Lösung der schwebenden Schwierigkeiten überlassen würde." Grosse Politik, IV, 76. For the Russian ambassador's instructions see the Slavonic Review, III, 179-186.

²¹⁷ This statement was made to Blowitz. The Times, 6 August 1884.

²¹⁸ In a leading article in *Le Figaro*, 27 July 1884, a writer pointed out that the English, not the Germans, were the enemies of France. He discussed the possibility of a Franco-German alliance, saying in part: "Et maintenant, demandera-t-on, quel accueil rencontrerait en Allemagne l'alliance française? . . . Constatons simplement qu'il y des symptômes dans l'air! au sein de la Conférence, l'appui apporté aux propositions françaises; l'éponge passée si vite sur l'escapade de l'Hotel Continental; la visite du docteur Koch à Toulon. D'autre part, il suffit de considérer la situation d'ensemble de l'Europe, d'analyser le caractère des événements, de se pénétrer du mouvement des idées; et la conclusion se présente d'elle-même: l'intérêt de l'Allemagne est identique à celui de la France."

²¹⁹ Grosse Politik, III, 415. Bismarck wrote to Münster: "Auch in den Konferenzverhandlungen hätte ich gewünscht, dass unsere

meeting between Hatzfeldt and Courcel the basis was laid for a common policy in Egypt.²²⁰ Accordingly Hatzfeldt recommended informing France that Germany would support French proposals with regard to the debt commission during future negotiations.²²¹

The conduct of Münster at the London conference made Ferry suspect the efforts of Germany to bring about a rapprochement with France, for he was of the opinion that Germany desired to trick Great Britain and then would drop France.²²² Bismarck, too, recognized that the friendly relations which he had sought for several years were made difficult to secure by reason of mutual mistrust.²²³ Hohenlohe, however, thought that Ferry's hesitancy was determined by the uncertainty of Anglo-French relations after the rupture of the conference, and by his relations with former Gambet-

Auffassung bezüglich der Mitgliedschaft Deutschlands bei der Caisse de la dette publique mit mehr deutlichkeit ausgesprochen und nicht, wie in der Sitzung vom 29. Juli geschehen, an die Bedingung der russischen Beteiligung geknüpft worden waren. Ebenso habe ich vermisst, dass Euere Excellenz den französischen Antrag in der Sitzung vom 2. August auf Vertagung der Konferenz bis zum 20. Oktober nicht pure unterstützt, vielmehr Ihre Zustimmung von der an sich selbstverständlichen, aber deshalb unnötigen Bedingung 'si omnes' abhängig gemacht haben." Ibid., IV, 77-78.

²²⁰ Ibid., III, 416-417.

²²¹ Ibid., III, 417. Bismarck annotated this report as follows: "Wir werden damit anfangen können, dass wir in Wien u[nd] Pet[er]s[burg] die Ansicht äussern, dass der status quo ante durch die Konferenz rechtlich nicht alterirt und die Schulden-Commission nach wie vor in Wirksamkeit steht, gleich allen andern Verträgen bezüglich Egyptens, und dass wir die Ansicht der beiden Kabinette hierüber vertraulich erbitten." Ibid.

²²² Ibid., p. 418.

²²³ German mistrust was based upon the following consideration: "Wenn wir auch zu jetzigen Regierung volles Vertrauen fassen könnten, so ist damit nicht ausgeschlossen. dass jede, die ihr folgt, die entgegengesetzte Politik uns gegenüber einschlagen kann, ohne dass sie sich selbst untreu wird. . . . Wir können uns deshalb immer der Befürchtung nicht entschlagen, dass Frankreich, nachdem wir im Verein mit ihm bis zum Bruche mit England oder nahe daran gelangt sein würden, infolge eines Regierungswechsel plötzlich die Situation benutzt, um sich auf Englands Seite zu stellen und uns zu isolieren. Diese Eventualität müssen wir uns vor Augen halten. Aber wenn wir beiderseits unser Misstrauen nicht überwinden wollen, so müssen wir auch definitiv darauf verzichten. Interessen, die uns gemeinsam sind, gemeinsam geltend machen." Ibid., pp. 418-419. See also Bourgeois and Pagès, 209.

tists.²²⁴ In order to familiarize himself with conditions Ferry summoned Courcel to Paris.²²⁵ The ensuing interview convinced the French foreign minister of Germany's sincerity, and August 23 Courcel informed Hohenlohe that France was ready to undertake a common policy with Germany.²²⁶ Two days later the French ambassador returned to Berlin, proposing to Hatzfeldt united action with Germany in Egypt with regard to the Alexandria indemnities, the sanitary question, the commission of the debt, and the policing of the Suez Canal.²²⁷

Courcel was then summoned to Varzin to an interview with the chancellor.²²⁸ The above mentioned proposals were fully discussed,²²⁹ but the chancellor still remained convinced that "the French cabinet manifestly . . . had . . . no inclination and no sufficient confidence in Franco-German relations to approach the danger of a rupture with England on account of an anti-English attitude in Egypt."²³⁰ The French ambassador reported his conversation with Bismarck to Ferry, saying that the chancellor was taking a keener interest in Egypt than formerly and was disposed "to depart from that Olympian indifference against which we hurled ourselves in vain for more than two years."²³¹ He concluded by saying that the chancellor ought to be able to count upon the support of France, but that the present reserve of the government would cause him to be deceived.²³²

²²⁴ Grosse Politik, III, 419-420.

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Under the date of August 24 the German ambassador entered in his journal: "Courcel ist gestern nach Berlin zurück und bringt die Zustimmung Ferrys zu der Verständigung, die allerdings kein Allianzvertrag, aber ein grosses Rapprochement ist. In der west-afrikanischen Frage wird man gemeinschaftlich vorgehen, ebenso in bezug auf verschiedene ägyptische Fragen, wie Quarantane, Suezkanal, Liquidations-kommission u. a." Hohenlohe, II, 351.

²²⁷ Grosse Politik, III, 423.

²²⁸ Daudet, 58.

²²⁹ Grosse Politik, III, 424-425.

²³⁰ Bismarck supplemented this by saying: "Es fürchtet die Zahl seiner Gegner im Lande zu vermehren, wenn es eine Politik einschlägt, die den Frieden mit Deutschland zur unbedingten Voraussetzung hätte." Ibid., p. 424.

²³¹ Bourgeois and Pagès, 383; Daudet, 60-61.

²³² Gabriel Charmes, an advocate of a Franco-German entente in

Shortly after the failure of the London Conference the British government sent Lord Northbrook to Egypt to investigate the "present exigencies of Egyptian finance."²³³ The Egyptian government was still operating with a large monthly deficit,²³⁴ and Northbrook recommended that the law of liquidation be set aside temporarily so that the surplus, which had been used to extinguish the debt, might be appropriated to meet the deficit.²³⁵ Immediate opposition arose in France, causing Ferry to bring suit against the Egyptian government for violating the law of liquidation.²³⁶ Courcel informed Hatzfeldt that France expected to be hindered by Great Britain in Egypt, and therefore desired a previous understanding with Germany, expressing the belief that the "circumstances offer us a new legal and limited field where the entente between France and Germany may be based upon common interests."²³⁷ Bismarck agreed to support France,²³⁸

Egypt, wrote: "Par la manière dont . . . [les Anglais] . . . nous ont traités en Égypte, par l'opposition incessante qu'ils nous font en Chine, à Madagascar, partout, ils nous obligent à chercher où à accepter l'appui de tous ceux qui consentiront à nous aider à leur résister. Nous avons dû, à la Conférence de Londres, nous appuyer pour cela sur l'Europe; nous sommes obligés en ce moment même de nous unir aux trois empires pour protester contre la brutalité des procédés anglais en Égypte. . . . Il est certain que la conduite de l'Angleterre envers nous a produit ce résultat étrange, inattendu, qu'un grand nombre de Français ne repugnent plus à idée de s'appuyer sur l'Allemagne pour défendre nos intérêts sur les mers. On parle ouvertement de l'alliance allemande, on la discute: c'est une combinaison politique à laquelle les esprits s'habituent." *Journal des Débats*, 30 September 1884.

²³³ Cd. 4177. Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Egypt, 1-2; Mallet, 188; Colvin, 108; Fitzmaurice, II, 335; Cromer, II, 366-368; Newton, II, 334.

²³⁴ Colvin, 108.

²³⁵ Cd. 4242. Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 20-21; Colvin, 108-109; Mallet, 190-191; Fitzmaurice, II, 335. Granville accepted Northbrook's suggestion and on September 18 this decision was communicated to the powers. Cd. 4242, p. 22.

²³⁶ Grosse Politik, III, 429.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 429.

²³⁸ In making his report to the chancellor Hatzfeldt wrote: "Falls Euere Durchlaucht es für angezeigt halten, der gegenwärtigen, wie ich glaube, aufrichtig gemeinten Annäherung Frankreichs Folge zu geben, würde sich die von der französischen Regierung gewünschte Verständigung dadurch einleiten lassen, dass wir zunächst der vorgeschlagenen Kollektiv-demarche in Kairo zustimmen und unseren Einfluss in diesem Sinne bei den übrigen Signitär-

and several days later Courcel was informed of this decision. The latter regarded this action as an indication of friendly accommodation and a basis for further entente.²³⁹

Meanwhile, Herbert Bismarck was discussing the Egyptian question with Sir Charles Dilke in London. The latter was very pessimistic concerning Anglo-French relations, being convinced that a war with France was imminent.²⁴⁰ In accordance with his instructions the chancellor's son next journeyed to Paris for the purpose of interviewing Ferry. The two men entered into a detailed discussion of the Egyptian question, especially with regard to Great Britain's recent attitude.²⁴¹ In speaking of the latter point the French foreign minister said that "it was a question of showing one's teeth to the English; on the whole, they are too practical and filled with good sense not to abandon a position as soon as they recognize it as untenable."²⁴² Herbert Bismarck then imparted to Ferry the chancellor's instructions, the tenor of which was decidedly peaceful.²⁴³ The French statesman replied with great earnestness that Prince Bismarck was too practical a statesman to desire an Anglo-French war, and acknowledged that since the affair of Tunis he had "always treated France honorably and benevolently."²⁴⁴ He con-

mächten, namentlich bei Italien und der Pforte, geltend machen." Ibid. Bismarck's marginalia reads: "bei Italien lieber noch nicht, aber bei Pforte, Oest[er]reich, Russland." Grosse Politik, III, 430.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., IV, 89-90. Dilke endeavored to justify the action of Egypt with regard to the law of liquidation, but he also expressed the desire that the chancellor should call a conference to deal with the Egyptian question. Ferry, however, was unsympathetic towards this idea when it was mentioned by Herbert Bismarck. Ibid., III, 436.

²⁴¹ Grosse Politik, III, 431-434.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 434.

²⁴³ The chancellor telegraphed to his son October 5:

"Sage Ferry folgendes:

Wir haben mit Frankreich das gleiche Interesse, dass Bruch mit England und namentlich Krieg verhütet und die ägyptische Frage friedlich gelöst werde. Ein französisch-englischer Krieg würde für uns, auch wenn wir unbeteiligt blieben, eine ähnliche Kalamität sein, wie ein russisch-österreichischer; Ferry möge uns vertrauen, dass wir ehrlich bemüht sind, ihn zu verhüten und die ägyptische Frage friedlich zu lösen." Ibid., p. 431.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 435.

cluded by saying that he had the fullest confidence in Germany, and that in no manner was he *à double fond*.²⁴⁵

Notwithstanding the mutual assurances of the French and German statesmen complete confidence was not fully established. This was evident in a confidential despatch from Courcel to Ferry. In his communication of December 3, 1884, the French ambassador wrote:²⁴⁶

The skill with which the chancellor of Germany ascribes to himself a position of neutrality, impartiality, equal and straightforward correctness between England and France is a masterpiece of diplomacy. At bottom he desires to play very nasty tricks upon England, but by our hand, and without revealing himself. When the two western powers are embroiled he will rub his hands and swear that he only desired harmony and conciliation. . . . As for us, he desires to win us through our conceit. He thrusts upon us the honor of settling the Egyptian question, and even of settling it at Paris, at a conference over which we would preside, and where Europe would hold a triumphal procession for us. I confess, this brilliant picture has made me somewhat suspicious. I would rather prefer that he had promised fewer ornaments and more material satisfactions.

France and Germany were successful in persuading other powers to support the protest made concerning the disregard of the law of liquidation.²⁴⁷ A suit was brought against the Egyptian government in the mixed tribunals,²⁴⁸ and December 9 it was decided that the conduct of the Egyptian government was illegal.²⁴⁹ In the meantime the British high commissioner, Lord Northbrook, had submitted his report,²⁵⁰ which, among other things, recommended a loan of £9,000,000 to be guaranteed by the British government.²⁵¹ Upon the basis of this report Granville circulated new financial pro-

²⁴⁵ Ibid. When Herbert Bismarck informed Courcel that Ferry had promised to take no step in the Egyptian question without previously concerting measures with Germany, the French ambassador cried out: "voilà donc l'entente établie, et je m'en rejouis de tout coeur." Ibid., p. 438.

²⁴⁶ Bourgeois and Pagès, 386-387.

²⁴⁷ Colvin, 109; Fitzmaurice, II, 335; Annual Register, 1884, p. 394; Cd. 4242, pp. 22-23, 32-33.

²⁴⁸ Annual Register, 1884, p. 394; Colvin, 109; Fitzmaurice, II, 335.

²⁴⁹ Cd. 4337. Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 49; Colvin, 112; Fitzmaurice, II, 335.

²⁵⁰ Cromer, II, 369-371; Mallet, 192.

²⁵¹ Mallet, 192.

posals among the European cabinets,²⁵² but Ferry was opposed to a British guaranteed loan, and true to his promise, he began negotiations with Bismarck in order to prepare counter-proposals. The latter, when they were completed, recommended an inquiry into the finances of Egypt and a European guaranteed loan.²⁵³

The French proposals after having been prepared²⁵⁴ were submitted to the powers January 8, 1885.²⁵⁵ Bismarck was well satisfied that circumstances had been able to draw France and Germany together,²⁵⁶ and Courcel believed that a community of interests was the best argument for triumphing over mutual distrusts and accustoming the two people to go together.²⁵⁷ January 24 the chancellor informed Hohenlohe that Courcel had remarked that "the slight attack of mistrust and uncertainty in French opinion . . . would vanish entirely if . . . [Germany] . . . supported the efforts of France in the Egyptian question and worked towards European control: this was the question upon which the entire future of our mutual relations would depend."²⁵⁸

Bismarck lost no time in reminding Great Britain that "Germany's anti-English policy . . . [was] . . . the consequence of the anti-German colonial policy of England in Guinea, New Guinea, and South Africa."²⁵⁹ Ferry, when

²⁵² Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires d'Égypte, 2-6.

²⁵³ Grosse Politik, III, 439-440.

²⁵⁴ Bismarck informed the German ambassadors in St. Petersburg and in Vienna that he considered the French proposals appropriate and considered it useful "Frankreich keine Schwierigkeit zu bereiten, sondern Entgegenkommen zu beweisen, damit es nicht durch Ablehnung entmutigt werde." Ibid., p. 441 note.

²⁵⁵ Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires d'Égypte, 1-2, 6-13. Austria, Russia, and Germany immediately adhered to Ferry's proposal. Ibid., pp. 14-16; Grosse Politik, III, 441 note; Von Schweinitz, II, 294.

²⁵⁶ Bourgeois and Pagès, 388.

²⁵⁷ The French ambassador emphasized this remark by saying: "Il est des passions qui ne peuvent disparaître immédiatement, mais en cherchant les points de contact dans chaque affaire particulière qui se présentera successivement, *von Fall zu Fall*, suivant une expression que vous employez quelquefois, nous arriverons à multiplier les occasions d'accord; il pourra naître de cette manière de procéder une sorte d'habitude, et l'habitude transforme les sentiments." Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Grosse Politik, III, 441.

²⁵⁹ Ibid., IV, 94.

informed of this sharp note to Great Britain, expressed his complete approbation by remarking that if the British government consented to the proposals of the powers the energetic words of the chancellor would be responsible for it.²⁶⁰ The German note probably did have the desired effect, for January 21 Granville consented to a European guaranteed loan, freedom of the Suez Canal, and a commission of inquiry.²⁶¹ The British proposals were accepted,²⁶² and negotiations were carried on in London during February and March for the purpose of embodying them in a convention.²⁶³ The latter was concluded March 17, 1885.²⁶⁴ This was only one of many similar agreements made in later years, but it was important as closing a question that had been at issue since 1882. It was also noteworthy because its successful conclusion was brought about by a Franco-German entente.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., III, 442.

²⁶¹ Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires d'Égypte, 18-21; Cd. 4337, pp. 110-111. The commission of inquiry was to be named at the end of two years if circumstances warranted it. Annual Register, 1885, p. 349.

²⁶² Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires d'Égypte, 25.

²⁶³ Ibid., pp. 32-36.

²⁶⁴ Cd. 4339. Further Correspondence Respecting the Finances of Egypt, 2-15; Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires d'Égypte, 42-53; Colvin, 121; Annual Register, 1885, p. 349.

CHAPTER VI

FRANCO-GERMAN POLICY IN WEST AFRICA

After the Franco-German war the founders of the German Empire were engaged chiefly in consolidating its position in Europe and undertaking internal reforms. Consequently no thought was given to the dissipation of men and money in foreign parts.¹ The chancellor held definite views with regard to colonization, for he considered the German navy inadequate to protect such settlements and the German bureaucracy not sufficiently skilled to manage them.² German missionaries, to be sure, had established missions in Africa, but they received little protection from the imperial government. In the early eighties, however, German policy suddenly changed, and the government entered upon colonial projects with much zeal. This new departure was caused by a combination of circumstances at home.

Since 1848 large numbers of Germans had emigrated to the United States not only to escape from economic burdens, but also to avoid military service. It was natural to demand that the government provide colonies to which Germans might go without severing all previous ties with the fatherland. A second cause which led to the foundation of an overseas dominion was to be found in the operation of the protective tariff in Germany. The latter had resulted in over-production, soon causing merchants and manufacturers to clamor for trade outlets.³ Then, too, increasing enthusiasm for

¹ For the early colonial movement see the article by Marcus L. Hansen, "German Schemes of Colonization before 1860," in the *Smith College Studies in History*, IX, numbers 1 and 2. The later policy followed by Germany is discussed at great length by Maximilian von Hagen, *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik*. This work appeared late in 1922, but the newly published documents of the German foreign office were not used. The new materials have been utilized by other scholars to supplement von Hagen's work. One of the most important articles is Helmuth Rogge, "Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik als Aussenpolitisches Problem," in *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, XXI, 305-333, 423-443.

² Hohenlohe, II, 291.

³ Fitzmaurice, II, 347-348.

African exploration caused the formation of colonial societies, and it was not long before the government had to pay attention to their persistent demands for colonies.⁴

The efforts of Germany to establish colonies in Africa were not at first regarded with suspicion by the other European powers. Missionaries and traders had formerly been placed under British safeguard,⁵ but soon the German government endeavored to give effective protection to its own subjects. Out of such an incident arose the struggle for the possession of Angra Pequena in southwest Africa. In November, 1882, Franz Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant, requested his government to protect a trading post that he was about to establish in southwest Africa⁶; and the chancellor, in accordance with his previous policy, inquired whether the factory might rely upon British protection.⁷ Lord Granville consulted the colonial office, and then replied that no assurance could be given until the exact place of settlement was known.⁸ Meanwhile Lüderitz secured a strip of territory in the neighborhood of Angra Pequena,⁹ and September 10, 1883, the German government inquired of Great Britain whether she claimed suzerainty over that region.¹⁰ Granville replied November 21 that "although Her Majesty's Government have not proclaimed the Queen's sovereignty along the whole country, but only at certain points . . . they consider that any claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign Power

⁴ German colonial policy has been surveyed by Mary E. Townsend, "Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885," in Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, 1921. This writer places much emphasis upon the importance of Bismarck's change from free trade to protection as a factor in his colonial policy. Also see Karl Rathgen, "Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik," in *Das Bismarck-Jahr*, 207-214.

⁵ Fitzmaurice, II, 346-347.

⁶ *Deutsche Weissbuch*, Angra Pequena, 19.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20; *Annual Register*, 1884, p. 297; Fitzmaurice, II, 348.

⁸ *Deutsche Weissbuch*, Angra Pequena, 21.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁰ Cd. 4190. Correspondence Respecting the Settlement at Angra Pequena, on the S. W. Coast of Africa, 15. This request for information was repeated by Herbert Bismarck in November. *Annual Register*, 1884, p. 297; Fitzmaurice, II, 349; James Rennell Rodd, *Social and Diplomatic Memories, 1884-1893*, p. 63.

between the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18° and the frontier of the Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights."¹¹

Bismarck was very much provoked by this answer, and December 31 he replied that "if the government of Great Britain should claim sovereignty over the wide territory hitherto considered independent . . . the Imperial government would . . . esteem it of importance to learn upon what title such claim is based. . . ." ¹² Granville referred this despatch to the colonial office, and the latter gave it over to the Cape government.¹³ In Cape Colony a ministerial change prevented immediate consideration of this important document; ¹⁴ in short, Germany waited six months without a reply.¹⁵ The chancellor then took the initiative by informing the British government that no doubt existed concerning the right of Germany to protect the Lüderitz settlement at Angra Pequena.¹⁶

The Cape authorities finally replied, May 29, 1884, recommending that the British government assume control of the entire coast as far as Walfisch Bay.¹⁷ Münster, the German ambassador in London, informed Granville that the "German government could not recognize such a mode of taking possession of these territories and could not acknowledge the right of doing so."¹⁸ Herbert Bismarck was then sent to

¹¹ Cd. 4190, p. 24; Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 23.

¹² Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 24-26.

¹³ Cd. 4190, pp. 24-26; Fitzmaurice, II, 350; Rodd, 64.

¹⁴ Grosse Politik, IV, 63; Fitzmaurice, II, 350; Rodd, 64.

¹⁵ Bismarck was greatly vexed by the action of the British authorities. To a despatch of May 24, 1884, he appended the following note: "Wenn wir über See kein Recht bei England finden, so müssen wir allerdings nähere Fühlung mit andern seefahrenden Mächten, Frankreich eingeschlossen, zu nehmen suchen." Grosse Politik, IV, 58-59. A week later he wrote to Münster: "Das Versteckspielen mit dem Kolonialamt und die Berufung auf die Selbstständigkeit der englischen Kolonien sind nichts als Winckelzüge . . ." Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁶ Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 29; Cd. 4190, pp. 40, 43; Fitzmaurice, II, 350; Annual Register, 1884, p. 298.

¹⁷ Cd. 4190, pp. 44, 49; Fitzmaurice, II, 350. Walfisch Bay is about 280 miles north of Angra Pequena.

¹⁸ Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 33.

London¹⁹ in order to arrive at some agreement with Granville. The latter attributed the innumerable delays to the complexity of the colonial system, but promised a quick settlement of the question. The British foreign secretary was then reminded of Germany's interests in Egypt, and no doubt was allowed to remain that German policy would change if Great Britain did not alter her course in west Africa.²⁰ A second interview between the two men, June 17, brought the question no nearer to solution, but only served to accentuate the hesitancy of the British government.²¹

At last Great Britain decided not to question the protectorate proclaimed by Germany over Angra Pequena,²² and July 14 this was formally acknowledged.²³ Soon after recognition of the German protectorate the Cape parliament recommended that the territory north of the Orange River²⁴ should be annexed.²⁵ Such action aroused the anger of the chancellor, and this was reflected immediately in the attitude of Germany at the conference on Egypt in London.²⁶ Bismarck at once informed Münster that "Germany's reserve at the conference was a consequence of the English treatment of our overseas interests, and that continuation of such conduct would make it necessary for us to strengthen our contact with France."²⁷ The proposal of the Cape parliament was protested by Germany,²⁸ and it seemed that there might be a

¹⁹ At the time Herbert Bismarck was the German representative at the Hague.

²⁰ Grosse Politik, IV, 64-65.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 68-71.

²² Gwynn and Tuckwell, II, 81; Fitzmaurice, II, 354; Grosse Politik, IV, 71.

²³ Great Britain stipulated that no penal colony was to be established at Angra Pequena and that British rights and interests were to be protected. Cd. 4190, p. 59; Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 38.

²⁴ The Orange River is the northwestern boundary of the Cape Colony.

²⁵ Cd. 4262. Further Correspondence Respecting the Settlement at Angra Pequena on the Southwest Coast of Africa, 5; Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 42-43; Fitzmaurice, II, 354.

²⁶ Above, p. 127.

²⁷ Grosse Politik, IV, 78.

²⁸ Cd. 4262, pp. 8-9; Deutsche Weissbuch, Angra Pequena, 45-46.

rupture in the relations between Germany and Great Britain.²⁹ Soon, however, the tension was relieved by an exchange of letters between Granville and Herbert Bismarck.³⁰

Throughout the difficulties with Great Britain concerning colonial affairs the German government made it known that the ultimate result would be a rapprochement between France and Germany. This became clearer as successive disputes arose with Great Britain about the Fiji Islands, Togoland, the Cameroons, New Guinea, the Samoa Islands, and the Congo. The latter question afforded France and Germany an opportunity to concert measures, and made it evident that mutual interests were sufficiently strong to overcome antipathies that were deep-rooted.

The question of the Congo had its origins in the efforts of Leopold II, king of the Belgians, to establish an "International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Africa."³¹ The explorations of the Englishman, Henry M. Stanley, added much interest to the project, and with his assistance a committee of the African Association was formed to obtain accurate information concerning the Congo.³² Stanley soon returned to Africa and conducted investigations from 1879 to 1884, concluding many treaties with the native

²⁹ A note written by William Bismarck, August 23, indicated German feeling. "Wenn England unsern Protest gegen das Vorgehn der Kapregierung nicht berücksichtige, so kämen wir zum vollen Bruch mit ihm. Deswegen einem Krieg mit ihm anzufangen, sei das Objekt zu geringfügig. Es würde vielmehr dann zunächst unsere Aufgabe sein, England auf allen Punkten diplomatische Schwierigkeiten zu machen. Den Bruch mit England zu beschleunigen, sei nicht ratsam. Träte er ein, so sei er hinzunehmen, und seine natürliche Folge ein nähere Anschluss an Frankreich. Letzterer habe immerhin seine Bedenken, insofern als es Frankreich einfallen könnte, für eine Vereinigung seiner Politik mit der unsrigen England gegenüber ein Kompensation in Lothringen zu verlangen." *Grosse Politik*, IV, 79.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 79-83.

³¹ A survey of the Congo question has been made recently by Arthur B. Keith, *The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act*. An account of the formation of the International Association is given in the *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, XXI, 601-622. Also see Demetrius C. Boulger, *The Reign of Leopold II, King of the Belgians and Founder of the Congo State*, I, chap. viii.

³² Henry M. Stanley, *The Congo*, I, 26-29.

chiefs and establishing numerous stations.³³ The activities of Stanley caused some uneasiness in Portugal, for she claimed both banks of the Congo and it was but natural for her to become suspicious of his work. Furthermore, the expedition of a French naval officer, Savorgnan de Brazza, afforded ample reason for belief that France had designs upon the upper Congo.³⁴

The Portuguese government turned to Great Britain in November, 1882, and sought to have the latter recognize its claims to the mouth of the Congo.³⁵ Granville expressed his willingness to negotiate, but stipulated numerous provisions in accordance with which a convention should be held.³⁶ Negotiations continued for more than a year, and February 26, 1884, an agreement was signed whereby Great Britain recognized both banks of the Congo River to be Portuguese territory; and Portugal in turn promised commercial equality for all nations, free navigation of the Congo and Zambesi Rivers, suppression of slavery and the slave trade in the territory, protection of missionaries, and guarantee of religious liberty.³⁷

Opinion in Great Britain was very much opposed to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty,³⁸ and the same was true among the European powers. France protested against the treaty to the Portuguese government because it impaired previous treaties between France and Portugal.³⁹ Germany was also displeased but she took no action until there had been an ex-

³³ Ibid., chaps. v-xxv; II, chaps. xxvi-xxxiii.

³⁴ For de Brazza's activities: Stanley, I, 231-234, 292; II, 385. Also Léo Quesnel, "Explorations de M. Savorgnan de Brazza," in *Revue Bleue*, XXXIII, 513-519.

³⁵ Cd. 3885. Correspondence Relating to Negotiations Between the Governments of Great Britain and Portugal for Conclusion of the Congo Treaty, 1882-1884, pp. 1-6.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

³⁷ Cd. 3886. Despatch to Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon Inclosing the Congo Treaty, 1-8.

³⁸ Parliamentary Debates, third series, CCLXXXVII, 1827-1836; Cd. 4023. Further Papers Relating to Events Connected with the Negotiations with Portugal Respecting the Congo River and the Adjacent Coast, 47-53; Fitzmaurice, II, 345-346; Annual Register, 1884, p. 333; Stanley, II, 383-384.

³⁹ *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires du Congo*, 25-29.

change of views with the other powers, especially France.⁴⁰ Early in May, 1884, the chancellor discussed the Congo question with the French ambassador,⁴¹ and proposed that the powers should arrive at a general agreement concerning the principles which should govern the acquisition of hitherto unoccupied territory.⁴² He added significantly: "I do not speak of the English because their exclusive principles in colonial affairs keep them apart."⁴³ After a short delay Bismarck informed the British foreign office that he would not accept the Anglo-Portuguese treaty even if modified, and that he was "convinced of the necessity of making the Congo question the subject of an international agreement."⁴⁴

The chancellor perceived that an international conference would afford an excellent opportunity to check British colonial policy, and at the same time to aid in bringing about a Franco-German rapprochement. Throughout the summer the questions of Angra Pequena and Egyptian finance occupied the attention of the European cabinets, but the chief result rising out of these negotiations was the mutual feeling in Berlin and Paris that close coöperation would be necessary in order to gain success in Africa and Egypt. Bismarck in an address to the reichstag, June 26, emphasized the cordiality between France and Germany by remarking that "full confidence prevails between our government and that of France in the integrity and sincerity of our mutual relations, and in the good-will with which we regard every French effort which is not directed towards the restoration of the earlier unnatural arrangement dating from the time of Louis XIV."⁴⁵ The press of France and Germany in commenting upon the European situation frequently suggested that the two coun-

⁴⁰ Livre Jaune, 1884, *Affaires du Congo*, 50-51.

⁴¹ Bourgeois and Pagès, 208.

⁴² Daudet, 53-55.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

⁴⁴ Cd. 4205. Correspondence Respecting the West African Conference, 2.

⁴⁵ *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags*, V Legislative Period, 4th Session, 1884, II, 1080-1081; *Die Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck*, X, 215-216.

tries should put aside their grievances and make common cause against Great Britain.⁴⁶

The failure of the London conference in August ⁴⁷ resulted in greater estrangement between France and Great Britain, and Bismarck seized upon this opportunity to begin negotiations with France concerning west African commercial relations.⁴⁸ The chancellor desired chiefly an agreement whereby freedom of commerce with the littorals not hitherto under any European jurisdiction would be guaranteed to the participants; but at the same time he believed British cooperation improbable and that it was therefore necessary for the remaining commercial nations to act as a counter-weight to British colonial supremacy.⁴⁹ Hatzfeldt accordingly opened negotiations with the French ambassador August 11, suggesting an understanding between France and Germany relative to west Africa.⁵⁰ Hohenlohe, meanwhile, began conversations in Paris with Ferry.⁵¹

Because of insufficient information as to the principles under discussion, the French foreign minister hesitated to enter upon negotiations, and therefore Courcel was summoned to Paris.⁵² Hohenlohe wrote later that Ferry was at first somewhat amazed by Courcel's disclosures, but that the foreign minister had finally familiarized himself with the idea of an understanding with Germany and was ready for a joint undertaking.⁵³ The German ambassador considered this to be a "great rapprochement."⁵⁴ The French ambassador

⁴⁶ The Times, 30 July 1884. Concerning the hostility of France, Lord Lyons wrote: "I am very unhappy about the growing ill-will between France and England which exists on both sides of the Channel. It is not that I suppose that France has any deliberate intention of going to war with us. But the two nations come into contact in every part of the world. In every part of it questions arise which, in the present state of feeling, excite mutual suspicion and irritation." Newton, II, 331-332.

⁴⁷ Above, p. 126.

⁴⁸ Grosse Politik, III, 413.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 414.

⁵⁰ Ibid.; Bourgeois and Pagès, 208-209; Bourgeois, IV, 29.

⁵¹ Grosse Politik, III, 419.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 418-419.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 420-421.

⁵⁴ Hohenlohe, II, 351. Ferry made it clear to Courcel that the

returned to Berlin August 25 and immediately laid before Hatzfeldt the French proposals concerning the Congo. These proposals were as follows: to accept the German definition of the Congo and its tributaries because France could provide a legal title by reason of an old treaty with Portugal; to come to an arrangement with Germany concerning the entire east coast of Africa on the principle of effective occupation; and lastly, to reach an understanding with Germany relative to the free navigation of the Niger River.⁵⁵

After having interviewed the secretary of state for foreign affairs Courcel journeyed to Varzin in order to converse with the chancellor.⁵⁶ Here the two men evolved a plan of operation to secure the free navigation of the Congo and the Niger upon the principles which had been accepted by the congress of Vienna for international rivers. At the same time they discussed the manner in which new occupations on the African coast might be made.⁵⁷ The chancellor then agreed with Courcel that the German government should communicate to Paris its readiness to unite with France upon the foregoing proposals, and then, after both governments had assented, to invite Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and the United States to a conference in order to concur with this agreement.⁵⁸

The remarkable progress made towards restoring more intimate relations between France and Germany was well indicated in several conversations between their statesmen. During a visit to Herbert Bismarck at Königstein the French consul at Cairo, Camille Barrère, expressed his pleasure at

understanding between France and Germany was to be a rapprochement in definite matters and not a formal alliance. *Grosse Politik*, III, 421.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 421-423.

⁵⁶ Daudet, 58; Bourgeois and Pagès, 209 note; *Grosse Politik*, III, 424.

⁵⁷ *Grosse Politik*, III, 426.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* Many curious suppositions were made at the time concerning the questions discussed by Bismarck and Courcel. A part of the Parisian press thought that some arrangement was being made whereby Germany was to seize Holland and France was to receive compensations elsewhere. *Galvani's Messenger* (Paris), 31 August 1884.

the benevolent attitude of the German government and the friendly tone of the German press after the London Conference. He remarked that it would be quite a long time before the remembrance of 1870 became merely an historical one and no longer recalled sensibilities, but that only patience need be employed to succeed to that end. At the same time he exclaimed: "I would not say that there is no more enmity, for in order to get that far more time is necessary, but there is no longer mistrust among us and that is already a great advantage."⁵⁹

Of much the same character was the conversation between General Campenon, French minister of war, and Lieutenant von Heuduck, chief of the German mission to the French army maneuvers. In discussing the recent rapprochement the latter remarked that a Franco-German alliance could only be considered upon the unreserved recognition of the Frankfort treaty. Campenon replied with animation: "That is just what I tell my colleagues every day. One should not occupy himself feebly with the past, but must reckon with the future. If this alliance materialized, France again would resume immediately her former position in the world. France and Germany united would rule the world."⁶⁰

Bismarck was still inclined towards his plan to associate the European powers in a league as a counter-weight to British naval and colonial supremacy. This became more and more evident in the various interviews between the chancellor and the French ambassador.⁶¹ A full report of one of these con-

⁵⁹ Grosse Politik, III, 427.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 428. Von Rotenhan, the German chargé d'affaires in Paris, reported this conversation to Bismarck, but remarked that it was probably made under the influence of a good dinner. There seems to be some truth in this statement in view of Campenon's later declarations. He withdrew from the Ferry ministry in January, 1885, and gave as his reason the following: "L'ex-ministre de la guerre ne blâme pas seulement la politique coloniale de M. Jules Ferry; il blâme également sa politique extérieure. Le président du conseil s'est laissé leurrer par M. de Bismarck. . . . Le général ne veut accepter aucune part de responsabilité dans la politique extérieure du gouvernement qui nous met à la merci de l'Allemagne." Henri Galli, *Les Dessous Diplomatiques. Dix Ans de Politique Étrangère*, 1884-1893, pp. 26-27.

⁶¹ A French journal quoted the Vienna Neue Freie Presse as say-

versations is given by Courcel under the date of September 23, 1884. After complaining of British pretensions to the unoccupied portions of the globe the chancellor expressed the opinion that it was of common interest to put an end to this illusion. He then revealed his plan: ⁶²

What I seek to establish is a kind of equilibrium upon the sea, and France has a large part to play in this if she desires to enter into our plans. . . . I repeat that I do not desire war with England, but I wish her to understand that if the navies of the other nations united they would form a counter-weight upon the ocean and compel her to reckon with the interests of others. Consequently she would have to become accustomed to the idea that a Franco-German alliance is not an impossibility. After all, this co-operation of the secondary navies grouped around France to oppose the preponderance of the English navy is within the traditions of your policy.

Courcel, however, was of the opinion that such a league would be for the sole benefit of Germany.⁶³ Behind these proposals he suspected that Germany aspired to gain commercial and industrial supremacy, and in order to obtain this result she needed French support.⁶⁴

Notwithstanding the suspicions of Courcel the French government took advantage of the German proposal to concert

ing: "Le Prince de Bismarck a changé de politique; depuis 1870 il s'était efforcé d'isoler la France; maintenant il poursuit avec la même persévérance l'isolement de l'Angleterre. Lorsque, en 1872, les empereurs d'Allemagne, d'Autriche et de Russie se rencontrèrent à Berlin, on se demande en France, non sans quelque raison, s'il fallait s'attendre à une coalition des monarques contre la république. Si les trois empereurs se revoient cette année, ce qui est fort possible, la France peut être tranquille.

"Que dans les grandes monarchies de l'Europe on ne médite aucun projet qui puisse provoquer des inquiétudes à Paris, que ce soit, au contraire, l'intention du maître de Varzin de rapprocher toujours plus la France des autres puissances continentales, c'est ce dont la visite du Baron de Courcel au prince de Bismarck nous semble être une éloquent témoignage." *Journal des Débats*, 31 August 1884.

⁶² Daudet, 106; Bourgeois and Pagès, 383-384. This remained one of the main points in Bismarck's European policy. He wrote to von Schweinitz, German ambassador in St. Petersburg, February 25, 1887: "Frankreichs Fortbestehen als Grossmacht ist für uns ebenso Bedürfnis, wie das jeder andern der Grossmächte, allein schon aus dem Grunde, weil wir für gewisse Fälle eines maritimen Gegengewichts zur See gegen England bedürfen." *Grosse Politik*, VI, 177.

⁶³ Bourgeois and Pagès, 385.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*; Daudet, 109-110.

measures against Great Britain.⁶⁵ Ferry accepted Bismarck's invitation to come to an agreement with Germany on the Congo question, and then to invite other interested powers to a conference.⁶⁶ This approach between the two countries was severely condemned by a large part of the radical and conservative parties in France. Friendly relations with Germany were made the occasion to impugn the patriotism of Ferry,⁶⁷ although the *Journal des Débats* remarked that this arose chiefly out of partisan spirit.⁶⁸ The Paris correspondent

⁶⁵ Lyons in his despatch of October 17 to Granville said: "As regards the Congo Conference, I came away with the impression that there is more or less a tacit, if not a very explicit, understanding between France and Germany, in addition to what appears in the Yellow Book, and that this understanding may prove inconvenient to us." Newton, II, 334.

⁶⁶ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1884, *Affaires du Congo*, 56-60.

⁶⁷ *The Times*, 10 October 1884.

⁶⁸ *Journal des Débats*, 5 October 1884. Gabriel and Francis Charmes, the editors of the *Journal des Débats*, were the advocates of an entente with Germany. They expressed this sentiment, October 6, at a dinner which was attended by Herbert Bismarck. The latter wrote the following account to his father: "Die Herren sprachen sich sämtlich sehr energisch für die franko-deutsche Entente aus und bemerkten, sie hätten nicht geglaubt, als sie mich vor 18 Monaten gesehen, dass in so kurzer Zeit so bedeutende Fortschritte in dieser Heilsamen Richtung gemacht werden würden: 'Il faut qu'enfin ce cauchemar pour la France et pour l'Allemagne finisse,' rief Herr Charmes aus; 'nous sommes sur la meilleur chemin,' fügte Herr Palain hinzu: 'd'abord la détente doit se faire et puis l'entente ne manquera pas de s'établir.'" *Grosse Politik*, III, 437.

Gabriel Charmes advocated a particular entente with Germany as opposed to a general entente, that is, he believed that the common action of France and Germany should be limited to specific questions. He wrote: "Lorsque certains journaux parlent d'une alliance allemande, ils ne sauraient ignorer qu'ils jouent absolument sur les mots. Une alliance, une intimité permanente entre notre pays et l'Allemagne, une union pareille à celle qui existe entre celle-ci et l'Autriche-Hongrie n'est évidemment possible; personne n'y songe, et ceux qui feignent croire ne le font que dans un intérêt de parti. Mais il peut arriver que, si séparées qu'elles soient, la France et l'Allemagne aient des intérêts communs à défendre; et, dans ce cas, quoi qu'on dise, il n'y aurait ni faiblesse ni humiliation de notre part à confondre nos efforts avec ceux des Allemandes. Nous pouvons, sans rougir ou sans souffrir dans notre patriotisme, revendiquer, par exemple, d'accord avec l'Allemagne, nos droits violés en Égypte; nous pouvons même faire pour cela des concessions à la politique allemande dans le reste de l'Afrique, et seconder ses entreprises coloniales et commerciales sur des points où elles ne sauraient contrarier les nôtres. Ce ne serait en aucune manière une alliance; ce ne serait que le résultat de relations naturelles, forcées, telles

of the Times expressed the opinion that although the clamor of the opposition parties might neither be disinterested nor sincere, it was in entire concurrence with the feelings of the great majority of Frenchmen. He wrote:⁶⁹

Woe to the Government which should try to induce the nation to accept the results of 1870 as definitive. It would encounter a latent, perhaps unconscious sentiment, which would never forgive such a betrayal of the national greatness and honour. Curiously enough, the simple rumour of a drawing together and possible alliance between France and Germany has aroused slumbering recollections and revived passions supposed to be allayed or extinct.

A similar view was expressed by Edmund About, a prominent French journalist. He said:⁷⁰

France and Germany have been at peace since the treaty of Frankfort, that is undoubtedly true; but unfortunately this peace is precarious and always will be so through the fault of the Germans. Had they contented themselves with defeating us, with bleeding us white, with extorting our billions, they would not have placed the impossible and the irreparable between us. . . . But the military party in Berlin carried away the diplomatic party. Some short-sighted experts preferred a strategic security fruitful of

qu'il en existe nécessairement entre deux grandes pays qui, malgré leur peu de sympathie mutuelle, ont souvent le même but à poursuivre, et ne sauraient le faire qu'en suivant la même route." *Journal des Débats*, 5 October 1884. This article resulted in a violent attack in the radical journal *La Justice*, but Charmes made a dignified reply in the *Débats*, 7 October 1884.

Another writer, commenting upon the Franco-German accord in the Congo question, said: "Il n'a pas été nécessaire, pour attendre ce but, de contracter une alliance avec l'Allemagne. L'accord limité à une question special suffira pour réaliser cette ligue des neutres appelée à solidariser les intérêts de l'Europe continentale. . . ." *Le Figaro*, 10 October 1884.

⁶⁹ The Times, 11 October 1884. The Berlin Post of September 30 indicated that France was not the irreconcilable enemy of Germany, and that "la haine contre l'Allemagne s'apaisera du moment où la France verra qu'elle pourra, à côté de l'Allemagne, se faire une situation aussi grande." This article was reprinted in the *Journal des Débats*, 20 October 1884.

⁷⁰ *Le Dix-Neuvième Siècle* (Paris), 18 November 1884. In referring to this period a former president of the French Republic said: "Ce n'est pas par ressentiment, ce n'est pas par rancune, c'est par dignité nationale, par respect de la justice et par fidélité envers des populations brutalement séparées de la mère patrie, que la France ne pouvait répondre à l'invitation du prince de Bismarck. Elle aurait pu oublier Sedan, elle aurait pu oublier un désastre militaire; elle ne pouvait pas oublier l'atteinte portée à la liberté de ses nationaux." Raymond Poincaré, *Les Origines de la Guerre*, 21.

hatred, malice, and unlimited armaments to a moral security which would have been born of an equitable peace. . . . Whatever interest that might counsel us to seek or accept an alliance with the Germans, we could not do it; history would stigmatize us as a nation of cowards. Beyond an artificial frontier which the sword has traced in blood there are a million and a half Frenchmen, our brothers by birth, education, and spirit.

After having reached an agreement with the French government Germany issued invitations for the Congo conference.⁷¹ The kaiser in opening the reichstag informed his auditors that "in harmony with the French government I have invited here the representatives of most of the maritime nations, in order to consider means by which commerce with Africa can be promoted and secured against the disturbances of international friction."⁷² The representatives of thirteen European powers and the United States met in Berlin November 15, 1884. Bismarck opened the conference, declaring that it had three problems to solve: the free navigation, with freedom of trade, of the Congo River; the free navigation of the Niger River; and the formalities to be ob-

⁷¹ Livre Jaune, 1885, Affaires du Congo, 44; Cd. 4205, p. 6.

⁷² Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, VI Legislative Period, 1st Session, 1884-1885, I, 2. This announcement was considered "to demonstrate to the world the fact that France had reluctantly but decisively submitted to a supremacy she could not hope to challenge, and that French statesmen were eager, on any terms, to exhibit themselves as the allies of Germany." The Times, 22 November 1884. A leading French journal, however, did not take such a view: "si le discours du trône n'a pas été reçu avec des manifestations bruyantes et n'a donné lieu qu'à de sobres commentaires, c'est que, sous les graves paroles prononcées, on a compris qu'il existait autre chose qu'un besoin accidentel; c'est qu'elles répondaient à une nécessité politique de premier ordre." Le Figaro, 23 November 1884.

A critic of the Ferry ministry wrote: "Les deux pays marchent donc la main dans la main; ce que pense M. de Bismarck, M. Jules Ferry le veut, et bien que la réciprocité ne soit pas encore tout à fait complète, il doit suffire à notre bonheur que M. Jules Ferry soit persuadé de la sincérité du chancelier. Ces compliments étranges, ce rapprochement miraculeux pourraient bien être monstrueux, si nous allions directement au fait, si nous osions demander ce qui nous vaut tant de démonstrations cordiales, tant de politesses offertes avec un sangfroid sarcastique. La haine de l'Allemagne est une danger, mais son affection subite alors qu'elle nous redoute moins, dosée pour ainsi dire dans le mesure de notre impuissance, est une cruelle humiliation et ajoute à une souffrance que nous n'avions pas cru être dépassé." Nouvelle Revue, XXXI, 617.

served in the future for the valid annexation of territory in Africa. The conference began its labors by examining the boundaries of the Congo basin in which freedom of trade was to be established; and then turned its attention to the acts of navigation on the Congo and Niger, the liquor traffic with the natives, and the slave trade. Discussions concerning the formalities to be observed upon taking new territory in Africa were continued throughout January, and not until February 26, 1885 was the work of the conference completed.⁷³

Bismarck endeavored to establish closer relations with France during the Berlin conference, but the suspicion of Courcel and the attacks of the Right at home made the French government cautious. During the course of an interview December 3, 1884 the chancellor remarked to the French ambassador: "I desire you to reach the point where you will forgive Sedan as you have forgiven Waterloo."⁷⁴ Courcel did not venture a reply, but he wrote to Ferry:⁷⁵

If we listen to him perhaps some day one of his successors will say to our descendants: "I wish that you would pardon a new

⁷³ The protocols of the conference are to be found in the *Livre Jaune*, 1885, *Affaires du Congo*, 55-292; Cd. 4361. Protocols and General Act of the West African Conference; House of Representatives, 48th Congress, 2nd Session, Executive Document 247. Additional information is contained in Stanley, II, 391-403; Rodd, 71, 72, 76, 78; Fitzmaurice, II, 374-376; Rambaud, 279-281; Boulger, I, chap. ix. The treaty signed in Berlin provided for freedom of trade in the basin of the Congo, and parts of the Niger and Shire Rivers. The former was placed under the control of an international river commission; and the same rules of navigation were applied to the Niger and its tributaries, although these regulations were to be enforced by France and Great Britain. Further provisions related to the protection of natives, missionaries, and travelers; the guarantee of religious liberty; and the prohibition of the slave trade. The powers also agreed to respect the neutrality of the territory comprising the conventional basin of the Congo River. Lastly, the treaty provided that effective occupation should be recognized as a title for annexation, but that such action had to be communicated to the signatory powers. *Livre Jaune*, 1885, *Affaires du Congo*, 295-316; Cd. 4739. General Act of the Conference of Berlin.

⁷⁴ Bourgeois and Pagès, 387.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 387-388. Notwithstanding this definitive statement Courcel was considered by some to be the chancellor's confidential man rather than French ambassador. *Nouvelle Revue*, XXXI, 203. This, of course, was a great injustice to him.

defeat and a new dismemberment like your fathers pardoned Sedan!" . . . I believe that in the event of a sustained dismemberment, a nation . . . ought never pardon anything, never forget anything. I have never said a word to the chancellor of Germany that could encourage him in such an illusion with regard to us. . . . To pacify the present, to reserve the future, such is the program that I have always before my eyes since it has been a question between France and Germany to substitute the calculation of mutual interests for vanity and the danger of noisy provocations. . . . From the beginning of our conferences with Count Hatzfeldt, and even the chancellor, I specified that there could never be any question of Alsace or Lorraine between us; that it was a domain reserved for both of us, and where it should be forbidden to penetrate because we would never meet in good understanding upon that question.

At home the attacks of the Right and the Extreme Left made it difficult for Ferry to retain power. In the senate the leader of the Right, the Duc de Brogile, condemned the policy of colonial expansion as a source of weakness to a power essentially continental and European; and his ironic allusions to Germany's paternal care of French colonial interests, which were to serve as a balm for the injuries sustained in 1870, were received with approbation by his colleagues.⁷⁶ Ferry defended his foreign policy, and in particular his accord with Germany in the Congo question, indicating that France was no longer isolated in Europe and that her relations with the other powers were very friendly.⁷⁷ Bismarck was also attacked by his opponents in Germany on account of his policy of colonial expansion. Windthorst, leader of the Center party, asserted that as a consequence of colonial endeavors Germany would fall into difficulties abroad, and that she ought not to endeavor to become a naval power when she was surrounded by enemies.⁷⁸ In replying the chancellor surveyed Germany's relations with other powers and expressed the opinion that none but friendly states surrounded the empire. With regard to France he said: ⁷⁹

For many years . . . we have not been in such good relations with France as to-day. It is the result of a wise and moderate

⁷⁶ Journal Officiel, 1884, Sénat, Ext., II, 1887-1889.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 1892.

⁷⁸ Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, VI Legislative Period, 1st Session, 1884-1885, I, 531.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 532.

government in France, which knows how to value just as much as we the benefits of peace; both governments know that there could be no greater calamity upon the continent than a Franco-German war. We once experienced the latter, and for both the victor and the vanquished it was a great disaster; even a triumphant war of such magnitude is a calamity for the country which must carry it on, and I believe that on neither side there exists the temptation to do this.

Notwithstanding the frequent approaches of the chancellor, Courcel remained sceptical of Germany's desire for a good understanding. In an interview with Bismarck, January 20, 1885, the French ambassador remarked that in seeking points of contact in each particular undertaking the two governments could multiply the occasions for accord and in this manner change hostile opinion through habit.⁸⁰ But Courcel was not certain whether this *entente particulière*, based upon the establishment of positive interests, entirely satisfied the chancellor.⁸¹ German policy, the former thought, was based upon the following considerations:⁸²

To soften our memories, to turn our attention from the past to an indeterminate future in order to accustom us to the harsh conditions of the present, and thus to lead us imperceptibly to accept the accomplished facts of 1815 and 1871, so that France . . . gravitates henceforth in the orbit of the new German empire, such is Bismarck's policy towards us. We must do him the justice of recognizing the frankness and sincerity with which he declares it. "Renounce the Rhenish question," he has often said to me, "and I will aid you to gain in every direction all the satisfactions you may desire."

Bismarck was anxious to ascertain whether French policy would continue in the same direction as it had during the past year, and he accordingly wrote to Hohenlohe for information.⁸³ The latter interviewed Ferry and was convinced that the policy of France would undergo no change.⁸⁴ He therefore advised the chancellor that "[Ferry's] confidence in Your Highness' aims is unshaken, and he is far removed from the current mistrust here which causes Frenchmen of the

⁸⁰ Bourgeois and Pagès, 388.

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 388-389.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Grosse Politik, III, 441.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 442.

ordinary type to perceive everywhere the cunning plans and traps of German policy.”⁸⁵

However, the suspicion that Germany was leading France into a snare by urging her to further colonial conquests became greater and greater. During the debates upon the budget of the ministry of foreign affairs a senator exclaimed: “You do not need the support of deceitful Germany, who wishes to draw you into the Congo under the pretext of a worthless commercial freedom which will turn against you!”⁸⁶ In connection with French colonial enterprises elsewhere—Tonkin and Madagascar—similar warnings were given. Soon a minor incident at Tonkin was to put an end to the attempted rapprochement.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 443.

⁸⁶ Journal Officiel, 1885, Sénat, Ord., 242.

CHAPTER VII

THE RESULTS OF THE AFFAIR OF TONKIN

During the period from 1880 to 1885 France was engaged in establishing a large colonial empire, her statesmen successfully bringing under the control of the republic vast possessions in north and west Africa, Madagascar, and Tonkin. The acquisition of the latter territory, however, was effected with great difficulty. Napoleon III had gained a foothold in the region of Indo-China after a successful war with the emperor of Annam,¹ for by the treaties of 1862 and 1867 the latter ceded six provinces to France.² A further extension of French influence was made when a protectorate was assumed over Cambodia in August 1863.³ At the same time the desire of Frenchmen for new trade outlets made them active in opening the districts about the upper Mekong and Red Rivers.⁴ This caused difficulties with the mandarin of Tonkin,⁵ and in 1873 a French military force was sent to his capital at Hanoi for the purpose of conquering the delta of the Red River.⁶

The French government, however, considered dangerous the occupation of southeastern Tonkin, and accordingly arrangements were made for the evacuation of this territory.⁷ A protectorate treaty was concluded in April 1874 with the

¹ The empire of Annam occupied the greater part of the peninsula bounded by the Bay of Bengal and the China Sea.

² Henri Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, II, 257-261; Rambaud, 325.

³ Rambaud, 325; Norman D. Harris, *Europe and the East*, 352-354. Cambodia comprises the territory between the Mekong River and the Gulf of Siam.

⁴ Cordier, II, 261-265; Paul Deschanel, *La Question du Tonkin*, 37 ff. The Mekong rises in Tibet and flows southeasterly, emptying into the China Sea. The Red River has its source in the province of Yunnan and flows into the China Sea.

⁵ Harris, 356.

⁶ Rambaud, 325; Cordier, II, 267. Also see Jean Dupuis, *L'Ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au Commerce et les Événements du Ton-Kin, 1872-1873*.

⁷ Cordier, II, 267; Harris, 356-357; Rambaud, 325.

Annamite emperor whereby foreign affairs came under the control of France, and Annam was declared to be independent of all other foreign powers.⁸ But the events of the next five years indicated that the treaty was almost without effect. The emperor of Annam continued to pay tribute to Peking, he called upon China to put down a rebellion in Tonkin,⁹ the Red River was not opened to trade, and frequent massacres of Christians occurred.¹⁰ In view of this general disorder the French minister of marine and colonies suggested settling the question by definite action,¹¹ but nothing was done at the time.

China had never recognized the protectorate established by France over Annam, and November 10, 1880 the Chinese minister in Paris solicited information as to the relations between France and Tonkin.¹² Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, the French minister of foreign affairs, replied December 27 that the relations between the two countries were regulated by the treaty of March 15, 1874, and that France would fulfill the obligations arising out of it.¹³ The Chinese government delayed its reply, but September 24, 1881, Marquis Tseng, the Chinese minister in Paris, informed the French minister of foreign affairs that China would not recognize the treaty of 1874. At the same time, however, he invited France to come to an agreement with China in order to regulate the question satisfactorily.¹⁴ Gambetta, the new minister of foreign affairs, replied to this note January 1, 1882, claiming complete liberty of action for France in the affairs of

⁸ Livre Jaune, 1874-1882, *Affaires du Tonkin*, I, 1-10. The last provision was to put an end to the sovereignty claimed by China over Annam. The treaty was discussed by the national assembly August 4, 1874, and subsequently authorized the president to ratify the treaty. *Journal Officiel*, 1874, IV, 5576-5581.

⁹ By the treaty of March 9, 1874, France agreed to give military support upon the request of the emperor in order to secure his throne and to suppress piracy.

¹⁰ Livre Jaune, 1874-1882, *Affaires du Tonkin*, I, 29-117; Cordier, II, 285-290.

¹¹ Livre Jaune, 1874-1882, *Affaires du Tonkin*, I, 117-122.

¹² *Ibid.*, I, 158-159.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189.

Annam.¹⁵ Repeated protests were made by Marquis Tseng,¹⁶ but May 31 the French government replied that it had no explanations to offer China since the question concerned only France and Annam.¹⁷

The protectorate claimed by France over Annam remained incomplete, for the emperor still continued to send tribute to Peking¹⁸ and to employ irregular Chinese troops, known as "Black Flags," to prevent the navigation of the Red River.¹⁹ French travellers were annoyed by the latter action,²⁰ but in course of time the French garrison at Hanoi was able to establish its control over the lower delta of the Red River.²¹ The latter operations made necessary new credits for the ministry of marine and colonies, and May 15, 1883, Ferry²² introduced the required measures in the chamber of deputies. The government's policy in Tonkin was attacked by members of the Right, it being indicated that the proposed expedition was presented to the deputies under the same aspect as the undertaking in Tunis.²³ It was also asserted that France was committing a fatal error by scattering her military forces in foreign parts, for, in the event of war, not only would she weaken her continental resources, but also offer a larger field to the attacks of an enemy. France should concentrate her strength at home.²⁴ The government, however, successfully defended its measure, the deputies voting the new credits by a large majority.²⁵

Meanwhile the position of the French commander at Hanoi became more precarious. The Black Flags gradually

¹⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1874-1882, *Affaires du Tonkin*, I, 195-196.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 198-200, 212-213.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

¹⁸ Cordier, II, 309-310.

¹⁹ These troops were named after the standard they carried. H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, II, 348-349; Deschanel, chap. iii.

²⁰ *Livre Jaune*, 1874-1882, *Affaires du Tonkin*, I, 194-195.

²¹ Rambaud, 328; Harris, 358; Morse, II, 350.

²² The second ministry of Jules Ferry came into office February 21, 1883, with Challemeil-Lacour as minister of foreign affairs.

²³ *Journal Officiel*, 1883, *Chambre*, *Ord.*, II, 299.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

concentrated their forces near the capital, and finally their leader challenged the French to battle.²⁶ Rivière, the French commander, made a reconnaissance May 19, causing the Black Flags to begin an attack in which he and many of his men were killed.²⁷ This made the French government all the more anxious to hasten operations in Tonkin. The bill approved by the deputies May 15 was passed by the senate May 24,²⁸ and preparations were made to carry the war to a successful conclusion.²⁹ The minister of foreign affairs, however, was forced to defend his policy in parliament against the attacks of the Right and the Extreme Left. In the chamber of deputies the complaint was renewed that France ought not to disperse her forces in colonial enterprises,³⁰ and in the senate the government was accused of exceeding its powers by carrying on war without the consent of parliament.³¹ But in both instances Ferry was able to gain the consent of the legislative body for his program.³²

With the aid of military and naval reinforcements the French troops in Tonkin began taking possession of the Red River delta.³³ This caused the Annamites to seek peace, and August 25 the French commissioner to Tonkin signed a convention with the former's representative.³⁴ By this agree-

²⁶ Morse, II, 351, 474-475.

²⁷ Livre Jaune, 1882-1883, Affaires du Tonkin, II, 117, 157-158; Annual Register, 1883, p. 225; Le Siècle, 27 May 1883; Rambaud, 328; Cordier, II, 379-380.

²⁸ Journal Officiel, 1883, Sénat, Ord., I, 543-553.

²⁹ The government announced to the senate, July 2, that warships would be sent to Tonkin from Quiberon, Brest, and Corfu, and that military reinforcements would be obtained from Cochinchina and New Caledonia. Ibid., pp. 614-617.

³⁰ Ibid., Chambre, Ord., II, 1140. One speaker said: "Est-il dans l'intérêt de notre pays d'éparpiller ainsi nos forces sur tous les points du globe sans méthode, sans plan organisé, à l'aventure? la prudence ne nous commanderait-elle pas de nous replier sur nous-mêmes, de nous concentrer en vue d'éventualités qui peuvent se produire autour de nous?" Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., Sénat, Ord., I, 966-968.

³² Ibid., p. 969; Ibid., Chambre, Ord., II, 1159.

³³ Livre Jaune, 1883, Affaires du Tonkin, 7-11; Rambaud, 330-331; Cordier, II, 382-383, 386-387.

³⁴ Livre Jaune, 1882-1883, Affaires du Tonkin, II, 201; Cordier, II, 387.

ment the emperor of Annam acknowledged the protectorate of France over his territory, his foreign relations were to be controlled by France, the area of French Cochinchina was enlarged, Annamite troops were to be withdrawn from Tonkin, the customs and public works were brought under French control, and commercial privileges were secured for French merchants.³⁵ This convention brought the question of Annam nearer to solution, but more serious difficulties with China were soon to arise.

Throughout the closing months of 1883 the French and the Chinese governments endeavored to reach some agreement in respect of the suzerainty over Annam, but without success. Ferry announced October 31 that France intended to occupy several new positions on the delta of the Red River,³⁶ whereupon the Chinese minister in Paris informed him that Chinese troops were occupying those places and that a collision would be inevitable.³⁷ Notwithstanding this French troops continued their campaign against Chinese and Annamite forces during the early months of 1884.³⁸ Finally, May 11, 1884 France and China signed a preliminary convention whereby China recognized the protectorate of France over Tonkin and Annam. China also opened two of her provinces to French commerce, and France, on the other hand, renounced her claims upon China for a war indemnity.³⁹

The struggle in Tonkin involved large expenditures which gave rise to frequent attacks in parliament upon the government. Opposition to an adventurous colonial policy grew more acute as repeated credits were voted. Clémenceau and his colleagues of the Extreme Left excoriated the government's policy in the debates of October 30 and 31.⁴⁰ The radical

³⁵ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires du Tonkin*, II, 201-202; *Cordier*, II, 387-392.

³⁶ *Journal Officiel*, 1883, *Chambre*, Ext., 108-109.

³⁷ *Livre Jaune*, 1882-1883, *Affaires du Tonkin*, II, 256-257.

³⁸ *Rambaud*, 340-341; *Annual Register*, 1883, p. 227; *Ibid.*, 1884, pp. 369-371.

³⁹ *Livre Jaune*, 1884, *Affaires du Tonkin*, 5-7; *Journal des Débats*, 13 May 1884; *Cordier*, II, 435-436; *Rambaud*, 341-342.

⁴⁰ *Journal Officiel*, 1883, *Chambre*, Ext., 81-100, 102-123.

leader deplored the part taken by France in plundering other nations of their possessions, and begged the deputies to give greater heed to the European interests of France.⁴¹ Notwithstanding the concerted efforts of the Right and the Extreme Left, the Ferry ministry was sustained by a vote of confidence.⁴² Defeated, but undaunted, Clémenceau returned to the attack November 29⁴³ and December 10.⁴⁴ In the latter debate the alleged mania for colonies was again discussed and its effect upon military disorganization was indicated,⁴⁵ but the vote necessary to overthrow the cabinet could not be secured.⁴⁶ The government again had to defend itself in the chamber of deputies December 18,⁴⁷ and two days later in the senate.⁴⁸

The relations between France and Germany were not directly affected by the events in Tonkin, but the chancellor was only too glad to see the former sacrifice men and money in colonial pursuits.⁴⁹ He let no obstacles be placed in the way of France, bidding Hohenlohe to make it known in Paris that Germany would act loyally towards France and would allow nothing to turn her from neutrality in the event of a Sino-French war.⁵⁰ Bismarck soon gave proof of his benevolent neutrality. Several Chinese cruisers were being constructed in Germany, but the chancellor would neither allow a German crew to deliver them, nor permit the recruitment of sailors to perform the task.⁵¹ At the same time the Chinese minister in Berlin solicited German intervention in

⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 117-119.

⁴² Ibid., p. 123.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 519-523. Ferry was again sustained by a vote of confidence.

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 724-750.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 725.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 750.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 916-927.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Sénat, Ext., 1480-1492.

⁴⁹ Bismarck's personal physician noted in his journal under the date of January 8, 1884: "In Frankreich bessere sich die Stimmung jetzt. Er wünsche den Franzosen Siege in Tonkin und Madagaskar. Das befriedigte ihre Eitelkeit und hielte sie von der Revanche ab." Brauer-Marcks-Müller, 323.

⁵⁰ Hohenlohe, II, 348.

⁵¹ Daudet, 26-28.

the Tonkin dispute, only to be advised that China should settle her differences with France.⁵² Similar counsel was given by Hohenlohe to Marquis Tseng,⁵³ and Herbert Bismarck assured Ferry that Germany would do nothing contrary to the interests of France and would place herself at his disposal if he regarded her useful in the settlement of the dispute.⁵⁴

Meanwhile relations between France and China had grown more critical. In carrying out the evacuation provided for by the treaty of May 11 a misunderstanding arose between the French and Chinese troops,⁵⁵ resulting in the defeat of a French force in the battle of Baclé, June 23.⁵⁶ The French government presented an ultimatum to China demanding the immediate withdrawal of her troops from Tonkin and the payment of an indemnity of two hundred and fifty million francs.⁵⁷ China was not disposed to accept the latter demand, but offered to pay three million and a half francs to the families of the victims at Baclé.⁵⁸ After brief negotiations France took war measures. Kelung, an important harbor in Formosa, was bombarded August 4,⁵⁹ and three weeks later the Chinese fleet at Foochow was destroyed.⁶⁰ France did not consider herself to be at war with China, but regarded her measures an act of reprisal. Desultory warfare, however, continued throughout the closing months of 1884.

⁵² Daudet, 29. The chancellor in refusing a similar request for support is said to have remarked: "Wir stehen in zu kitzlichen Beziehungen zu Frankreich, um uns darauf einlassen zu können." Brauer-Marcks-Müller, 256.

⁵³ Daudet, 29-30.

⁵⁴ Grosse Politik, III, 437.

⁵⁵ Cordier, II, 449-460; Rambaud, 343-344; Morse, II, 354-355; Annual Register, 1884, p. 371.

⁵⁶ Livre Jaune, 1884, Affaires du Tonkin, 19-21; Rambaud, 343-344; Morse, II, 354-355; Annual Register, 1884, p. 371; Journal des Débats, 28 June 1884.

⁵⁷ Livre Jaune, 1884, Affaires du Tonkin, 34-35; Journal Officiel, 1884, Chambre, Ord., II, 1601-1602.

⁵⁸ Livre Jaune, 1884, Affaires du Tonkin, 76.

⁵⁹ Rambaud, 353; Morse, II, 356; Cordier, II, 474-475; Annual Register, 1884, p. 372; L'Année Politique, 1884, p. 218.

⁶⁰ Morse, II, 357-360; Rambaud, 353; Cordier, II, 505-508. Foochow is situated on the Min River in the province of Fukien.

The fear of drifting into war with China and the repeated demands for credits caused opposition to increase against the Ferry ministry. The government's policy with regard to China was attacked August 14 and 15 in the chamber of deputies,⁶¹ and August 16 in the senate.⁶² New credits meant repeated debates at the Palais Bourbon. Ferry was forced to defend his policy before the deputies October 20 and 21,⁶³ and November 24, 25, 26, and 27 the general policy of colonial expansion was again debated.⁶⁴ As usual the deputies spoke of the relation between colonies and continental politics, divulging the reasons that animated so many of them in their opposition to Ferry.

During the course of the debate November 25 a partisan of the government remarked: ⁶⁵

Is there any reason to lose sight of what is going on in the world because one looks towards the gap in the Vosges. . . . It is quite right to look towards the gap in the Vosges and not to forget that France is primarily a continental power; one must never forget this principle. However, sirs, one must face the reality of things and not delude oneself with vain dreams and chimerical illusions. Nobody threatens us in Europe and you threaten nobody! As for the sorrows which are in the heart of every Frenchman and which will remain there, we are obliged, willing or unwilling, to postpone reparation to the future. For . . . the person who, in the present state of affairs, would provoke a collision with a country which I do not care to mention, would be not only a madman but a criminal. Thus I find the present time suitable for restoring our colonial fortune to a certain degree.

While some believed a colonial policy not to be incompatible with future reparations, others did not think so. One speaker was of the opinion that the entente with Germany in colonial affairs would cause France to become estranged from her

⁶¹ Journal Officiel, 1884, Chambre, Ord., II, 1983-1996, 2000-2013.

⁶² Ibid., 1884, Sénat, Ord., II, 1473-1476.

⁶³ Ibid., Chambre, Ext., II, 2076-2079, 2088-2089.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 2443-2456, 2459-2475, 2479-2491, 2495-2509.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 2461. At the time it was thought that France and Germany had some agreement concerning Chinese affairs. "The belief that M. Jules Ferry has come to a general understanding with Prince Bismarck on the foreign policy of France and Germany is gaining ground. It is alleged that the Imperial Chancellor has agreed to allow the French Government *carte blanche* in the Far East, France, on her side, abandoning any claim to the ultimate recovery of Alsace-Lorraine." Galignani's Messenger, 22 September 1884.

natural allies, and would result in the loss of her liberty of action and independence.⁶⁶ Another deputy, after having read About's article of November 18⁶⁷ to his colleagues, concluded that "we ought to be extremely prudent in our colonial ambitions, and that as long as we are not put back again in possession of Alsace-Lorraine we ought not to think of remote conquests."⁶⁸ Clémenceau, who was always ready to reprobate Ferry's policy, returned to the attack, saying:⁶⁹

In scattering our forces to the four corners of the world, in squandering our money, and thus diminishing our strength of resistance you have condemned yourselves to undergo the attraction of a statesman who is at present the master of Europe. You have undergone this attraction, you know it well enough, and above all, you know why. . . . It plainly appears that in entering upon this colonial policy . . . you have placed yourselves in the situation of acting only with the consent of the person who is the master of peace and war in Europe. Oh! it is not necessary to give my words a meaning which they do not have. I am a partisan as much as you . . . of a policy of good understanding and good relations with all our neighbors, but one must safeguard one thing above all—the independence of our position.

He again warned his colleagues of Bismarck's friendship, and advised a return to the policy of peaceful seclusion.⁷⁰

After these lengthy debates the policy of Ferry was approved,⁷¹ but a minor event in Tonkin resulted in Clémenceau's triumph. Early in 1885 the French troops began a campaign having for its objective the strategic border city of Langson in northeastern Tonkin. The army was successful

⁶⁶ Journal Officiel, 1884, Chambre, Ext., II, 2450.

⁶⁷ Above, pp. 148-149.

⁶⁸ The following incident concerning Paul Déroulède, founder of the Ligue des Patriotes, illustrates a feeling which must have been prevalent in France.

"Jules Ferry reproche un jour ses ambitions de gloire militaire et son désir de revanche à Déroulède, et il lui insinue:

'Monsieur Déroulède, vous finirez par me faire croire que vous préférez l'Alsace-Lorraine à la France. Ne pensez-vous pas qu'il serait sage de sacrifier les provinces perdues et de prendre des compensations ailleurs?'

'C'est ça, réplique le patriote; j'ai perdu deux enfants, et vous, vous m'offrez vingt domestiques.'" Camille Ducray, Paul Déroulède, 150.

⁶⁹ Journal Officiel, 1884, Chambre, Ext., II, 2500-2501.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 2501.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 2507, 2509.

in its operations and towards the end of February the city was occupied,⁷² but the Chinese quickly repaired their losses and soon laid siege to Langson.⁷³ The French commander-in-chief was wounded in action March 28,⁷⁴ and his subordinate, fearing that the enemy greatly outnumbered his forces, gave an order to evacuate the city.⁷⁵ The news of this reverse reached Paris at an inopportune moment. Ferry had been bitterly assailed in the chamber of deputies March 26,⁷⁶ but further discussion was postponed to March 28. When the debate was resumed the ministry was accused of having waged war without the authorization of parliament,⁷⁷ and Ferry was denounced as being an obstacle to peace.⁷⁸ Clémenceau returned to his favorite theme—that of the European interests of France. He said:⁷⁹

Since 1870 we are a conquered people. We cannot forget it; we carry about with us constantly this thought which besets us, because it constitutes for the future a continual menace. We cannot forget that we are a people divided by revolutions and dismembered by a foreign war. We have to safeguard interests in Europe which are even the interests of civilization. I do not wish to develop this thought, that is useless, all of you understand me.

A vote of censure was rejected by the narrow vote of 217 to 246,⁸⁰ and the order of the day pure and simple was then passed by a small majority.⁸¹

On the evening of March 28 a despatch arrived announcing the reverse at Langson. Ferry did not give the full text to the newspapers, for public opinion was already very uneasy.⁸² March 30, however, the Paris press published the full

⁷² Cordier, II, 516-517; Rambaud, 359; Annual Register, 1885, p. 332.

⁷³ Cordier, II, 522; Rambaud, 359-360; Annual Register, 1885, p. 332.

⁷⁴ Journal des Débats, 30 March 1885; Cordier, II, 522.

⁷⁵ Rambaud, 360; Morse, II, 365; Annual Register, 1885, p. 332.

⁷⁶ Journal Officiel, 1885, Chambre, Ord., I, 671-672.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 684-687.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 690-692.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 694.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 696.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 697.

⁸² Annual Register, 1885, p. 206.

despatch.⁸³ The panic in Paris redoubled,⁸⁴ and a great crowd gathered at the Place de la Concorde and the Palais Bourbon to cheer the deputies who opposed the government.⁸⁵ Such a panic had not been witnessed since 1871.⁸⁶ The same day, March 30, Ferry introduced a bill in the chamber of deputies for a new credit of two hundred million francs for the Tonkin expedition.⁸⁷ The opposition that had formed against the ministry during the past two years gained the ascendancy. Clémenceau exclaimed: "There is no longer a ministry or ministers before me, they are criminals! They are accused of high treason, and if there exists in France a principle of responsibility and justice the hand of the law will not be long in falling upon them."⁸⁸ Ferry made an attempt to have the credit put to a vote, but in vain.⁸⁹ Thereupon he and his colleagues withdrew from the room,⁹⁰ the deputies closing the session with the cries of "Vive la République! Vive la France!"⁹¹ A large crowd followed the fallen minister from the Palais Bourbon to the Quai d'Orsay, shouting: "A bas le Prussien."⁹² Far into the night many surrounded the Palais Bourbon shouting: "A bas Ferry! A mort Ferry! A l'eau Ferry!"⁹³ The next day, March 31, Ferry formally tendered his resignation to President Grévy.⁹⁴

⁸³ Rambaud, 365.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Annual Register, 1885, p. 207; Journal des Débats, 31 March 1885.

⁸⁶ Nouvelle Revue, XXXIII, 657; Pierre Albin, *L'Allemagne et la France en Europe, 1885-1894*, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Journal Officiel, 1885, Chambre, Ord., I, 703.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 704.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 705.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 706.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Grosse Politik, VI, 129.

⁹³ Rambaud, 370. The Times, 31 March 1885, gives the following account of the ministerial resignation: "This news spread rapidly, cries were heard in all directions, from the entrances to the Chambers to the Place de la Concorde, of 'A bas Ferry!' 'A bas le Chinois!' 'A bas la quantité négligeable!'" A good account of the fall of Ferry's ministry and his subsequent unpopularity is given by Raymond Poincaré, "Jules Ferry," in *Revue Bleue*, fifth series, XV, 481-485.

⁹⁴ Journal Officiel, 1885, II, 1833-1834.

This period of French colonial expansion had come to an end.

A new ministry under Henri Brisson,⁹⁵ with Charles de Freycinet as minister of foreign affairs, concluded peace with China June 9, 1885.⁹⁶ The reaction against colonies had set in. No more colonial conquests. No more foreign expeditions.⁹⁷ Ferry—"le Tonkinois"—had forgotten the blue line of the Vosges.⁹⁸ Bismarck genuinely regretted the fall of the French statesman, and many years later⁹⁹ the chancellor confided to Lord Randolph Churchill that "if Jules Ferry had remained in power, a very good arrangement and condition would have come about between the Germans and the French."¹⁰⁰ To be sure, the friendly relations between France and Germany did not cease at once,¹⁰¹ but Bismarck grew more sceptical with regard to a Franco-German understanding against Great Britain. He wrote to Hohenlohe May 25:¹⁰²

I am of the opinion that in the Egyptian question no less than in the Congo question France will not have the courage to remain constant in the face of firm English opposition, and that fear of the revenge movement and its manifestation through the Opposition for the time being will prevent every government from seeking our firm support. A temporary agreement is therefore not to be rejected by us, but we cannot place any great reliance upon it; for at a critical moment mistrust against us will always be greater than anger with England. For this reason we must refrain from continuing to take the lead against England and being more French than the French. . . .

New complications in Europe also influenced the chancellor in his policy. The early months of 1885 were filled with rumors of an Anglo-Russian war arising out of the

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Rambaud, chap. xxv.

⁹⁷ Albin, 11.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ August 7, 1893. Ferry had died the previous March.

¹⁰⁰ Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 478.

¹⁰¹ A conference began in Paris, May 30, to draw up regulations concerning the free use of the Suez Canal. *Livre Jaune*, 1885, Commission Internationale pour le Libre Usage du Canal de Suez. The French and German governments were in agreement throughout the conference. *Grosse Politik*, III, 447-450.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 446.

difficulties in Afghanistan.¹⁰³ British statesmen were anxious to settle colonial differences with Germany, and Bismarck was ready to acquiesce.¹⁰⁴ The German chancellor warned the French ambassador May 28 that German policy would probably take a new course upon the death of the emperor, and indicated that the general tendency would be to comply with the wishes of Great Britain.¹⁰⁵ He said:¹⁰⁶

If our old emperor were preserved to us and if we could view the continuation of the present system of government nothing would be changed. I would guarantee you the same policy that we have followed thus far. But I desire . . . that there should be no misapprehension between us, and that you might have confidence in my word. I think that I ought to inform you because I have considered it honest and necessary always to indicate how far and how long we could go together. I advise you then to consider this eventuality in order to make certain arrangements with England. I do not think that it will pain M. de Freycinet to take this advice into account. Since he has been in the ministry it seemed to me that the action of your government was more lenient towards the English.

The fall of the Gladstone ministry in June 1885 and the formation of the Conservative government under Lord Salisbury¹⁰⁷ facilitated the restoration of good feelings between Germany and Great Britain. The new prime minister informed the German ambassador that "the governing principle of the Conservative party was to maintain and cherish

¹⁰³ Grosse Politik, IV, 111-128; Lyall, II, chap. iii; Freycinet, II, 300-303.

¹⁰⁴ Herbert Bismarck was sent to London in March, 1885, to bring about a settlement of colonial differences, and within a few days he succeeded in laying the basis for an understanding. Grosse Politik, IV, 100-107; The Spectator, LVIII, 341-342.

¹⁰⁵ Bourgeois and Pagès, 395-397.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 396. Freycinet replied to this despatch as follows: "La grave confiance que vous a faite le prince de Bismarck, . . . m'a moins surpris que vous ne paraissiez le croire. Depuis longtemps je m'étais dit que des circonstances étrangères à la France, parmi lesquelles la mort du vieil Empereur n'était pas la dernière à prévoir pouvait amener d'un jour à l'autre une brusque évolution de la politique allemande et un rapprochement subit de l'Empire avec l'Angleterre. Je connaissais de longue date les sympathies de la future impératrice pour son pays d'origine, son grand ascendant sur son époux, l'indépendance d'esprit avec laquelle le Chancelier change d'alliés; je comprenais dès lors combien il était dangereux pour la France d'accentuer une politique qui risquait, à un moment donné, de la placer seule en face de l'Angleterre hostile et de l'Europe indifférente, sinon malveillante." Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁰⁷ Annual Register, 1885, pp. 106-107; Buckle, III, 659 ff.

good relations with Germany" as had been the policy of Lord Beaconsfield.¹⁰⁸ Bismarck was very much pleased by this assurance,¹⁰⁹ which resulted in an interchange of letters with Lord Salisbury. The latter wrote to the chancellor: "I have asked . . . [von Plessen]¹¹⁰ to communicate to Your Highness my own convictions as to the future of English politics, which may aid you in forming a judgment, and perhaps may tend to restore the good understanding between the two countries which we value as of supreme importance, but which in recent times has been slightly clouded. I think you may reasonably count on a continuity of policy in this matter."¹¹¹ Bismarck replied: "As to politics I have not the slightest doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two dynasties as well as between the two nations will give a sufficient security for settling every existing or arising question in a conciliatory way."¹¹²

In France the anxiety caused by the events in Tonkin did not abate, becoming manifest during the electoral campaign from August until October.¹¹³ Ferry was still being hissed in public,¹¹⁴ his supporters were referred to as "Tonkinois,"¹¹⁵ and the press was indulging in chauvinistic articles.¹¹⁶ Bismarck despaired of a reconciliation with France. He remarked that "the good relations of the past two years have had less effect to secure us good will than to encourage turbulent minorities 'à la Déroulède'"¹¹⁷ in the belief that we

¹⁰⁸ Grosse Politik, IV, 131.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 131-132; Buckle, III, 682-683.

¹¹⁰ Ludwig Freiherr von Plessen was the first secretary of legation in London from 1884 to 1888.

¹¹¹ Grosse Politik, IV, 132.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 133.

¹¹³ Freycinet, II, 315.

¹¹⁴ Annual Register, 1885, p. 217.

¹¹⁵ Freycinet, II, 315.

¹¹⁶ The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of August 3, 1885, alluded to the chauvinistic agitation in France, and asserted that the efforts of Germany to cultivate good relations with France and to facilitate a policy of reconciliation had as yet no success. Grosse Politik, III, 451 note. Bismarck used this article as "ein Schachzug gegen die Hetzpolitik der kriegerischen Pariser Minoritäten und gegen die missbrauchliche Ausbeutung der Revanchephrasen bei den Wahlen." Grosse Politik, III, 451.

¹¹⁷ Paul Déroulède, a poet and soldier, was one of the founders

will accept every anti-German demonstration and bellicose speech; and that one can therefore put to good use, without paying any attention to us, the sensitive chord of revenge at the elections."¹¹⁸

Difficulties between Germany and Spain concerning the Caroline Islands¹¹⁹ further served to convince Bismarck that France would attack Germany at a favorable moment. With regard to the anti-German agitation in the French press he wrote to Hohenlohe:¹²⁰

The impression which the first appearance of the Spanish episode made upon Frenchmen of all parties has proved to us that the latter, however disorganized they might be otherwise, are all united in the intention to utilize the first favorable opportunity to break with Germany. Fifteen years of obliging treatment in every sphere of policy with the single exception of Alsace has not been able to effect change or moderation in this respect. The mistrust with which the French populace received our complaisance of many years, their openly favorable attitude towards the activity of the League of Patriots, the terrorism which the latter exercises upon public opinion by means of a press partially subventioned by public funds, the continuation of agitating influences upon the populace of the imperial provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, all are efficient causes which we cannot disregard and which would make it necessary to give thought to the security of the western frontier with the outbreak of a Hispano-German war.

Freycinet instructed Courcel to express his regrets that the German press doubted the loyalty of France in the Hispano-German controversy.¹²¹ The French ambassador then informed the German government that nothing lay closer to the heart of France than to retain and cherish the good relations that had been prepared the previous summer and autumn, and that Freycinet was determined to carry on the policy of his predecessors.¹²²

of the League of Patriots, an organization dedicated to the recovery of the lost provinces. Ducray, chap. viii; Florent Matter, Paul Déroulède, 33-34.

¹¹⁸ Grosse Politik, III, 451.

¹¹⁹ Germany established a protectorate over the Caroline Islands although suzerainty was claimed by Spain. Relations became strained and the German embassy in Madrid was attacked by the populace. The pope finally mediated between the two countries.

¹²⁰ Grosse Politik, III, 452.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 453.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 453-454.

Bismarck, however, was not reassured by this. The reports of the German representatives in Paris were also disquieting,¹²³ and the chancellor became convinced that France was maturing a policy of revenge.¹²⁴ German writers, for the most part, have accepted the view that after the fall of Ferry French statesmen inclined towards the parties advocating a policy of revenge and sought the support of Russia.¹²⁵ This, however, does not seem to have been the case.¹²⁶ Freycinet, the new minister of foreign affairs, was convinced that

¹²³ See the long despatch of the German military attaché in Paris in which the so-called "Revancheidee" is traced. *Grosse Politik*, VI, 127-131.

¹²⁴ Count Launay, the Italian ambassador in Berlin, reported his conversation of October 24, 1885, with Bismarck as follows: "Allo scopo di mantenere la pace egli aveva cercato, dal trattato di Versailles in poi, di rimanere in buoni termini con la Francia, di non ostracolarla nella sua politica di espansione in Tunisia, in Cina, nel Madagascar e sulla costa occidentale d'Africa. Le dava così qualche indennizzo, qualche soddisfazione d'amor proprio; ma le aveva anche fatto comprendere chiaramente che doveva rinunziare per sempre all'Alsazia. Seguendo lo stesso ordine di idee, egli era divenuto in certo modo, specialmente in Egitto, l'ausiliario degli interessi francesi. Ma i suoi sforzi erano stati sterili. La sua assiduità, la sua quasi servilità nel corso degli ultimi quindici anni, era stata una delusione. La Francia, nelle sue grandi correnti d'opinione pubblica, pensa sempre alla rivincita, e se la prende con tutti coloro che non partecipano ai suoi rancori. Essa ne ha data l'ultima prova nell'affare delle Caroline." Crispi, 129.

Several years later, June 8, 1887, Herbert Bismarck said in a conversation with Herbette, the French ambassador in Berlin: "Wir wären lange Zeit hindurch bemüht gewesen, Anknüpfungspunkte zu schaffen, um die deutsch-französische Beziehungen besser zu gestalten, hätten dafür aber keinerlei Dank oder Anerkennung von Frankreich geerntet: ich brauchte nur die Namen Tunis, Tonking, Madagaskar zu nennen und an den Ausgang des chinesischen Krieges zu erinnern: alle diese Namen bezeichneten ebenso viel gute Dienste, die wir Frankreich in der Hoffnung geleistet hätten dass die Franzosen schliesslich einsehen würden, wie sie grössere Interessen auf der Welt hätten, als die Wiedereroberung Elsassens, bei deren Verfolgung unsere Unterstützung ihnen von Nutzen sein konnte. Die Erwartung, dass die loyale Haltung, welche wir seit dem Abschluss des Krieges Frankreich gegenüber beobachtet hätten, dazu führen würde, den Chauvinismus zu mindern und das Revanche-geschrei verstummen zu lassen, habe sich aber nicht erfüllt." *Grosse Politik*, VI, 194-195.

For further information see the chancellor's review of Franco-German relations in his famous address to the reichstag January 11, 1887. Die Politischen Reden des Fürsten Bismarck, XII, 184-196.

¹²⁵ Otto Hamman, *Der Neue Kurs*, 38; Ernst zu Reventlow, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888-1914*, p. 3.

¹²⁶ A very unbiased account is given in Plehn, 216.

France was gaining nothing substantial from German friendship, and he accordingly sought to resume good relations with Russia and with Great Britain.¹²⁷ He was successful in doing this, but he did not fully realize his policy until 1892. He was also anxious to remain upon friendly terms with Germany, but the relations between the two countries were not as intimate as they had been since the Congress of Berlin. The rise of Boulanger and the Schnaebele incident, important events in the history of Franco-German relations, were not far distant.

¹²⁷ Freycinet, II, 297-299, 306-307.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The fall of the second French Empire marked the end of French predominance in Europe, and witnessed the beginning of German hegemony. Having succeeded in unifying Germany and obtaining the boundaries he desired, Prince Bismarck set about securing the results achieved by the war. His primary object was to have the new order of things acknowledged by the European powers, and to keep France in a state of isolation. France, on the other hand, virtually withdrew from European affairs. Under the leadership of Thiers her entire energy was devoted to paying the war indemnity as rapidly as possible, but no sooner was this accomplished than she was plunged into party strife. Bourbon, Orleanist, and Bonapartist claimants struggled to regain the throne of France, while Thiers and his supporters endeavored to establish a conservative republic. In this contest the German government desired the latter to prevail, for it was generally believed that a "red republic" would be less capable of contracting a European alliance than a monarchy, and that internal dissension would be a source of weakness.

With the overthrow of Thiers and the subsequent election of MacMahon the German government feared that its own position was endangered, believing that the advent of a conservative Catholic government was but the first step towards a monarchical restoration. Such a change might, indeed, have made the success of German policy problematical. Bismarck was of the opinion that such a government would ally itself with the Holy See—endangering the *Kulturkampf*—and then seek alliances with the Catholic states of Europe or with Russia. In order to prevent this the German chancellor made it his policy to cultivate friendly relations with Russia, Austria, and Italy. Although he succeeded in doing this, he still remained suspicious of the conservative ministry in France. The affair of 1875 and the eastern question served

to bring France into the European concert again, still further subjecting the chancellor to the "nightmare of coalitions." In the end he concluded that there could be no friendly relations between France and Germany as long as a monarchical-ultramontane ministry remained in power in the former country.

The renewal of friendly relations between the two countries was made possible when MacMahon was forced to summon to power a ministry that was inclined towards a conservative republic. The removal of Gontaut-Biron from Berlin, the unofficial participation of Germany in the Paris exposition, and the conduct of France at the Congress of Berlin, served to inaugurate a period of better relations. Notwithstanding this, the chancellor continued his efforts to isolate France effectively. The Austro-German alliance of 1879 removed the danger of a Franco-Austrian agreement, and the renewal of the *Dreikaiserbündnis* in 1881 lessened the possibility of a Franco-Russian entente. At the same time Bismarck urged the French government to seek compensation for the losses sustained by the Treaty of Frankfurt in colonial expansion. This, according to the belief of the Germans, would serve to remove from France the desire for a war of revenge; and at the same time force her to weaken her continental position by expending men and money in distant enterprises. In the second place, such activity would bring about the impairment of friendly relations with other countries. For these reasons the German chancellor supported France at the Madrid conference in 1880, and assisted her in 1881 to secure a protectorate over Tunis.

Bismarck also considered it a part of his policy to foster good accord between France and Great Britain. He was upon friendly terms with the Conservative ministry in the latter country, and thought that the best method by which to prevent a Franco-Russian rapprochement was to keep France in good relations with a power hostile to Russia. When, however, the Gladstone ministry came to power in 1880, Bismarck hurried to strengthen Russo-German relations in order

to prevent Great Britain forestalling him in that direction. Thus he was able to keep France and Great Britain in good accord, while he succeeded in preventing an alliance between Paris and St. Petersburg. This policy was especially evident in Germany's attitude with regard to the Egyptian question, and it was not altered until 1884.

The most intimate period of Franco-German relations existed during the second ministry of Jules Ferry, February 1883 to March 1885. The latter recognized that France would be unable to gain immediate reparation from Germany for the losses sustained in 1871, so he was ready to profit by German support to win a huge colonial empire for France. It appears that Bismarck and the critics of Ferry erred in supposing that colonies would weaken France, for as years went by they proved to be a valuable asset to her. This intimacy between France and Germany was due in large part to their respective grievances against Great Britain. The latter had arrogated to herself the right to settle the Egyptian question after 1882, and had opposed German expansion on the west coast of Africa. As a result of the latter incident Bismarck proposed that France and Germany should concert measures to check the pretensions of Great Britain. Thus the two countries arranged the Berlin conference on the Congo question, November 1884 to February 1885, from which meeting France emerged with additional territory in west Africa. In the same manner France enjoyed the assistance of Germany in settling the financial problems of Egypt. Neither Bismarck nor any responsible French statesman contemplated contracting an alliance, but merely sought specific cases in which the two countries could go forward together.

In this manner France built up a vast colonial empire, adding Tunis, Madagascar, Tonkin, and a part of west Africa to her colonial possessions. At the time many persons believed that France was weakening her continental position by such undertakings, and in France the parties of the Right and Extreme Left attacked this expansive colonial policy.

They constantly represented the sad plight of France in the event of a general European war, and frequently alluded to the motives of Bismarck in supporting France in her colonial ventures. This continued in both the senate and the chamber of deputies throughout the entire period under discussion. Finally, under the influence of the misfortune suffered at Langson, the deputies repudiated the policy of Ferry. When the latter retired from office he was succeeded by a ministry unfriendly to colonial expansion, hence one of the main bases for a Franco-German entente was destroyed. Then, too, the general diplomatic situation in Europe began to change in the early part of 1885. Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia became more bitter in that year, and the newly formed Conservative ministry under Lord Salisbury was anxious to settle outstanding differences with Germany. With her colonial disputes settled, Germany had no reason further to antagonize Great Britain by supporting France, thus destroying another basis for a Franco-German understanding.

The entente between France and Germany did serve to pacify Europe to a great degree, for Franco-German rivalry had been considered one of the most disturbing factors upon the continent. It gave Germany an opportunity to assuage the injured feelings of France—in keeping with the former's policy of peace, and it allowed France to gain colonies without having to fear serious difficulties with other countries, whose objections were largely unheeded as long as Germany would do nothing to restrain France. Again, the good understanding between the two powers aided materially in bringing about the pacific settlement of numerous problems which arose between 1878 and 1885. In all, this period of Franco-German relations is of interest because it contrasts greatly with the years immediately preceding it, and the years that followed, illustrating the principle that national antipathies can be overcome in the pursuit of policies of mutual interest.

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